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Abstract 
 
 
During the last decade there has been intense controversy over the nature of 
contemporary armed conflicts and their connection with religion, ethnicity, crime and 
natural resources. Central to the discussion is the question of why armed 
organisations use violence against civilians. Recent contributions underscore the self-
interested behaviour of individuals and suggest that war, violence and collaboration 
are increasingly driven by personal ambitions rather than political goals. Combatants, 
warlords and politicians seem less interested in victory than in satisfying their lust for 
power and money, usually at the expense of the population; meanwhile, fearful but 
rational civilians try to exploit the opportunities that conflict throws up, engaging in 
individualistic alliances with armed organisations and even prompting the use of 
violence against their fellows. These trends, it is argued, are compounded by 
the convergence between crime and warfare, and the Colombian conflict is often 
cited as a typical example. This dissertation examines these claims by studying a 
recent outbreak of violence against civilians in the Middle Magdalena Valley, in 
Colombia, that left nearly 2,000 civilians dead and more than 110,000 people 
forcefully displaced. Based on data obtained from official and unofficial sources on 
conflict and violence, interviews with key informants and news reports, the 
dissertation argues that violence was used by armed organisations and, to a lesser 
extent, by the state, to extend and strengthen the territorial and political control they 
had over the region. Despite the salience of illegal economies, there is no evidence 
that economic motives have significantly contributed to the production of violence. 
Furthermore, civilian collaboration went beyond the narrow sphere of private 
interests as politicians, parties and social organisations took part in alliances with 
armed organisations and aimed to advance the interests of the social groups they 
represented. The dissertation thus challenges common misconceptions and influential 
contributions in the field of armed conflict and political violence; it also sheds light 
on the nature of the Colombian conflict. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Violence against civilians has been a common feature of wars throughout history, 
but it has become especially notorious, in terms of scale and cruelty, in recent 
conflicts and episodes of political turmoil. Although its salience is, perhaps, partly 
caused by the unprecedented attention given to humanitarian crises by the media, 
international agencies and NGOs, it has been argued that there is, in effect, an actual 
increase in the victimisation of civilians in the context of contemporary wars (e.g. 
Kaldor 1999: 8, 100). Indeed, in recent armed conflicts large numbers of civilians 
have been killed, tortured, displaced, forcefully recruited and, in general, subjected 
to a wide range of abuses, universally regarded as morally unacceptable. In Sudan, 
humanitarian agencies put the number of civilians forcibly displaced until January 
2009 at 2.6 million; in Colombia, the official figure approached the 3 million.1 
Meanwhile, in Gaza and northeast Sri Lanka, civilians recently came under attack as 
government troops employed heavy artillery in attempts to crush insurgents who 
sometimes used them as human shields and who, in turn, have perpetrated repeated 
terrorist attacks against Israeli and non-Tamil civilians, respectively. Likewise, Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Pakistan have seen notorious increases in the civilian death tolls in 
recent years in the context of sectarian violence. The civilian death tolls in these 
crises, however, are dwarfed by Iraq’s, which was close to 100,000 by early 2009, 
according to Iraq Body Count. 
 
Attempts to prevent and outlaw violence against civilians can be dated back at least 
to Ancient Greece. Attempts to explain it, however, are fairly recent, as scholars 
have usually looked at these phenomena with more moral revulsion than intellectual 
curiosity. Often, the issue has been merely touched upon to illustrate the 
consequences of war in the context of broader enquiries or subsumed into wider 
analyses about the causes of conflict and political violence in general, with little 
                                                
1 Data obtained from the United Nations Sudan Information Gateway (http://www.unsudanig.org) and 
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attention to its nature (e.g. selective, indiscriminate, ‘collateral’) and to the relation 
between its forms and purpose (e.g. killings, forced displacement, kidnappings). 
However, more recently debates on the changing nature of contemporary warfare 
have encouraged scholars to address the specific issue of violence against civilians in 
a more systematic way. Moreover, the recent comeback of counterinsurgency as a 
critical issue in the political and military agenda of the West is likely to spur further 
interest in the subject, as the role of civilians as victims but also as sources of 
manpower, resources and legitimacy for armed organisations acquires critical 
importance.2 
 
Predictably, the fundamental debate in the emerging literature on violence against 
civilians in wars concerns its causes. Inevitably, this debate relates to a larger 
discussion on the nature of contemporary wars and to the issue of ‘what are they 
about’. If violence is deliberate, and most authors assume it is, then it should be 
instrumental in achieving the warring factions’ ultimate goals but, as Ch. 1 shows, 
they are not always self-evident and the nature of warfare is not necessarily clear. 
While most contemporary wars are unconventional, it is unclear whether they fit the 
standard model of irregular warfare—where insurgents use guerrilla tactics against a 
superior army in an attempt to establish a new government or claim sovereignty over 
a given territory—or if other goals, economic or political, are being pursued and war 
and disorder merely provide the ideal environment to accomplish them, as is the case 
of the so-called ‘new wars’. Depending on the scenario, violence against civilians 
assumes different forms and is used with different rationales. 
 
Since these rationales are unobservable, researchers have focused on formulating 
testable hypotheses about the determinants of violence and the mechanisms that 
shape its intensity, spatial distribution and forms. This dissertation goes precisely in 
that direction: it uses quantitative and qualitative data and methods to explain and 
lay out the processes by which violence against civilians is produced in the context 
of an armed conflict.  
 
                                                
2 American Defence Secretary, Robert Gates has highlighted the urgency of developing the 
counterinsurgency capabilities of the American army (2009). Worried about the failures in Iraq, 
military analysts had been working on developing new approaches to tackle insurgencies more 
effectively, while protecting civilians, since the Bush administration (Gordon 2006). 
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To this effect, it focuses on a recent outbreak of violence against civilians in the 
Middle Magdalena River Valley, in Colombia. During most of the twentieth century 
radicalism and political violence thrived in the Middle Magdalena Valley. Social and 
economic conflicts, ideological influences and the weak presence of the government, 
all contributed to the emergence of insurgent groups that challenged the state and 
private militias, known as paramilitaries, that employed violence recklessly to 
protect their sponsors, including drug bosses, from the threats posed by the 
insurgency. The roots of this state of affairs are discussed in detail in Ch. 3; for the 
moment, it suffices to note that by the mid-1990s both insurgent and paramilitary 
organisations were stronger and bolder in their actions in the Middle Magdalena 
Valley and, in general, across the country. Indeed, during the late 1990s and early 
2000s, the intensity of armed conflict in Colombia reached levels not seen since the 
1950s; and different sources have shown a sharp peak in ‘political homicides’ or 
conflict-related killings during this period (Restrepo et al. 2004b; Gutierrez et al 
2007). 
 
In the Middle Magdalena Valley, the intensification of armed conflict and violence 
from 1996 to 2004 left a death toll close to 1,000 combatants and 2,000 civilians; 
according to official data, more than 110,000 peopled fled their homes during the 
same period as a direct effect of armed conflict—approximately an eighth of the total 
population of the region. This dissertation addresses the question of what caused 
such levels of violence against civilians in the region during this period. Taking a 
critical approach on the existing knowledge on the subject, it puts to test some of the 
hypotheses, concepts and methods developed by scholars in recent years, thus 
making a contribution to the theoretical debates in the field and to the discussion on 
the nature of the Colombian conflict. 
 
In response to the question, the dissertation argues that violence against civilians was 
used by armed organisations and to a lesser extent by the state, to extend and 
strengthen the territorial and political control they had over the region. Despite the 
salience of the illegal economies, there was no evidence that economic motives have 
led to the production of violence. Thus, by contrast with conventional wars, violence 
and coercion against civilians were deliberate, not a side effect of armed conflict; 
and, unlike ‘new wars’ they could not be explained with reference to identity politics 
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or ‘greed’.  
 
Based on this finding, the dissertation tackles a second debate that concerns the role 
of civilians in armed conflict and, in particular, its involvement in the production of 
violence against other civilians. The standard model of irregular warfare assumed 
that civilian collaboration resulted from political and ideological sympathy and could 
be nurtured through indoctrination; however, scholars have highlighted the selfish 
behaviour of civilians and their determination not only to survive the war but also to 
take advantage whenever possible, even if the lives of their fellows are at stake. In 
this context, civilian collaboration is shaped by fear, expectations about changes in 
territorial control and alliances with armed organisations. Indeed, it has been 
suggested that opportunistic civilians play a crucial role in the production of violence 
by accusing their own foes and rivals of collaboration with the enemy, in the hope 
that this will prompt selective attacks against them. 
 
The dissertation supports the view that civilian collaboration is based on alliance 
rather than allegiance: when it comes to providing support for an armed organisation, 
civilians seem less interested in long-term social change than in improving their 
chances of survival and their living conditions in the immediate future. However, it 
challenges the notion that alliances can further only the private interests of 
individuals and shows how politicians, parties and social organisations may enter as 
partners in such alliances and shape them in ways that are, at least to some extent, 
beneficial to the interests of the social groups they represent. While this view of 
civilian collaboration is distinctly political (in the sense that it involves the 
aggregation and articulation of interests and the making and negotiation of claims 
vis-à-vis the state), it does not support the naïve assumption that insurgencies 
necessarily represent the popular interest. 
 
These findings have important implications for other debates. First, they challenge 
the assumption that crime and politics are antagonistic by nature, taken for granted in 
many contributions on the nature of contemporary wars, as they show how the 
involvement of armed organisations in criminal activities does not mean that they are 
less willing or able to pursue political ends or engage in political activities. Second, 
they cast new light on the nature of the Colombian conflict and question the view 
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that it is plainly criminal or just ‘about nothing’. In particular, they show the 
connection between the struggle for territorial control and the political ambitions of 
armed organisations and highlight the paradoxical role of the drug trade in the 
conflict. They also show how, despite its illegal nature, the merger between 
paramilitary groups and drug mafias was, ultimately, helpful in defusing the threat 
posed by the insurgency to the state, regional elites and companies, at a fraction of 
its actual cost. 
  
Compared to other recent contributions to the field, this dissertation displays several 
methodological strengths: first, it relies on detailed data on armed conflict and takes 
into consideration different forms of violence and coercion against civilians used by 
armed organisations—not only lethal violence, as most contributions do. This is an 
important innovation because some forms of violence are just as effective in terms of 
military advantage as killings and nearly as harmful in terms of devastating civilian 
lives and livelihoods. In the particular case of the Middle Magdalena Valley (and 
Colombia, for that matter), kidnappings and forced displacement have been widely 
employed by armed organisations and cannot be overlooked in any attempt to gauge 
the impact of armed conflict on the population. As a second innovation, it explores 
how armed organisations target people from different social groups and classes; the 
differences, it turns out, are negligible and suggest that the use of violence against 
civilians by armed organisations reflects in a limited way the underlying social and 
economic conflicts in the region. A third innovation is the combined use of 
quantitative and qualitative methods and data, discussed in detail in Ch. 2. 
 
The dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 1 identifies and discusses different 
approaches to the debate on the causes of violence and coercion against civilians in 
the context of contemporary armed conflicts. It also provides a brief review of the 
contributions that tackle this issue with specific reference to the Colombian conflict; 
these reflect, to some extent, the lines of argument seen in the international, 
comparative literature.  
 
Chapter 2 describes and discusses the methods and sources used to address the 
research question, highlighting their virtues and limitations and describing the 
challenges found in the process and the way they were tackled. In particular, it 
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shows how despite their limitations and biases, the datasets used in this work 
enabled us to gauge with precision the intensity of conflict and the magnitude and 
spatial distribution of different forms of violence against civilians. It also discusses 
the rationale that led to study one particular region rather than the whole country or 
only a town or a village.  
 
Chapter 3 traces the emergence and evolution of the armed organisations existing in 
the region during the period of study and identifies some of the conditions that led to 
disorder and insecurity, outlining the crucial social conflicts during the last century 
and discussing the role of the state in the process. It also provides a brief summary 
about the situation of political violence in the first half of the 1990s, just before the 
period of the study. 
 
Chapter 4 provides the reader with a general and yet precise idea of the magnitude 
and outcomes of armed conflict in the region from 1996 to 2004 and its impact on 
civilians, exploring several forms of violence (killings, kidnappings and forced 
displacement) and the way their ‘users’ employed them. The key contribution of this 
chapter to the main argument results from the cross-sectional regression analyses, 
aimed to establish the determinants of different forms of violence and coercion. 
Overall, they suggest that the use of violence by the warring factions was mainly 
aimed to shape civilian collaboration and expand and consolidate territorial and 
political control over the region, rather than to purely economic ends. In that sense, it 
fits better into the standard model of irregular warfare than into the ‘new war’ 
narrative and other alternative approaches to contemporary warfare. 
 
Following this line of enquiry, Chapter 5 tests the most sophisticated model of 
violence as an instrument of territorial control, developed by Kalyvas (2006). 
According to this model, the levels of violence used by each faction depend on the 
levels of territorial control they have reached and civilian collaboration is based on 
‘alliance’ rather than on allegiance, that is, on self-interested cooperation rather than 
on loyalty or sympathy towards a cause. It is precisely through these alliances that 
civilians end up playing a substantial role in the production of violence and shaping 
the spatial distribution of selective violence. The model is tested using data from the 
urban area of Barrancabermeja, the largest town in the Middle Magdalena Valley but 
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the results corroborate the model only in a limited sense: while they confirm that 
violence was used by armed organisations to expand and consolidate territorial 
control, they suggest that political control was equally important. Furthermore, they 
show that civilians do not necessarily play a crucial role in the selection of targets of 
lethal violence, as the model predicted.  
 
Chapter 6 confirms the importance of alliances as a crucial mechanism in shaping 
civilian collaboration and explaining violence against civilians. It does so by 
illustrating the efforts of the state and armed organisations in consolidating and 
expanding territorial and political control in south Bolivar, a rural, isolated zone in 
the region. It also shows how armed organisations developed alliances with local 
elites and organisations, promoting social mobilisation and building constituencies to 
advance and legitimise their struggle and secure political control. Thus, despite their 
distinct nature, violence and alliances are complementary components of the relation 
between armed organisations and civilians and key elements of their strategies to 
increase territorial and political control. 
 
Chapter 7 integrates the findings and arguments put forward in previous chapters, 
adding new evidence and suggesting a framework that shows how armed 
organisations and the state may use a variety of means, including violence against 
civilians, to achieve territorial and political control. The chapter also discusses the 
implications of the findings in the context of the existing literature on armed conflict 
and violence, focusing on aspects such as the notion of alliance and its importance in 
understanding civilian collaboration; the merger between crime and warfare and its 
effect on the scale and forms of violence against civilians; and the limits and 
possibilities of methodological individualism in developing theories of armed 
conflict and violence. 
 
Two caveats must be made at this point. First, this work does not attempt to explain 
the origins of violence or political violence in general; it is focused, exclusively, on 
those forms of violence and coercion used against civilians in the context of armed 
conflict. Accordingly, and to avoid wordiness, the term ‘violence’ is used in the text 
in a narrow sense, to refer to situations in which state and armed organisations 
physically harm civilians or use the threat of violence against them in the context of 
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armed conflict. In the few occasions when the term ‘violence’ is used in a broader 
sense (e.g. political violence), it is explicitly signalled in the text. This narrow usage 
reflects the boundaries of the subject of study and is mostly a matter of economy of 
words rather than anything else.  
 
Second, this work does not intend to find the culprits of the crimes alluded in its 
pages, or to cast moral judgements on their perpetrators; rather, it is concerned with 
understanding the conditions made them possible as well as the rationale behind the 
use of violence by armed organisations. At times, the discussions presented 
throughout this work may seem cynical and the memory of the victims reduced to 
nothing but cold statistics. While the author cannot but unreservedly condemn all the 
crimes and abuses mentioned in this work, he takes the view that, when it comes to 
preventing their occurrence, understanding their causes and the processes that led to 
such outcomes is just as important as voicing our disapproval.3  
 
 
  
                                                
3 As Bauman (1989: 88) put in reference to research on the Holocaust, ‘much more is involved in 
such a study than the tribute to the memory of murdered millions, settling the account with the 
murderers and healing the still-festering moral wounds of the passive and silent witnesses. Obviously, 
the study itself, even a most diligent study, is not a sufficient guarantee against the return of mass 
murderers and numb bystanders. Yet without such a study, we would not even know how likely or 
improbable such a return may be’. 
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1. VIOLENCE, ARMED CONFLICT AND TYPES OF 
WARFARE—A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
“Man’s greatest good fortune is to chase and 
defeat his enemy, seize his total possessions, leave 
his married women weeping and wailing, ride his 
gelding [and] use the bodies of his women as a 
nightshirt and support.”  
 
- Gengis Khan (Keegan 1993: 189) 
 
 
Violence against harmless, unarmed people has been an essential feature of wars 
throughout history, as the words of Khan, cited above remind us. From the 
Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) to the English chevauchées (1339-1380) to the 
French Revolutionary Wars (1791-1802) and the bombings of Hamburg and 
Hiroshima (1943 and 1945, respectively) history provides several examples of 
widespread violence against people not involved directly, or even remotely, in the 
waging of war (Grimsley and Rogers 2002).4 Furthermore, several genocides have 
been connected with wars, including the Armenian genocide, during WWI, and the 
Holocaust, to mention just two (Shaw 2003: 41-9). 
 
Similarly, norms restricting the targets of warfare can be traced back to the Greeks, 
for whom ‘war is an affair or warriors [and] non-combatants should not be the 
primary targets of attack’ (Ober 1994: 13).5 In the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church 
pushed forward moral norms aimed to protect the clergy and the poor in wartime and 
prevent violence among Christians in general, not least because these ‘unprotected 
                                                
4 King Edward III launched several campaigns, chevauchées, aimed to destroy French villages and 
towns during the Hundred Years’ War as a way to incite a sometimes ‘battle-shy opponent’—Philip 
VI— and destroy the economic base of the Valois monarchy (Rogers 2002). In the dawn of the 
French First Republic, the revolutionary army resorted to violence and coercion on Belgian and 
German civilians—plunder, forced labour and repression—as a way to sustain itself and punish bands 
of peasants who tried to resist the occupation (Blanning 2000). 
5 However, during the Peloponnesian War, social and political change in Athens led to a breakdown 
in the pre-existing mode of warfare and also in the rules of war: ‘non-combatants were increasingly 
the targets and victims of strategies based on social disruption and destruction of economic resources’ 
(Ober 1994: 23). 
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classes’ were a source of income for the Church (Cowdrey 1970: 48). Furthermore, 
in feudal times, the business of war was increasingly restricted to the nobility and 
thus ‘peasants and townsmen ought not to fight all [as] it was the job of knights to 
protect (and exploit) these non-combatant pauperes’ (Stacey 1994: 30). Notably, 
these norms and unwritten codes predate the notion of human rights. 
 
The current approach regarding the distinction between combatants and non-
combatants, and the differential treatment granted to them, emerged in the late 
nineteenth century and was first delineated in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 
1907. It was developed in a more explicit way in the Geneva Convention IV of 1949, 
‘relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war’, and the Additional 
Protocols I and II of 1977. The distinction belongs to a set of principles and rules 
known as jus in bello, which aim to prevent any ‘unnecessary suffering’ in the 
conduct of war. In particular, it aims to restrict violence to those who represent a 
threat, granting ‘immunity’ to the ‘harmless’ or, at least, trying to minimise the 
damage inflicted on them (Detter 2000: 166; Coates 1997: 235; Green 2000: 106). 
 
In legal terms, the status of combatant is currently granted to those who, in the 
context of warfare, (i) belong to a hierarchical structure, (ii) have a ‘fixed distinctive 
sign recognisable at a distance’ and (iii) carry arms openly ‘during each military 
engagement’ or during the period previous to such engagements. Of these criteria, 
the two latter are perhaps the more easily verifiable in the field; however, they ‘are 
still vague and difficult to apply in practice’ (Detter 2000: 135-148).  
 
By contrast, civilians comprise those ‘who never take part in the hostilities’ but also 
those who, having been combatants, are ‘at some stage, hors de combat and no 
longer take part in the hostilities’ (ibid: 317). Under the law of war any forms of 
‘violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons’, as well as 
collective punishments, taking of hostages, acts of terrorism, degrading treatments, 
rape, enforced prostitution, slavery, pillage or threats against civilians are forbidden 
(Detter 2000: 319). 
 
Coercion and violence against civilians has been a recurrent topic in the academic 
literature in recent years, as the interest in contemporary conflicts soared, as 
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reflected in the increasing number of publications on the subject.6 This interest 
reflects the perception of an increasing victimisation of civilians in the context of 
war during the twentieth century, often summarised in the claim that up to 85 
percent of the fatal victims in recent conflicts are civilians (e.g. Kaldor 1999: 100; 
Cairns 1997: 17). The impact on civilians is compounded by the fact that these wars 
tend to be protracted: of the 26 intra-state conflicts active in 2003, only five started 
after 1993 and twelve had been active for two or more decades (Eriksson and 
Wallensteen 2004). 
 
However, the interest in the manifestations of violence against civilians is often 
merely rhetorical in that they are used to illustrate the ‘horrors of war’ in the context 
of discussions related to other aspects of armed conflicts (e.g. its causes), thus giving 
the impression that such manifestations do not need to be explained as if they were a 
mere by-product or a symptom of wars. As Kalyvas put it, ‘fascination and detail 
abound, but sound theoretical understanding is in short supply’ (2006: 34). Similarly, 
there is a tendency to conflate several forms of violence, as if their motivations and 
consequences were the same. 
 
Having said this, there is growing number of contributions to the understanding of 
violence and coercion on civilians in the context of wars. Scholars interested in the 
motives and means of such conflicts have addressed the issue, not always in a 
systematic way but, nonetheless, providing insights on the broad motivations behind 
it. Moreover, an increasing number of scholars have tackled the question in an 
explicit and more systematic way, suggesting hypotheses and models to explain such 
violence and, in some cases, backing their findings with evidence, usually from case 
studies. Furthermore, there is a strand of literature that, despite not being academic, 
has enormous importance. It consists of manuals and other writings produced by 
political leaders or official agencies setting up doctrines and rules on the strategic 
and tactical aspects of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Although rarely based on 
evidence, some of them have been actually used on the field and in this sense they 
provide hints on the possible rationales behind specific phenomena. 
                                                
6 Approximately 76 percent of the books and journal articles referenced in the IBSS database 
including the terms ‘war’ or ‘conflict’ in the title were published after 1990. The corresponding 
figures for terms such as ‘economic’ or ‘politics’ were in the range of 46 to 67 percent. 
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Drawing on this body of knowledge, it is possible to identify three possible sets of 
explanations for the use of violence against civilians—associated with the three 
dominant forms of warfare after WWII: conventional, irregular and the ‘new wars’ 
warfare. These explanations are presented in the first three sections of the chapter; 
the fourth focuses on contributions regarding contemporary violence against 
civilians in the Colombian armed conflict. Based on this review, the last section 
shows how the dissertation tackles key research challenges and shortcomings in the 
current literature. 
 
 
1.1 Conventional warfare 
 
Perhaps the simplest explanation of violence against civilians is that it is an 
unintended, side effect of proper warfare—a negative ‘externality’ of war caused by 
technical miscalculations in the planning and execution of military operations or 
malfunctioning of weapons. This view is particularly suited to explain civilian 
casualties in conventional wars, that is, in conflicts involving open, large-scale 
confrontations (‘battles’) between relatively symmetric armies with a well-defined 
‘front’. Symmetry, in this context, refers to aspects such as size, equipment and 
organisation. Moreover, in conventional warfare, the parties display an ostensible 
level of sophistication in all of these aspects, reflecting the fact that the armies are 
formally organised and war is conducted by professionals and fought using the most 
appropriate technology and manpower. Furthermore, the ‘front’ that separates them 
is well defined and can be drawn in a map, its changes reflecting the struggle 
between the parties (Janos 1963; Harkavy and Neuman 2001). Some instances of 
predominantly conventional wars after WWII include the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) 
and several confrontations within the Arab-Israeli war (Harkavy and Neuman 2001). 
 
In this context, aggressions against civilians are considered unnecessary, contrary to 
the ethics of war and subject to judicial prosecution, the only exception being the 
one allowed under the ‘principle of double effect’, i.e., in circumstances where the 
conduct of a legitimate operation, aimed to reduce the opponent’s military strength, 
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may lead to foreseeable, yet unintended side effects on civilians (Coates 1997). In 
this sense, the absence of violence against civilians is both a principle and an 
expected outcome of this mode of warfare with observable implications such as: (a) 
absence of military operations aimed at civilians; (b) any instances of violence 
against civilians would be unintended and linked to specific operations against 
military targets; and (c) the ratio of civilians to combatants dead would be low—
ideally far below the one to one threshold. 
 
The limitations of this explanation are evident, as violence and coercion on civilians 
have been privileged means to the ends of wars. This has been particularly clear 
during the twentieth century as technical and demographic change, i.e. more deadly 
weapons, population growth, urbanisation, and the rise of total and irregular warfare 
have contributed to increased civilians’ death tolls.  
 
In total warfare, the economy and the population are massively mobilised towards 
the war effort; moreover, the war is aimed to the total subjugation of the enemy, 
including its population (Forster 2000). Therefore, crushing the opponent’s economy 
and morale is as important as winning battles and ‘the distinction between military 
and civilian targets is almost completely ignored’ (Luttwak 1971: 203). Although the 
line that separates total war from genocide is thin, the conceptual distinction 
remains: unlike genocide, total warfare is bilateral and, most importantly, the 
factions aim to subjugate, but not exterminate, the population. In this sense violence 
against civilians remain a means to the ends of war.7  
 
 
                                                
7 Two controversial examples of this logic are the bombing of Hamburg and Hiroshima. In the first 
case, Coates argued that it was not justified by ‘any vindictive spirit, but from the conviction that this 
was the best way to defeat the enemy and to bring the war to its swiftest, and least costly, conclusion’ 
(1997: 259). Regarding Hiroshima, it has been argued that the atomic bomb was the best way to crack 
the will of the Japanese military, while minimising the number of American casualties and, arguably, 
of Japanese casualties as well. 
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1.2 Irregular warfare 
 
The concept of irregular warfare is still ambiguous and, indeed, it is not clear why is 
it called ‘irregular’ in the first place. 8 However, it is generally accepted that it refers 
to strategies and tactics specifically devised for situations of asymmetry—when one 
of the factions is considerably weaker than the other in terms of size, technology and 
organisation. The lack of a well-defined battlefront is another characteristic aspect of 
this form of warfare: open warfare can erupt literally anywhere and territorial control 
remains variable and ambiguous; only a few patches of the geography are fully 
secured and controlled by either factions. However, the crucial feature of interest 
here is that irregular warfare involves civilians, both as agents and targets. It is 
perhaps in this sense that it is irregular—it involves people other than ‘regulars’, i.e., 
full time soldiers.  
 
Irregular warfare has become the dominant form of warfare after WWII. In this 
section, possible rationales for instrumental coercion and violence against civilians 
in the context of irregular wars are presented and discussed. Although some authors 
equate irregular warfare with guerrilla warfare, neglecting the importance and 
distinctive nature of counterinsurgency, this section discusses the use of violence in 
both contexts. The last part highlights the importance of civilian collaboration in the 
emerging debate and the discusses how recent contributions have modelled the 
relation between civilian collaboration and violence and attempted to derive testable 
hypotheses that could explain the levels and forms of violence seen in specific armed 
conflicts. 
                                                
8 For instance, while Luttwak defines irregular warfare as the combination of guerrilla warfare and 
subversion (1971: 102), Sarkessian considers unconventional or irregular warfare as one of the 
elements of revolutionary guerrilla warfare (1975: 7). Harkavy and Neumann (2001) use the terms 
‘unconventional’, ‘guerrilla’ and ‘insurgency’ warfare interchangeably but they seem to prefer the 
idea of ‘low intensity conflict’. Smith (2003) lists more than 30 similar terms often used to describe 
‘low intensity conflict’ and suggests to dispose of them altogether, including ‘guerrilla warfare’, 
arguing that they do not require a distinctive analytical body of thought, different to the Clausewitzian 
‘classic strategic theory’ (2003). Smith, though, acknowledged the existence of guerrilla tactics within 
war.  
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1.2.1 Guerrilla warfare 
 
Guerrilla warfare is a mode of warfare consisting of surprise attacks followed by 
dispersion on the defensive, high mobility, deceit and avoidance of open 
confrontation aimed to the ‘slow erosion’ of the enemy (Harkavy and Neumann 
2001). Although guerrilla warfare is not a modern invention, its doctrine was largely 
developed during the twentieth century. It was aptly condensed by one of its most 
important theorists, Mao Zedong, in his famous dictum: ‘Enemy advances, we 
retreat; enemy halts, we harass; enemy tires, we attack; enemy retreats, we pursue’ 
(cited by Janos 1963: 643). Guerrilla warfare is based on the premise that 
conventional armies react slowly and cannot possibly protect every point of a 
territory on a permanent basis; therefore, guerrillas can choose the place and time of 
their attacks. Furthermore, the usual response of the stronger army will be to ‘scatter 
troops over many local posts’, making them even more vulnerable (Knorr 1962: 55; 
Kiras 2002: 214-5). 
 
Although, guerrilla warfare is often used in revolutionary wars, i.e., those fought by 
‘rebels’ to overthrow a regime, the two notions are not unequivocally related. On the 
one hand, guerrilla warfare might be used by conventional armies, including 
incumbent forces, ‘in a supporting role’ to conventional warfare (Harkavy 2001: 
192; Janos 1963: 638). On the other hand, guerrilla warfare has had a central but 
limited role in the ‘theory and practice’ of revolutionary wars as it is too demanding 
for nascent insurgencies and insufficient when their strength is such that asymmetry 
disappears. For instance, Mao saw guerrilla warfare was an intermediate stage 
between a previous phase of propaganda, terrorism and sabotage, and one of 
conventional warfare, in which the regime will be finally defeated (Sarkesian 1975: 
9-10).  
 
While mobility is one of the defining features of guerrilla warfare, it also demands 
the ability to establish safe operational bases and expand the areas under insurgent 
control. While this ability is crucial in the case of territorial conflicts, as insurgents 
seek to found a new, autonomous state over their homeland, it may also be important 
in conflicts over government (i.e. political change). In Mao’s view, for instance, 
expanding and strengthening territorial control could allow guerrillas to secure areas 
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and ‘establish a formal government, claiming to legitimately represent the people 
and raising the possibility of foreign support’ (Sarkesian 1975: 10). It would also 
place the insurgents in a better position to launch a decisive, conventional attack on 
the central government. 
 
Crucially, guerrilla warfare demands a substantial degree of political and operational 
support from civilians as well as ‘effective but covert control’ over them—what 
Luttwak calls subversion (1971: 102). This demands a deep ‘embeddedness’ in local 
social networks that might be a spontaneous result of the involvement of local 
population in guerrilla activities or the product of the rebels’ political strategy to 
indoctrinate, mobilise and control the population—as was largely the case in the 
Latin American guerrilla movements.9 
 
The involvement of civilians in guerrilla activities goes far beyond the role the might 
have in conventional warfare. As Wickham-Crowley put it, ‘guerrilla warfare is the 
most labour-intensive form of warfare […] Massive peasant support means not only 
bodies for combat but also personnel for all the ancillary activities of warfare: 
lookouts, guides, civil-defence specialists, food growers and providers, and even 
munitions manufacturers’ (1991: 324). Urban guerrilla warfare also ‘takes place 
among the masses and depends on their sympathy’ (Marighella [1969] 1975: 526). 
 
However, the role of civilians is not just ‘ancillary’: guerrillas disguise as civilians 
according to tactical needs blurring the distinction between civilians and combatants. 
For Sarkesian, this is indeed the ‘the decisive element’ in revolutionary guerrilla 
warfare: ‘the departure from the use of always visibly distinguishable combatants in 
formal battle order’ (1975: 7, italics added).10 This entails a challenge to the war 
conventions regarding the distinction between combatants and non-combatants: by 
making difficult to identify the targets, guerrillas put at risk the lives of civilians. As 
                                                
9 In his study of Latin American guerrilla movements, Wickham-Crowley argued that they ‘are not 
best understood as the response of oppressed peoples to government repression […] Rather, they 
better fit Skocpol’s concept of ‘marginal political elites’, heretofore excluded from full power, who 
turn to revolutionary organisations’ (1992: 47). However, he added, Colombia’s FARC are an 
exception to this rule. 
10 The word ‘always’ here denotes the ambiguous nature of guerrillas—halfway between individuals 
participating in a popular uprising and regular soldiers. Indeed, Mao’s model of revolutionary warfare 
entails the transformation of the former into the latter. 
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Walzer put it, ‘guerrillas do not subvert the war convention by themselves attacking 
civilians […] Instead, they invite their enemies to do it’ (1977: 179-80). 
 
But, in fact, guerrillas do attack civilians. While Mao’s doctrine encouraged 
guerrillas to give a fair treatment to peasants and to engage in the defence of popular 
causes, it did not exclude intimidation and violence to ‘suppress the activities of the 
counter-revolution in the countryside’ (Mao 1954: 27). Similarly, Lenin advocated 
the expropriation of civilians’ property—provided it was carried out ‘under the Party 
control and the money was used for the purposes of the uprising’. Indeed, in his 
words, the socialist revolution was not ‘so much a struggle of the people against the 
government as a struggle of one part of the people against the other’—one that could 
take the form of ‘a protracted civil war enmeshing the entire country’ (Lenin 1975 
[1906]).  
 
Furthermore, attacks against civilians are often the last resort—the ‘weapon of the 
weak’—in asymmetric warfare. Hultman (2004), for instance, hypothesised that 
asymmetry increases the chances that the faction experiencing military losses might 
resort to violence as a way to ‘signal resolve’, informing the opponent that its will to 
fight remains, even if the targets are not combatants or even collaborators. Boyle 
(2009) made a similar case with reference to the escalation of violence against 
civilians in Iraq after the US-led invasion. And Downes (2006) suggested that 
violence against civilians is more likely when the warring become ‘desperate’, in the 
context of protracted military stalemate. 
 
The epitome of this rationale is, of course, terrorism. Insurgent organisations often 
launch ‘terrorist’ attacks to force certain military or political decisions from the 
government; as such, the targets of these attacks are chosen less on the basis of their 
allegiance or political leanings than on the impact that death and destruction may 
cause on political decision-making. ‘Terrorism’ remains a highly contested, 
politicised term and its vagueness and ambiguity preclude its use in scholarly 
debates; as Tilly noted, terror, terrorism and terrorist are terms that ‘serve political 
and normative ends admirably despite hindering description and explanation of the 
social phenomena at which they point’ (2004: 5). However, its underlying logic, i.e. 
the use of violence against civilians to influence an ‘audience’, surely goes some 
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way in explaining specific instances of use of violence in the context of irregular 
wars. 
 
 
1.2.2 Counterinsurgency  
 
It is widely accepted that guerrilla warfare cannot be fought using conventional 
tactics; as E.T. Lawrence put it, that would be ‘like eating soup with a knife’ (cited 
by Knorr 1962: 55). Thus, guerrilla warfare has led to the development of 
counterinsurgency strategies, which are unconventional and yet different from 
guerrilla warfare. Like the latter, these strategies combine military and political 
components, although not necessarily in the same proportions. 
 
Generally speaking, the military component is aimed to destroy guerrilla targets and 
deprive the rebels from access to, and support from, civilians. In Vietnam, for 
instance, counterinsurgency comprised three kinds of operations to be carried out 
sequentially: search and destroy operations were ‘aimed at destroying the enemy’s 
main forces in uninhabited areas and in his base areas, his logistic resources in 
particular’. Clearing operations were aimed to ‘drive enemy forces away from 
populated areas and to allow small units to carry on securing activities among the 
people’. Finally, securing operations, were ‘directed at the enemy in the hamlets—at 
the infrastructure and the farmers by day and at the Viet Cong guerrillas by night—
who operated individually as well as in squads and platoons’ and included 
‘saturation patrols and squad-size ambushes’ (Hay 1989: 170).  
 
These operations often led to a massive disruption in the lives of livelihoods of 
people: the creation of ‘strategic hamlets’ controlled by government forces, for 
instance, aimed to deprive rebels from popular support, effectively entailed a 
massive forced displacement of population and demanded a huge logistic effort (Joes 
2004: 238-242). Other military tactics include food denial, which might be effective 
and can been put in practice by imposing severe restrictions to the mobilisation of 
food but also by spraying defoliants over crops near suspected rebel strongholds. 
Scorched earth operations are more radical, as they are aimed to destroy just about 
everything in areas controlled by guerrillas (Joes 2004: 222-3, 242). 
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A recent field manual published by the US Army (2007) offers a similar approach: 
military operations are structured in three stages: first, counterinsurgent forces must 
clear the area, that is, they must ‘remove all enemy forces and eliminate organised 
resistance’ through ‘cordon and search’ operations, ‘saturation patrolling’, 
‘interdiction ambushes’ and ‘targeted raids’ (2007: 175-6). Second, they must hold 
the area through ‘measured offensive operations […] against insurgents as 
opportunities arise, but the main effort is focused on the population’ (2007: 177, 
italics added), which must be separated from the insurgents through measures such 
as a ‘thorough population screening to identify and eliminate remaining insurgents 
and to identify any lingering insurgent support structures’ and ‘training local 
paramilitary security forces’ (2007: 178-9). During the third stage, aimed to build 
support, military operations as such are marginal but they may involve the 
imposition of ‘population control measures’ such as censuses, curfews, ‘limits on the 
length of time people can travel’ and ‘limits on the number of visitors from outside 
the area’ (2007: 180). 
 
Summing up, if guerrillas are to civilians as fish are to water, ‘the policy must be to 
destroy the fish either by removing the oxygen from the water or by draining the 
pond’ (Paget 1967: 168). The risks that such operations pose for the lives and 
livelihoods of people are obvious.  
 
The political component of counterinsurgency aims to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of 
the population by strengthening the government’s legitimacy. As Thompson put it, 
‘winning the population can tritely be summed up as good government in all its 
aspects’ (1966: 112), from fighting corruption to investing in people’s material well-
being, e.g. roads, hospitals, schools, or even in ‘prestige projects [of] questionable 
economic value [that] can play their part in building a sense of national pride’ (1966: 
66). It also calls for a restraint on the harshness of military operations: ‘there is a 
very strong temptation in dealing both with terrorism and guerrilla actions for 
government forces to act outside the law […] Not only is this morally wrong, but, 
over a period, will create more practical difficulties for a government than it solves’ 
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(Thompson 1966: 54).11 
 
Thompson considered that the political military and political components of 
counterinsurgency should go hand in hand in a balanced way. The current official 
military doctrine of the US Army states, as a principle, that ‘the political and military 
aspects of insurgencies are so bound together as to be inseparable’ (US Army 2007: 
40). It warns that ‘military actions executed without properly assessing their political 
effects at best result in reduced effectiveness and at worst are counterproductive’ 
(2007: 40). It constantly emphasises the importance of protecting the population and 
suggests that in areas cleared of guerrillas, ‘counterinsurgents should use every 
opportunity to help the population and meet its needs and expectations’ (2007: 181). 
 
In contrast with this well-balanced approach, military considerations often become 
dominant, so much so that governments may turn to conventional or even total 
warfare to fight the insurgency (Beckett 2001: 42). Indeed, there are those who 
advocate a tough approach and suggest that counterinsurgent strategists ‘should 
worry less about winning popular allegiance and more about raising the costs of 
supporting the insurgency’; therefore, counterinsurgent forces should use 
‘overwhelming firepower to destroy the adversary and […] armed coercion –
including harsh collective punishment—to convince the population to shun the 
insurgents’ (Kahl 2007). But, in some cases, this tough approach has been less the 
result of the application of a doctrine than the consequence of armies and 
governments ‘muddling through’, trying to defeat resilient movements, as was the 
case of the Japanese in China and, to a good extent, the Americans in Vietnam. In 
the latter case, it has been suggested that traditional conceptions about the nature of 
armed conflicts, more suited to conventional, ‘big wars’, led the military to 
misunderstand the challenges posed by guerrilla warfare and, furthermore, prevented 
them from learning from previous failures (Sarkesian 1975: 8; Cassidy 2006: 114-
                                                
11 The phrase ‘winning hearts and minds’ was apparently coined by a British officer during the 
campaign to suppress the Malayan Communist Party in the 1950s, which seems to have embodied the 
political approach to counterinsurgency. Thompson’s book on counterinsurgency is based on the 
Malayan experience and also on his critical observations on Vietnam, where he served as Head of the 
British Advisory Mission from 1961 to 1965 (Beckett 2001: 95-104). The case of Malaya is often 
cited as an example of successful defeat of a guerrilla movement, attributed to the adequate 
integration of military and political objectives and actions and the moderate use of force. It is 
important to highlight that approaches that emphasise the political considerations do not necessarily 
entail negotiations with ‘rebels’, truces or amnesties. 
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125). Likewise, it has been argued that ‘institutional distortions’ generated by 
internal competition among branches of the army favoured low risk operations, such 
as the bombing of peasant villages (Kalyvas 2004: 131-133).  
 
 
1.2.3 Civilian collaboration and violence 
 
As seen above, civilian collaboration is a key ingredient of irregular warfare, 
essential to achieve both the political and military goals of insurgents and the state. 
Based on this understanding, scholars have put forward various models and 
hypotheses aimed to explain how armed organisations and the state use violence (or 
non-violence), in its different forms and with different intensity, to shape civilian 
collaboration. Violence, in this context, results from strategic decisions that involve 
considerations on the costs, risks and potential gains derived from killing, looting or 
forcing a population to flee their homes. Such considerations are based, in turn, on 
assumptions regarding the determinants of civilian behaviour (e.g. fear, loyalty, self-
interest) and its strategic and tactical value to armed organisations. 
 
Kalyvas for instance, suggested that violence could be used selectively or 
indiscriminately against civilians, to different effects. In his view, selective violence 
is superior because it targets only those who fail to comply, but it demands reliable 
information, always in short supply; indiscriminate violence, by contrast, ‘makes 
everyone fear lethal sanctions regardless of their behaviour: innocence is irrelevant 
and compliance is utterly impossible’ (2004: 104). Therefore, he predicted, the 
intensity and randomness of violence against civilians are determined by the degree 
of control of each party over geographical areas and populations: violence would be 
selective and less extreme in areas where either party’s control is stronger and the 
information about potential ‘traitors’ is more reliable; by contrast, violence would be 
indiscriminate and especially brutal in contested areas, where armed actors have 
poor information about the possible links between locals and opponents. He found 
that during the Greek Civil War nearly half of the homicides occurred in the Argolid 
were indiscriminate (Kalyvas 2006: 270). 
 
Although Kalyvas’s insight on the effectiveness of selective violence seems quite 
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sensible, several authors have found that warring parties, and especially 
governments, often resort to indiscriminate violence as a means to achieve certain 
military goals. For instance, Azam and Hoeffler (2002) developed a model to explain 
forced displacement in which, instead of ‘fighting proper’, the government uses 
indiscriminate violence; ‘the displacement of a fraction of the civilian population, 
they argue, reduces the efficiency of the fighters from the rebel group as they cannot 
hide as easily from the army amidst a lower population, and they get less support’ 
(2002: 482). The authors tested their model with data on refugees from 25 African 
countries with positive results.  
 
Along similar lines, Valentino et al. (2004) argued that, in fighting guerrillas, 
governments might resort to ‘mass killings’ as a way to terrorise collaborators; using 
data from 147 wars, they found evidence that the probability of ‘mass killings’ by 
government forces increases with the level of military strength and popular support 
enjoyed by guerrillas; in such circumstances, governments find that indiscriminate 
violence is less costly than other soft-handed alternatives aimed to win the people’s 
‘hearts and minds’ (Downes 2004: 403). Based on evidence from the Second Anglo 
Boer War, the same author came to a similar conclusion, arguing that when the 
popular support towards the insurgency is too strong, selective violence is ineffective 
and ‘indiscriminate force [may be] required to make it impossible for people to 
provide support’ (2007: 420).  
 
However, insurgents also resort to indiscriminate violence. Attacking civilians in 
areas controlled by the government undermines their confidence on the ability of the 
ruler to protect them and, paradoxically, may prompt them to switch their allegiance 
in favour of the aggressor (Grimsley and Rogers 2002: xiii, xviii). For instance, Eck 
and Hultman found that in territorial conflicts i.e. secessionist, ‘rebels kill almost six 
times more civilians than governments’; this finding is somewhat surprising 
considering that they need popular support to succeed, so the authors suggest that 
rebels may be ‘forced to use intimidation and violence to ensure compliance and 
assistance’ (2007: 241). But as Lilja shows (2009), this is not always the case: 
despite their reputation, the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers used violence against Tamils in 
moderate, relatively mild forms, including forced recruitment of youngsters and 
restrictions on the transit of people in the zones they controlled. Indeed, her findings 
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suggest that the LTTE had established deep roots in the Tamil society, which, 
incidentally, may help to explain the extensive use of violence by government troops 
during the counterinsurgent campaign of 2009. 
 
In a more complex setting such as contemporary Iraq, where US-led coalition troops 
face attacks, the escalation of indiscriminate violence seems to reflect rational, 
strategic decisions by sectarian armed organisations competing with each other as a 
means to grow a constituency. As Boyle argued, violence ‘helps generate more 
recruits and funding in a competitive environment and convince the population to 
transfer their loyalties to that particular armed group’ (2009: 272); furthermore, in a 
context of increasing insecurity ‘the Iraqi people have a strong incentive to pledge 
their loyalties to tribes and sectarian communities, as a way of hedging in case the 
state falls apart’ (2009: 276). 
 
While civilian collaboration may involve a wide range of tasks and activities, some 
authors have focused on the economic dimension of support and on how different 
forms of reliance on civilian support lead to different levels and forms of violence. 
For instance, Naylor (1993) suggested that guerrillas’ fund-raising activities pose 
different risks to civilians depending on their relationship with them and their 
standing vis-à-vis the government. In ‘contention zones’, where guerrillas have a 
precarious presence, ‘predatory’ activities such as ransom kidnappings and bank 
robberies, activities that resemble petty or ‘blue-collar’ crime, are predominant. 
However, as insurgents increase their control, they need more stable sources of 
income and turn to recurrent, ‘parasitical’ forms of funding such as extortion. 
Finally, in zones of total control, ‘symbiotic forms of fundraising’ emerge: guerrillas 
begin to provide basic services and impose taxes and fees similar to those levied by a 
formal government.12 
 
Likewise, Le Billon suggested that the nature of violence is linked to ‘whether 
resources involve production or extraction: with extracted resources (e.g. 
minerals)— violence is most likely to take a physical form to achieve territorial or 
                                                
12 It is worth highlighting how in Naylor’s three-zone model, typically criminal activities such as 
ransom kidnappings and robberies still have a place, if limited, in the activities of rebel movements 
aimed to seize power or establish a state. This feature will be used to assess the nature of insurgent 
ransom kidnappings in the Middle Magdalena Valley in chapter 7. 
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state control [whereas] with produced resources (e.g. crops), violence usually takes a 
more structural form, such as coercive forms of labour or controls over trade’ (2001: 
568). By contrast, Azam (2006) saw in attacks by armed organisations against ‘their 
own’ civilians—more specifically farmers—as a means to make agricultural 
production less profitable, thus making cheaper the recruitment of new combatants. 
 
Paradoxically, not having to rely on civilians as a source of economic resources may 
lead to further violence: according to Johnson (1968) as Viet Minh guerrillas 
obtained support from China, they reduced their dependency on peasant support and, 
therefore, could afford to abuse them fearing no consequence. A similar claim is 
made by Ballentine, who argues that insurgent groups that depend upon ‘lootable’ 
resources ‘may have less of a need or incentive to generate and maintain social 
capital among putative supporters and fewer constraints against indiscriminate forms 
of civilian predation’ (2003: 270). Likewise, Weinstein has argued that resource-rich 
armed organisations attract undisciplined, careless combatants, with little regard for 
civilians’ rights (2007). 
 
While the contributors just cited acknowledge that violence can be used to shape 
civilian collaboration, a few authors have gone a step further by suggesting that 
civilians may be actually involved in the production of violence. This finding may 
seem trivial in the context of genocides, where civilians are often actively involved 
in producing violence and ‘doing the killing’, e.g. Rwanda (Prunier 1995: 247-8). 
Indeed, as Keen argued, violence can be a bottom-up process whereby ‘ordinary 
people’ can engage in ethnic violence in response to exclusion, impunity or because 
there are no strong revolutionary organisations that could channel their grievances 
(1998: 44-45).  
 
However, irregular wars constitute a different scenario as the use of violence remains 
in the hands of ‘specialists of violence’, be they insurgents, militiamen or 
government troops. It is precisely in this scenario that Kalyvas (2006) developed and 
tested a model in which civilians are ‘the most common and probably effective’ 
(2006: 176) source on information on collaborators. According to this model 
(discussed and tested in Ch. 5), civilians are not always victims or passive observers 
of violence: given the chance, they accuse other civilians of collaboration, leaving 
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the punishment to armed organisations (2006: 203-7).  
 
To conclude this section, some empirical indicators may be of help in identifying 
instances of violence against civilians that fit the pattern of irregular warfare: (a) 
coexistence of hostilities (i.e., clashes between the warring factions) and operations 
aimed exclusively at civilians; (b) presence of military units specialised in attacks 
against civilians, e.g., death squads; (c) any instances of violence against civilians 
could be linked to military outcomes and often (but not necessarily) related to 
suspected or actual civilian collaboration; and (d) the ratio of civilian to combatant 
deaths would be close to 1:1. 
 
 
1.3 New wars and pseudo-wars 
 
Although the concept of ‘new wars’ is commonly associated with the work of 
Kaldor (1999), it is often used to refer to a broader set of scholarly contributions that 
share the view that contemporary conflicts are qualitatively different from 
conventional and irregular wars—hence the label of ‘new wars’. These differences, 
authors argue, are evident in several respects: the goals pursued by the factions, their 
organisational structure and funding, the level of popular support they enjoy, their 
relation with the global economy and organised crime and, crucially, the extensive 
use of violence against civilians (Kalyvas 2001, Newman 2004).13 Although these 
features are not necessarily consistent (i.e. a given conflict can display a certain 
attribute but not others), there is a common thread to all of them: while in 
conventional and irregular wars the parties in conflict are interested in defeating the 
enemy, seize power or capture a territory, in these ‘new’ conflicts they pursue other 
economic and political goals, but not victory. In that sense, while they may resemble 
                                                
13 It is worth noting that it is there is still debate on whether new wars are actually an objective 
phenomenon or result from changes in the categories and concepts used to analyse conflicts. For 
instance, Kalyvas has argued that the end of the Cold War ‘has decisively affected how civil wars are 
interpreted’ and led to ‘an exaggeration of the criminal aspects of recent civil wars’ (2001: 117). 
Likewise, Newman has argued that the extent to which new wars are actually new has been 
exaggerated: ‘all of the factors that characterize new wars have been present, to varying degrees, 
throughout the last 100 years. […]The difference today is that academics, policy analysts, and 
politicians are focusing on these factors more than before, and they are understanding the underlying 
dynamics of conflict – and especially the social and economic factors – to a greater degree than in the 
past’ (2004: 179). 
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a military contest, they are about something else—hence the term ‘pseudo-wars’ 
used in the title of this section. Throughout the dissertation, I will use this term to 
refer to this type of armed conflicts and ‘new wars’ to refer, specifically, to those 
characterised by Kaldor (1999, 2005). 
 
Consistent with the above, armed confrontation in pseudo-wars becomes marginal 
and force and violence are aimed to other ends, including, sometimes, civilian 
victimisation. As Keen put it: ‘Whereas analysts have tended to assume that war is 
the “end” and abuse of civilians the “means”, it is important to consider the opposite 
possibility: that the end is to engage in abuse or crimes that bring immediate 
rewards, while the means is war and its perpetuation’ (1998: 12). As a consequence, 
the ratio of civilian to combatants deaths tends to increase, as has been the case in 
some recent wars (Kaldor 1999: 8). Furthermore, since the factions are not really 
interested in defeating an enemy or achieving victory, these crises tend to become 
protracted; this is particularly true when they pursue economic goals and, therefore, 
they can derive benefits from a sustained situation of conflict and disorder.  
 
As noted above, pseudo-wars may have political or economic goals. In the original 
definition by Kaldor, ‘new wars’ are ‘about political mobilisation through violence 
rather than about achieving specific military objectives. In new wars political 
mobilisation is achieved directly through violence’ (2005: 219). More specifically, 
politicians might resort to ‘political mobilisation on the basis of identity’ and try to 
‘control the population by getting rid of a different identity’, resorting to ‘mass 
killings, forcible resettlements [and] intimidation’ (Kaldor 1999: 8). Other political 
motivations include repression, as in Guatemala where, according to Keen, 
‘widespread attacks on civilians served a much wider function than simply 
suppressing the guerrillas, namely the suppression of a wide band of political and 
cultural opposition’ (2000: 6). 
 
However, economic goals also may lie at the core of the strategies followed by 
armed organisations and the state in pseudo-wars. Keen, for instance, suggested that 
war could be used as ‘a way of creating an alternative system of profit, power and 
even protection’ and may turn into ‘co-operative conflicts’ in which the parties 
collude to avoid confrontation while they continue exploiting the population (1998: 
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10, 107). Drawing on evidence from conflicts in several African countries, he noted 
how militias, insurgencies and government forces rarely clashed in ‘battles’ between 
themselves, focusing rather on attacks against civilians; in Sierra Leone, for instance, 
‘government soldiers and rebels shared important interests in preserving systems of 
economic exploitation that had flourished under the cover of war’ (2000: 4). 
Likewise, Reno has argued that ‘what is new about post-Cold War internal wars and 
rebellions is the extent to which economic interests appear to predominate, crowding 
out ideologically motivated mass reform and revolutionary movements’ (2002: 837). 
 
A more radical version of this idea, rooted in an entirely different tradition of 
thought (neoclassical economics), was put forward by Collier, who suggested that 
rebellions could be better understood as large-scale criminal operations rather than as 
attempts to address social grievances or promote political change. ‘Rebellion is 
motivated by greed’ he argued and, therefore, ‘victory over the government is not an 
objective’ (2000: 840).14 His view has been heavily criticised on theoretical and 
methodological grounds (Ballentine 2003; Acemoglu 2006; Cramer 2006: 129-135), 
but most authors agree that the role of resources in starting and fuelling armed 
conflict and violence against civilians merits further research. 
 
While the strategic goals of insurgencies and other armed organisations in pseudo-
wars may lead to more violence against civilians, other organisational traits seem to 
have a similar effect. One of them is the criminalisation of armed conflict. For 
instance, although violence in the Bosnian civil war—the prototypical new war—
was aimed at political ends, the worst atrocities were committed by paramilitary 
groups, composed up to 80 per cent by criminals. As Kaldor noted, ‘most of the 
paramilitary groups were involved in black market activities and, indeed, cooperated 
with each other across supposed confrontations lines in order to profit from the 
situation in besieged enclaves’ (1999: 53).  
 
Likewise, in Sierra Leone, gangs of so-called ‘sobels’—government soldiers 
                                                
14 Later, Collier and others argued that ‘loot is not usually the root motivation for conflict, but it may 
become critical to its perpetuation’; thus, while rebellions may be initially aimed at political change, 
‘over time the daily tasks involved in running a criminal business may tend inadvertently to develop a 
momentum of their own [and] the organisation starts to attract more criminal types and fewer 
idealists, so that it may gradually change its character’ (Collier et al. 2003: 79). 
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pretending to be rebels—extorted and looted civilians in diamond mining areas 
(Reno 1998: 125). However, the often-assumed association between organised crime 
and violence has been contested and, according to Naylor it is not backed by 
empirical evidence (2004: 30-31). Arguably, the key lies in understanding the roles 
that civilians come to play in the industrial organisation of different criminal 
activities; as Le Billon (2001) noted, some activities are more labour-intensive than 
others and, therefore, may lead to different forms and levels of victimisation and 
coercion. 
 
Related with the above, there is another aspect of pseudo-wars that increases the 
chances of victimisation for civilians: the leeway they give to the motives and 
emotions of combatants. Conventional and guerrilla warfare entail a significant 
degree of bureaucratisation within armed organisations: individuals’ emotions are 
suppressed through rigorous discipline and indoctrination; decisions are quickly 
implemented through a chain of command; and cowardice, insubordination and 
desertion are severely penalised. In pseudo-wars, by contrast, loose hierarchical 
structures give combatants room to pursue their own interests and emotions, often 
leading to abuses against the population. Even when behaviours such as looting and 
rape are forbidden, their superiors might be unwilling or unable to punish offenders 
on the field. For instance, in Sierra Leone, Humphreys and Weinstein (2004) found 
that ‘rather than being orchestrated by well-oiled machines capable of committing 
systematic acts of violence, […] abuses were undertaken by organizations with 
chaotic, disorganised internal structures that permitted abuse within and outside 
units’ (2004: 33).  
 
Overall, the arguments just mentioned highlight how the behaviour of warlords, 
combatants and armed organisations in pseudo-wars may lead to a privatisation of 
political violence. However, the argument can be extrapolated to the civilian side of 
the equation, leading to the same outcome. As noted above, Kalyvas (2006) argued 
that ‘political actors’ rely on civilians as a source of valuable information on enemy 
collaborators and use it to target their victims more effectively. But, since civilians 
are not only self-interested but also opportunistic, they use this privilege to accuse 
their own foes and rivals and, as a consequence, violence is privatised by the back 
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door.15 ‘Civil war, he concluded, transforms often trivial and petty conflicts and 
grievances into lethal violence’ (2006: 351, italics in the original). ‘Malicious 
denunciation’, as he calls this phenomenon, has been reported in other conflicts such 
as Sierra Leone’s, where civilians made false allegations against their rivals trying to 
turn the violence of soldiers against them (Keen 2005: 85). 
 
In any case, and to conclude this section, is worth identifying the empirical criteria 
associated with violence against civilians in pseudo-wars: (a) predominance of 
armed operations aimed exclusively at civilians and of military units specialised in 
such kind of attacks; (b) violence against civilians not linked to any evident military 
outcomes; and (c) the ratio of civilians to combatants dead would be well over 1:1—
maybe near 8:1 as Kaldor (1999) suggested.  
 
Table 1 summarises the empirical criteria to determine whether violence against 
civilians can be attributed to one of the three broad causes defined above. 
 
 
Table 1.1. Violence against civilians and types of warfare—comparative criteria 
 Conventional Irregular  Pseudo-wars 
Armed operations are 
aimed mainly 
against… 
Enemy combatants Both combatants and civilian collaborators Civilians 
Cases of violence 
against civilians are… Unintended 
Linked to specific 
military outcomes 
Not linked to any 
specific military 
outcome 
Ratio of civilians to 
combatants dead Well below 1:1 In the vicinity of 1:1 Well over 1:1 
 
 
 
1.4 Violence against civilians in Colombia  
 
Colombia, that ‘bloodthirsty country’ as Hobsbawm called it (1969: 63), has 
attracted the attention of students of violence, in particular at home. ‘La violencia’, 
the emergence of guerrillas, drug mafias and paramilitary groups and, in general, the 
pervasiveness of violence—on average the country had the world’s highest homicide 
rate from 1980 to 2000 (Shaw et al. 2003)—are some of the topics on which scholars 
                                                
15 The term ‘opportunism’ is used in this thesis to signify ‘self interest with guile’ (Williamson 1975: 
26). 
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of different disciplines, often grouped under the label of ‘violentólogos’ 
(violentologists) have focused over the last decades. This section focuses on 
contributions directly related with the magnitude, nature and purpose of violence 
against civilians during the 1990s and early 2000s in the context of the internal 
armed conflict.  
 
 
1.4.1 Nature and purpose 
 
The period under consideration was marked by two important developments in the 
global and domestic political arenas, which have influenced the evolution of the 
conflict and the way it has been interpreted. First, the end of the Cold War and the 
constitutional reform of 1991, which both weakened the ideological basis for the 
guerrillas’ struggle. In fact, several guerrilla groups demobilised in 1990, the most 
important being the Movimiento 19 de Abril, or ‘M-19’, which turned into a political 
party and gained a significant number of seats in the Constitutional Assembly 
elected to reform the Colombian constitution in 1991. Although the new constitution 
represented a compromise between the expansion of civil and political rights and the 
access to social services, on the one hand, and the implementation of the neo-liberal 
agenda, on the other, it was widely seen as a decisive step towards a more inclusive 
democracy. Of particularly importance were the steps taken towards a further 
political decentralisation and the creation of several mechanisms of ‘participatory 
democracy’.  
 
Second, the drug business and the internal political conflict became increasingly 
entangled. While drug bosses and organisations increasingly got involved in 
paramilitary organisations, the participation of FARC in the business has been based 
on the taxation of cocaine production in the initial stages and, sources claim, in its 
distribution to foreign markets. Furthermore, as the American government funded 
and provided military assistance in the war against drugs, it became more openly 
involved in counterinsurgent tasks and filed requests for the extradition of several 
guerrilla and paramilitary leaders on charges of terrorism and drug trafficking to the 
United States. Thus, as the acting Attorney General of the United States, John 
Ashcroft commented in 2004, there has been a ‘convergence of two of the top 
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priorities of the Department of Justice: the prevention of terrorism and the reduction 
of the flow of illegal and deadly narcotics into this country’ (Department of Justice 
2004). 
 
Against this backdrop, scholars have increasingly seen the conflict as a manifestation 
of the self-interested and even criminal nature of armed organisations. For instance, 
Pecaut has argued that, despite its intensification, political violence in Colombia 
remains ‘banal’, marginal and hardly distinguishable from other forms of violence, 
lacking any ‘imagined novel future’ or any connection with ‘class divisions and 
other collective forms of social identity’ (1999: 145, 147). 
 
Similarly, the authors of the UNDP’s 2003 Colombia Human Development Report, 
which was entirely devoted to the internal armed conflict, claimed that it lacked 
ideological or political content, being largely ‘inertial’ and resembling a pre-modern 
and feudal conflict, fought merely over territorial control. Furthermore, they 
described it as a ‘war of losers’ in the sense that none of the actors involved has 
been, or will ever be, close to victory. The conflict was thus deemed as futile, 
pointless, immoral and ‘essentially criminal’ (2003: 93). The criminal nature of the 
factions, they argued, was reflected in the composition of their members: no longer 
revolutionaries in pursuit of an utopia but selfish individuals concerned with 
personal enrichment and revenge (2003: 81-94).16 
 
Although the Report acknowledged the possibility that armed organisations could 
gain popular support, it argued that it was based only on fear (2003: 90). In this 
context, violence against civilians was largely seen as an instrument to control the 
population and the authors suggested that the increasing ‘brutality’ seen in the 
attacks against civilians resulted from the attempts made by the factions to outdo 
each other in their attempts to terrorise the population (2003: 91). However, they 
characterised the actions of guerrillas and paramilitaries against civilians as 
notoriously dissimilar: their ‘behaviour […] is so asymmetric with respect to the 
                                                
16 Paradoxically, the Report acknowledges that ‘armed groups, having been unable to take over, 
finished up replacing the State with another state of their own invention, with parallel and precarious 
legalities and bureaucracies—not a revolution, but a bifurcation of order and legitimacy’ (2003: 88). 
In doing so, they have created fragmented and competing sovereignties, wherein security, justice and 
even social services and infrastructure are provided (2003: 68-9). 
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kinds of aggression that it would appear as if each side were refusing to resort to 
tactics which they consider to be typical of the other’ (2003:126-7). Finally, the 
Report identified seven groups of civilians particularly vulnerable to the conflict:  
politicians and government officials; union leaders and activists; journalists; human 
rights’ activists; ‘afro-Colombians’; indigenous peoples, and women (2003: 128-33). 
However, this analysis was not based on a comprehensive account of the victims’ 
identities. 
 
In contrast with the views expressed above, other contributions have put less 
emphasis in the criminal nature of conflict and more on its political and military 
dimension, highlighting the challenge posed to state’s authority by the insurgency.17 
In a study funded by the American Air Force and carried out by the RAND 
Corporation, Rabasa and Chalk (2001) found that both guerrillas and paramilitaries 
use violence against civilians primarily as a way to intimidate the population and 
exercise control at the local level. In the case of guerrillas, the use of rudimentary, 
imprecise weapons also causes civilian casualties; kidnappings also impose a heavy 
burden on civilians, especially among ‘cattle ranchers, farmers, and merchants’ 
(2001: 33). 
 
In their account of the actions of FARC and ELN, the authors suggested that attacks 
against civilian targets and infrastructure reflected military weakness. While the 
former increasingly relied on drug-related incomes, they had been able to build up 
their military capacity and launch major attacks against military outposts. The ELN, 
by contrast, relied mainly on kidnappings and extortion, reflected in sabotage of 
infrastructure (2001: 45). However, guerrillas seemed to play a minor role in the 
killing of civilians: citing Echandia, the authors asserted that guerrillas caused only 
fifteen percent of the deaths caused by ‘illegal armed organisations’ from 1988 to 
1997 (2001: 56). 
 
As for paramilitaries, Rabasa and Chalk (2001) see their actions against civilians as 
attempts to eliminate guerrilla sympathisers, weaken their support networks and, 
                                                
17 Although they acknowledge the involvement of guerrillas in the drug economy, they saw it as 
means towards ‘the long-term goal [of creating] a force of 30,000, which in the FARC’s estimation 
would enable the organization to engage in large-scale offensive operations against the main units of 
the Colombian army’ (2001: 27). 
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ultimately, gain control of the population. To do so, paramilitaries rely on deserted 
guerrillas; according to one of their sources, ‘there are in fact numerous FARC 
deserters in the AUC ranks, because of the harsh discipline imposed by the FARC 
and because the AUC offers protection from retaliation by their former comrades’ 
(2001: 56). 
 
Gonzalez et al. (2003), tried to explain the increasing burden of conflict on civilians 
in terms of Girard’s (1996) theory of violence, that is, as a ‘mimetic interaction’ 
between armed organisations, whereby they successively retaliate the aggressions of 
each other against their own supporters, thus creating a spiral of increasing violence 
(2003: 72-75).  
 
Gutierrez explicitly rejected the notion that the Colombian conflict in recent years 
could be characterised as a ‘new war’ arguing that the increasing involvement of 
crime and criminals did not lead to more terrorism as Kaldor would have predicted 
(2006: 138). He also suggested that violence against civilians is more intense ‘when 
[a] given territory is disputed by two or more armed actors that engage in a bid to 
terrorize the population into acquiescence’ (2006: 147). However once one of the 
factions manages to prevail over the others, it faces the challenge of governing the 
population and, thus, must establish ‘some limit to the arbitrariness and discretion of 
the warriors concerning the lives of the civilian population’ (2006: 147). In his view, 
this is exactly what happened to the paramilitaries in Colombia, who waged ‘brutal 
offensives to expropriate peasants in the name of counterinsurgent policies’ but have 
learnt that ‘the indiscriminate use of violence is counterproductive’ (2006: 146). 
 
Likewise, Posada questioned the applicability of the concept of ‘new wars’ to the 
Colombian conflict (2001: 43) as well as the notion that it is a ‘war against society’, 
as Pecaut (2001) had called it. In his view, the conflict is multi-sided, involving not 
only insurgents and the state but also drug mafias and paramilitary groups fighting 
each other. In this context, civilians have been ‘caught in the middle’, lacking any 
role in determining the conflict’s processes and outcomes. Therefore, he argued, it 
cannot be called a ‘civil war’ either as ‘we are not faced with a polarized community 
divided into two opposing groups fighting each other on behalf of alternatives for the 
organization of society’ (Posada 2001: 47). 
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Richani acknowledged the political and military goals of the armed organisations but 
argued that all of them, including the military, had adapted themselves to the conflict 
and reached a ‘comfortable impasse’ in which war was ‘the best available option 
given the balance of power and the higher costs of peace’ (2002: 3-4). Thus, while 
‘the military developed a containment military strategy instead of seeking the 
elimination of the guerrillas’ threat’, ‘guerrillas decided on consolidating their 
political power at the local municipal level instead of seeking an outright military 
victory’ (2002: 153).18 However, by the late 1990s, the growth of paramilitary 
groups and the increasing military assistance provided by the US disrupted the 
existing ‘war system’ and created the conditions for a solution to the conflict. 
 
Although Richani did not explicitly tackle the issue of civilian victimisation, he 
suggested that guerrillas were less heavy-handed, as they had a marginal role in the 
execution of ‘massacres’ and their ‘taxation’ system was progressive. By contrast, 
paramilitaries taxed the population less fairly and had a major role in the killing of 
civilians, perpetrating increasing numbers of massacres aimed to control coca 
regions and markets, block the guerrillas’ access to funds from ‘taxation’ and make 
possible the transfer of lands to both drug bosses and sympathisers brought from 
other regions (2002: 120-1). According to Richani, by 2002 guerrillas had managed 
to ‘establish political and social control over vast areas’ of the country (2002: 86) 
and were able to control local authorities and prevent the misuse of public funds, 
which they could punish even with death (2002: 81).  
 
According to Reyes, although violence may be aimed to fight the insurgency, in the 
long term its true purpose is economic—in particular, the creation of favourable 
conditions for large haciendas. In his view, mafia bosses and large landowners buy 
farms in areas controlled by guerrillas, where insecurity has caused the price of land 
to drop. Then, paramilitary groups use violence to eliminate the social base of the 
insurgency and gain control over the population. In this way, the value of land as a 
productive asset is restored (Reyes cited by Cubides 1998: 76). Thus, although 
                                                
18 Both Richani (2002) and PNUD (2006) see territorial control as a change of course, rather than a 
step towards regime change. Ramirez (2001) has made a similar case regarding the FARC. However, 
these views are at odds with conventional approaches, which see in territorial control an intrinsic 
element of guerrilla warfare (e.g. Sarkesian 1975, Kalyvas 2006). 
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counterinsurgency may have military ends in the short term, ultimately it is also 
profitable, at least for land owners. 
 
Finally, some contributors have suggested, along similar lines with Kalyvas (2006), 
that armed conflict and violence has become localised in terms of the interests 
embodied by the parties in confrontation. For instance, Gonzalez et al. suggested that 
the internal conflict, rather than a dispute over power at the national level, might be 
‘expressing’ disputes among families, villages, towns and social groups (2003: 232). 
Likewise, Pecaut suggested that careful, historically informed examination of 
violence at the local level might reveal coalitions and conflicts among a variety of 
actors, including the state, local elites and guerrillas, which determine the intensity 
and direction of the conflict (1999). 
 
 
1.4.2 Magnitude  
 
As anywhere else, most of the analyses of conflict in Colombia have been limited by 
the lack of reliable data, are often based on press reports and incidental accounts. In 
general, they report an escalation of conflict and its impact on civilians in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. The UNDP (2003) Report shows how the numbers of 
conflict-related deaths and internally displaced people reported both by the 
government and NGOs increased during that period (2003: 119-23). 
 
Similarly Gonzalez et al. provided a detailed account of the evolution of conflict 
during the 1990s and reported an ‘increasing involvement of civilians in the war, 
which contrasts with the lesser intensity of proper belligerent actions’, that is, 
hostilities among combatants (2003: 100).19 Their contribution is based on data on 
political violence gathered by the Catholic Church—in particular the Inter-
congregational Commission ‘Justice and Peace’ and CINEP, a Jesuit NGO to which 
they themselves are affiliated. 
                                                
19 However, they incorrectly identified all violations to International Humanitarian Law with 
aggressions against civilians and used the frequency of the latter, as reported by their sources, to 
measure the former (Gonzalez et al 2003: 98). Thus, even violations that did not entail aggressions 
against civilians were included in their account; furthermore, all violations were lumped together in 
without any further distinction among them. 
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Using the same source, Restrepo and Spagat (2004) have provided a detailed picture 
of the magnitude and nature of civilian victimisation from 1989 to 2003. According 
to their figures, the number of civilian casualties remained relatively stable until 
1997—approximately 500 people dead and 300 injured per year. However, between 
1998 and 2002 there was an ‘upsurge’ of violence—approximately 3,000 civilians 
were killed in 2000 and 2001 and a 1,500 were injured in 2002.  
 
Significantly, most civilians did not die during ‘clashes’ between armed groups, but 
mainly in attacks ‘perpetrated by a single armed group, which are often specifically 
directed against civilians’ (2004: 4). In these attacks, paramilitaries ‘killed more than 
twice as many civilians as have the guerrillas [and] more than three fourths of these 
killings are in massacres’ (2004: 17), that is, in events in which at least four people 
died. The number of civilians killed by paramilitaries in such events increased eight-
fold from 1994 to 2001, suddenly dropping afterwards (2004: 19). By contrast, 
guerrillas were more prone to cause injuries than to kill civilians (more than 80 
percent of victims), particularly in bombings. Thus, the authors conclude, while 
paramilitary violence is selective, targeting only alleged guerrilla supporters, the 
insurgents find indiscriminate violence more efficient to attain their goals: ‘sowing 
fear, discouraging foreign and domestic investment, forcing expensive repairs and 
jamming infrastructure arteries’ (2004: 20).20 Restrepo and Spagat (2004) also found 
that more combatants than civilians have been killed in the period under study, thus 
rejecting the notion that the Colombian conflict could be catalogued as a ‘new war’ 
by the standards of Kaldor (1999).21  
 
A similar claim is made by Gutierrez (2006): a long-term time series of civilian to 
combatant deaths ratio, based on data gathered by the Colombian Instituto de 
                                                
20 Interestingly, the work of Restrepo and Spagat (2004) seems to confirm a claim, widely accepted 
among students of Colombian violence, that the bulk of violence in recent years is not directly linked 
to the internal armed conflict (Posada 2001: 36-7). Although the authors do not touch on this issue, a 
simple calculation shows that political violence accounted for less than eight per cent of the total 
number of homicides occurred in the country from 1988 to 2002 (as reported in the official statistics). 
Only after 1997 that figure rises over ten percent, reaching a peak of 14,5 percent in 2002. 
21 However, the authors claim that the sources overestimate the number of civilian casualties by 
including events not related to the conflict, and thus they exclude from their dataset an unspecified 
number of events and casualties. Since their claim is not substantiated, the possibility that their data 
actually underestimate the magnitude of civilian victimisation remains open. 
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Estudios Políticos, shows a decreasing tendency from the late 1950s to the late 
1970s and oscillates from then on around a ratio of one to one until the early 2000s 
(2006: 142). As he points out, this trend contradicts Kaldor’s hypothesis on the 
expected behaviour of the ratio and its relation to ‘old’ and ‘new’ wars. However, 
the author warns, the ratio hides how civilian victimisation increased notably in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, pushed by the paramilitaries’ ‘extremely vicious 
campaign’ (2006: 143).22  The ratio of civilians to combatants dead is briefly 
discussed by Rangel who, citing a Human Rights Watch dated on 1998, sets the 
figure in two civilians killed for every combatant dead but warns that it might be 
higher, as some conflict-related deaths are often ‘mistaken for common criminal 
activity’ and others, while not ‘politically motivated’, are nonetheless related to the 
conflict (2000: 581). 
 
To conclude this section, it is worth noting that the contributions made by scholars 
on the use of violence against civilians in the Colombian conflict reflect to some 
extent, some times inadvertently, the approaches and debates seen in the 
international literature reviewed in the first three sections of this chapter—where 
some authors see military and political ambitions, others see crime or a futile 
disorder. Arguably, the major shortcoming is the lack of substantial empirical 
evidence that, with a few exceptions, characterise most of the contributions just 
mentioned. While some authors have made serious attempts at measuring the 
magnitude of violence and, more specifically the civilian death toll, only in a few 
cases there has been a systematic attempt to test alternative hypotheses regarding the 
causes (e.g. Salamanca and Sanchez 2005). But, to end this section on an optimistic 
note, the lack of reliable, detailed data is now less of a problem thanks to the efforts 
of organisations such as CINEP and IEPRI as their reports and databases on armed 
conflict are likely to offer fresh insights on the issue of civilian victimisation in the 
near future.  
 
 
1.5 Challenges 
 
                                                
22 Unfortunately, in this article the author does not provide a separate account of the absolute number 
of civilian deaths, nor a methodological note on the definition of lethal political violence. 
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As noted at the beginning of this chapter, violence against civilians in the context of 
wars is as old as war itself, but systematic research on the issue is still at an early, 
exploratory stage, as is the development of reliable datasets. However, scholars have 
made significant contributions to the field over the last decade, clearing ground on 
conceptual and methodological issues such as the identification and measurement of 
variables (e.g. selective violence, territorial control). This section shows how this 
dissertation builds on those innovations and addresses some of the shortcomings and 
challenges that still remain. 
 
With a few exceptions, most of the contributions reviewed in this chapter are based 
on episodes of violence against civilians occurred in the context of specific armed 
conflicts. Indeed, influential contributions are based on single cases, quite useful in 
generating hypotheses (e.g. Keen 2005, Kalyvas 2006). Other works, by contrast, 
use quantitative techniques to test hypotheses using datasets from relatively large 
number of countries and conflicts (e.g. Azam and Hoeffler 2002, Valentino et al. 
2004). While the former usually provide a detailed a picture of the processes and 
actors involved in the production of violence, they sometimes fail to back their 
claims with evidence, even within the realm of the cases on which they focus. The 
latter by contrast are usually strong in assessing the empirical validity of their 
hypotheses but lack a detailed knowledge of the processes and events involved in the 
production of violence. 
 
In response to this challenge, the option of studying a Colombian region emerged as 
a methodological compromise that allows the assessment of the relation between 
violence and a range of independent variables across a set of municipios23 while 
keeping track on the actors and processes involved in the production of violence, 
often lost in analyses that rely exclusively on quantitative methods. In this sense, the 
methodology employed in this work belongs to a ‘more recent stream of research on 
the micro-dynamics of individual civil wars [that has] abandoned the country-level 
measurements in favour of disaggregated analysis and data collection that traces the 
behaviour and interactions of subnational actors in individual conflicts’ (Cederman 
and Gledistch 2009: 489) 
                                                
23 Municipios are the basic units of the political territorial division in Colombia; each municipio 
consists of a town and the adjacent rural area. 
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Providing an accurate picture of the magnitude of armed conflict and violence is a 
second challenge. While most of the recent contributions featured in this chapter 
focused on specific armed conflicts, including of course Colombia, only a few 
substantiated their findings with reliable data and none examined how different 
forms of violence against civilians may be used within the same armed conflict. To 
tackle this challenge, the dissertation uses three different datasets that offer a detailed 
view of the changing intensity of armed conflict during the period from 1996 to 2004 
and the role of different organisations in attacking civilians; since the datasets cover 
different forms of violence and come from different sources, NGOs and government 
agencies, they offer a more complete and balanced picture of the facts. For instance, 
thanks to the availability of these datasets, it is possible to establish that government 
forces rarely killed civilians in the region, paramilitaries were relatively incompetent 
on the battlefield, and guerrillas kidnapped nearly five times as many civilians as 
they killed.  
 
Furthermore, the dissertation makes use of the data on violence to assess the 
influence of several independent variables, including economic variables, on 
different forms of violence. Likewise, it uses data on the intensity of armed conflict 
to determine the level of territorial control achieved by the state and armed 
organisations and examines how it shaped the way they used violence against 
civilians. While territorial control is often mentioned as a key variable in explaining 
violence, efforts to measure it are rare; Kalyvas (2006) for instance, devised a simple 
test with five zones of control and coded the villages using qualitative information 
‘culled from both oral and written sources’ (2006: 421). This dissertation uses the 
same five-zone scheme but applies quantitative criteria to code neighbourhoods and 
municipios; while this method does not guarantee greater precision or accuracy, its 
main virtue lies in making the coding more consistent, transparent and replicable. 
 
A third challenge concerns the issue of whether the risks inherent in armed conflict 
are evenly spread across the population and, closely related, whether armed 
organisations use violence against civilians from different backgrounds or classes 
with different intensity. To tackle this challenge, the dissertation uses data on the 
occupations and social backgrounds of victims of killings and kidnappings and finds, 
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for instance, that paramilitary violence against civilians was more intense in the 
poorer neighbourhoods of Barrancabermeja, the largest town in the region (see Ch. 
5). Hence, it overcomes a tendency, seen in many contributions, to lump together all 
civilians into a single, homogeneous population. While this tendency probably 
reflects a morally sensible principle—the immunity of all non-combatants, 
regardless of their social status—it obscures the understanding of how violence 
affects social groups in dissimilar ways and with uneven intensity, overlooking the 
transformative (not merely destructive) effect of violence in society and overlooking 
crucial clues in understanding the rationale of armed organisations in using violence.  
 
Connected with the issue just mentioned, is that of whether violence serves in any 
way the of civilians themselves. In political theory, insurgency used to be seen as the 
violent reaction of the many to the oppression of the few and, therefore, violence 
against civilians was used only against the oppressors, e.g. ‘oligarchs’, to defend the 
interests of the masses. The literature on irregular wars (section 1.2.3 above) adopted 
a more practical view: violence was used to shape civilian collaboration, punishing 
enemy collaborators and sowing fear among potential traitors; if civilians reaped any 
benefits out of violence, it was only as a result of the restoration of order or the 
installation of a new regime. According to a third view, civilians could prompt 
attacks against other civilians and, thus, take advantage of disorder and violence, 
making a gain out of war. This view is particularly in tune with a scenario of pseudo-
war (section 1.3 above), where individual interests thrive behind the fog of war; but 
it is also possible in the context of a ‘classical’ irregular war where, as Kalyvas 
suggested: ‘alliances’ between armed organisations and civilians could enable the 
latter to have a direct role in defining who is selectively targeted by armed 
organisations—an opportunity they would seize, as self-interested individuals, to 
advance their private interests.  
 
The dissertation explores this issue but does not find evidence in support of the kind 
of alliances just described; in particular, the observed distribution of violence across 
zones of control does not match the distribution predicted by the theory. However, it 
finds evidence of a different form of alliance, in which civilians are engaged 
collectively (rather than individually), through politicians and social organisations, 
triggering episodes of social and political mobilisation. Despite their political, 
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collective nature, these alliances are less oriented by ideological principles than by 
the strategic needs and opportunities faced by both armed and social organisations, 
given the expected patterns of territorial control at a given time. To make these 
points, the dissertation employs the same datasets mentioned above as well as 
interviews with key informants, news reports published in national and regional 
printed media and secondary sources. To conclude, the dissertation overcomes some 
methodological shortcomings prevalent in the literature while building on recent 
innovations made by scholars. Ch. 2 shows how it combines qualitative and 
quantitative methods and data, obtained from a variety of sources, to this effect. 
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2. RESEARCH STRATEGY 
 
 
This chapter outlines the research strategy employed in the dissertation. The first part 
discusses the rationale of studying a region (i.e. a subset of territorial units within the 
same country) and the particular advantages found in studying the Middle 
Magdalena Valley. The second part focuses on operational aspects and describes the 
datasets and sources employed, their virtues and weaknesses. The third part shows 
how different pieces of evidence were employed to tackle the research question and 
the key issues and debates identified in the previous chapter and discusses the 
advantages of combining quantitative and qualitative data and methods 
 
 
2.1 The advantages of studying a region 
 
The geographical disparity in the observed levels of violence is one of the most 
common—and puzzling—attributes of armed conflicts. Discussing the tactical 
challenges of the ‘protracted popular war’, the US Army Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual warns their readers that ‘insurgents may use guerrilla tactics in one province 
while executing terrorist attacks and an urban approach in another. There may be 
differences in political activities between villages in the same province. The result is 
[…] a shifting “mosaic war” that is difficult for counterinsurgents to envision as a 
whole’ (US Army 2007: 14). Likewise, Kalyvas begins his study of violence in civil 
wars by identifying four puzzles, the first of which is precisely, the ‘very existence 
of variation [that] has been cited as evidence, at worst, of the sheer impossibility of 
making sense of violence and, at best, of the inability to move beyond educated 
guesses’ (2006: 3). Indeed, in recent years, explaining these variations has been 
suggested as a fruitful way to shed light on the complexities of civil wars; as 
Cederman and Gleditsch suggested, ‘looking at the spatial variation within 
individual states enables detailed comparisons between conflict and nonconflict sites 
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with attention paid to detailed subnational processes’ (2009: 491). 
 
The spatial disparities in the intensity of violence are evident in the case of 
Colombia, where the intensity of armed conflict and violence varies across the 
country, being particularly high in a few scattered patches. For instance, Echandia 
found that in the early 1990s guerrillas were present in 43 per cent of the Colombian 
municipios, mostly in rural, isolated areas still in the process of being colonised 
(1992).  
 
Students of the Colombian conflict have argued that local and regional disparities are 
connected with the particular conditions of the regions where the conflict takes 
place. This is particularly evident when the structure of armed organisations is 
considered: although most of them have a national coverage, with ‘fronts’ and 
‘blocs’ in charge of specific regions or cities, their emergence and evolution have 
followed different paths depending on local and regional conditions. For instance, 
Medina has described the dynamics of the National Liberation Army (ELN) from the 
late 1970s as a ‘confederation of regional stories and processes’ (2001: 397). In his 
history of the early years of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), 
Pizarro described the Colombian conflict as a set of ‘local wars’ (1991: 23). Local 
and regional heterogeneity is even more evident in the case of paramilitary groups, 
as different processes and sets of actors have led to their creation and consolidation 
across the country (Garzon 2005). 
 
Hence, scholars have suggested, understanding the spatial variations in the levels and 
forms of armed conflict and violence and the processes that explain such variations 
requires a detailed look to region-specific traits and trajectories. Deas and Gaitan, for 
instance, argued that any ‘inquiry [into the causes of violence] must aim to explore 
how general conditions unfold in a particular way in each region’ (1995: 398). 
Likewise, Pecaut suggested that a careful, historically informed examination of 
violence at the local level might reveal coalitions and conflicts among a variety of 
actors, including the state, local elites and guerrillas, which determine the intensity 
and direction of the conflict (Pecaut 1999, cited by Gonzalez et al. 2003: 232). This 
suggestion seems particularly adequate given our interest in exploring the role of 
alliances and civilian collaboration in the production of violence. 
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This scenario imposes potentially conflicting demands on the research design. On 
the one hand, a large-N, quantitative study would be particularly adequate to account 
for the variable intensity of armed conflict and violence in different local and 
regional settings; this strategy would involve ‘collecting as much data in as many 
diverse contexts as possible’, just as methodologists advice (King, G. et al. 1994: 
24). Indeed a nationwide study could include more than one thousand observations 
(municipios) and is viable given the availability of quantitative data (or sources from 
which data series could be compiled). On the other hand, a large-N study is less 
suited to trace the processes that led to the observed outcomes: their complexity 
imposes a limit on the scale of the phenomena to be studied and the number of 
actors, places and events they involve. Understanding such processes is critical to 
interpret the results of quantitative analyses, recast hypothesis that may need to be 
adjusted as a result of such analyses and, more generally, to back causal statements 
with plausible, evidence-based descriptions of the causal mechanisms involved 
rather than on speculation. As Elster pointed out ‘to cite the cause is not enough: the 
causal mechanism must also be provided’ (1989: 4).  
 
To conclude, the decision of studying a region, emerged as a compromise, a way to 
balance the advantages and drawbacks posed by the extreme options—a single case 
or a large-N study. By studying a region, it was possible to carry out quantitative 
analyses based on a number of observations large enough to avoid indeterminacy 
(King, G. et al. 1994: 118) without loosing grasp of the region-specific processes, 
events and actors involved in producing the outcomes of interest in the context of 
this research. As noted above, this choice reflects a recent methodological trend in 
the research on armed conflicts and violence (Cederman and Gleditsch 2009). The 
chosen region, known as the Middle Magdalena Valley, comprises 43 municipios; 
this choice is explained in detail in the second part of this chapter. 
 
Why the Middle Magdalena Valley? 
 
Given the widespread increase in the levels of violence in Colombia during the 
1990s, finding a region suitable to explore the issues discussed in the first chapter 
was not a difficult task. However, two conditions were considered in making a 
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choice: first, since the research question refers to violence produced in the context of 
an armed conflict, the region chosen had to have a record of recent conflict, 
manifested in hostilities and warfare. By 1995, several Colombian regions were in 
that situation including Uraba, Montes de Maria, Catatumbo, Lower Cauca, 
Putumayo and the Middle Magdalena Valley (Gonzalez et al 2003: 106-7). Second, 
the region had to offer relatively favourable conditions to carry out the research in 
terms of security and access to sources. 
 
The Middle Magdalena Valley satisfied both conditions. It was the cradle of the 
second most important guerrilla organisation in Colombia, of several paramilitary 
groups and a source of political and military challenges to the state’s authority. 
During the second half of the 1990s, frequent reports in the Colombia media, as well 
as bulletins disseminated by academics and NGOs suggested a significant increase in 
the intensity of armed conflict and violence, reflected in clashes between guerrillas, 
government forces and paramilitaries, as well as frequent attacks and abuses against 
civilians, including massacres and kidnappings. However, by 2004, during the 
preliminary stage of this research, the situation in the Middle Magdalena Valley had 
improved: the media reported less conflict-related events and a key informant 
indicated that the levels of violence in the region, although still worrying, had 
dropped compared with those seen a few years before.24 In general, these perceived 
trends were later confirmed by the data (see Ch. 4). With security conditions 
improving across the region, access to the sources improved as well: it was easier to 
travel within the region and, it was hoped, there would be less apprehension among 
the informants about expressing their views on politics and armed conflict to a 
stranger. 
 
Based on these considerations, in September 2004, I approached a local NGO based 
in Barrancabermeja, aiming to obtain their support in accessing data sources and 
local networks. They agreed to hire me as ‘analyst’ in a recently created ‘peace 
observatory’—a small project aimed to monitor armed conflict and violence in the 
Middle Magdalena Valley—from February to December 2005. As such, my main 
duty consisted in making contributions to periodical reports on the security situation 
                                                
24 This informant, a personal friend, was in charge of the regional branch of Red de Solidaridad, the 
government’s agency that deals with forced displacement. 
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in the region, e.g., hostilities and abuses against civilians. The post enabled me to 
contact a variety of social organisations and key informants, tapping into the 
networks that the staff of the observatory had already developed.  
 
The NGO mentioned above is the Middle Magdalena Valley Peace and Development 
Programme (PDPMM) and was founded in 1995 by the Catholic Church, the Oil 
Workers’ Union, the state-owned oil company, Ecopetrol, and CINEP25 to promote 
peace, reconciliation and development in the region. More specifically, PDPMM 
provides financial and technical assistance to community-based projects in conflict-
ridden zones. While the projects cover a wide variety of areas (e.g., agricultural 
production, fishing, mining, education, housing, human rights’ awareness, sexual 
health, environmental sustainability and institutional development), at their core, 
they are all aimed to reduce the vulnerability of poor, isolated communities to the 
risks of armed conflict. Because the PDPMM had developed important links with the 
national government, the European Union and national and international NGOs, it 
became a channel to broadcast ‘early alerts’ on imminent human rights violations 
and report past abuses. PDPMM is funded by the Colombian government, the World 
Bank and the European Commission; its activities are spread over 30 municipalities 
in the Middle Magdalena Valley. 
 
It is worth noting that, from the beginning, the staff of the PDPMM was aware of the 
aims and scope of my research; indeed, as the observatory’s director helped me in 
identifying potential informants, I discussed with him the specific issues that I was 
trying to unveil. Likewise, informants and interviewees outside the PDPMM were 
always informed of the general purpose of my research and, in most cases, being 
affiliated with this NGO proved to be an asset, as the organisation is trusted in 
different quarters, thanks to its reputation of impartiality.26 This was particularly 
                                                
25 CINEP is a Colombian NGO created in 1972 by the Society of Jesus and funded by the Jesuits and 
international organisations. Its main activities are: research on social and political issues, monitoring 
of human rights and educational projects aimed to low-income population. 
26 Of course, this reputation has its limits and being impartial is not always an asset. For instance, 
while some argue that the conciliatory approach favoured by the NGO is functional to the interests of 
the paramilitary groups, others see their work on human rights as a signal of sympathy towards the 
insurgency. Even though the national government funds and oversees the work done by this NGO, in 
one occasion a formal request of information sent to the Army by an intern working at the 
observatory, led to a visit by an intelligence officer who interrogated her about her political views and 
asked for personal details. The Army never replied to her request. 
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important since, by the time of the fieldwork, many interviewees were still wary 
about discussing political issues and events, even though they had occurred several 
years ago—especially with a stranger. 
 
 
Box 2.1. List of municipios 
Antioquia Santander Bolivar Cesar 
Caracoli Barrancabermeja Arenal Aguachica 
El Bagre Betulia Cantagallo Gamarra 
Maceo Bolivar El Penon La Gloria 
Puerto Berrio Cimitarra Hatillo de Loba Pelaya 
Puerto Nare Carmen de Chucuri Montecristo San Alberto 
Puerto Triunfo El Peñon Morales San Martin 
Remedios Landazuri Regidor Tamalameque 
Segovia Puerto Parra Rio Viejo  
Yondo Puerto Wilches San Pablo Caldas 
 Rionegro Santa Rosa del Sur La Dorada 
Boyaca  Sabana de Torres Simiti  
Puerto Boyaca San Vicente de Chucuri Tiquisio  
 Simacota   
 
The following chapter provides further details about the Middle Magdalena Valley. 
For the moment, it suffices to note that this is natural, rather than a political or 
administrative region, and there is no consensus on its precise boundaries. However, 
this work adopts a relatively inclusive definition that contains 43 municipios, from 
La Dorada in the south to El Peñon, in the north (see Box 2.1 and Map 2.1). Of 
them, 39 belong to the valley; the other four are neighbours of municipios with high 
incidence of violence and were included to increase the statistical power of the tests 
carried out in Ch. 4 as well as to account for spatial autocorrelation (i.e. ‘spill-over’ 
or ‘contagion’ effects).  
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Map 2.1. The Middle Magdalena Valley 
 
Source: Based on map drawn by Cesar Moreno, used with his permission. 
 
 
2.2 Fieldwork and data sources 
 
This part details the sources of information employed and the operational aspects 
involved in collecting and organising the data. 
 
2.2.1 Data and sources 
 
The availability of detailed, reliable quantitative data on armed conflict and violence 
in the Middle Magdalena Valley was better than expected at the initial stages of this 
research; three sources were particularly important: the VNN dataset, which covers a 
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wide variety of conflict-related phenomena, and the official databases on forced 
displacement and kidnappings. While the first dataset was specifically developed for 
this research, the other two were already available as databases. The most important 
qualitative sources were an archive of news reports and a set of semi-structured 
interviews with key informants. This section describes and discusses the methods 
used to gather and organise the information and the strengths and weaknesses of the 
sources. 
  
 
1) The VNN dataset 
 
The most important quantitative source used in this research is the VNN dataset. It is 
based on Noche y Niebla27 (‘N&N’ for short), a quarterly report published since July 
1996 by CINEP.28 N&N reports violent events motivated by political reasons or 
social intolerance, violations to the human rights and conflict-related, including 
hostilities and infractions to the international humanitarian law. These reports are 
based on a review of national and regional newspapers and interviews with local 
informants such as human rights’ activists and priests across the country. The N&N 
headquarters are located in Bogotá, but team members travel periodically to several 
regions to gather information.29 
 
The N&N Reports. N&N reports and classify events according to a conceptual 
framework consisting of four general categories:  
 
a) Violations to human rights. In particular, violations to the rights to life, liberty 
and integrity, e.g. killings, massacres, arbitrary detentions, disappearances, 
                                                
27 This name is the Spanish translation of ‘night and fog’ which refers to the deliberate lack of 
information regarding the fate of political prisoners captured by the Third Reich. 
28 From now on, I refer to the original reports as ‘N&N’ and to the dataset as ‘VNN’. As shown 
below, the variables in the VNN dataset are different from the categories used in the reports and 
exclude some observations contained in the latter.  
29 In many cases, the local priest is the first point of contact for victims of threats or forced 
displacement. As a member of the ‘peace observatory’ in Barrancabermeja, I attended several 
meetings with one of the field workers of N&N. During these meetings, the team discussed the events 
occurred in the region, focusing on those deemed more significant and also on those in which the 
motives and actors involved were unclear or several versions of the same event were contradictory. 
The general impression I gather from these meetings is that the events reported by N&N were subject 
to a thorough assessment of their accuracy. However, I cannot say whether the same rules and 
procedures were followed in the past. 
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torture and other intentional injuries. This category is based on the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on Human 
Rights. Violations to human rights are classified in three subcategories, 
depending on the motivation or nature of the crime: political persecution, abuse 
of authority or social intolerance.  
 
b) Infractions to International Humanitarian Law. This category is based on the 
Geneva Conventions and thus records infractions committed by any armed actor 
as a direct result of the waging of war. Infractions are classified in four 
subcategories: illicit means of warfare (e.g. landmines), illicit methods (e.g. use 
of Red Cross symbols to perform an attack), illicit targets (e.g. bombing a 
hospital or a water pipeline) and indignity in the treatment of human beings (e.g. 
rape, torture, taking of hostages).  
 
c) Hostilities or ‘belligerent attacks’. This category includes events in which armed 
groups or government forces clash with or attack each other, e.g. combats, 
attacks on military objectives, ambushes. 
 
d) Socio-political violence. This category includes events very similar to those 
recorded in the first category, but where the responsibility is unclear, which is 
quite common, as in the case of actions committed by men not wearing any 
badges or identification or when corpses or mass graves are found. This category 
also includes kidnappings. Events in this category are classified in two 
subcategories depending on the motivation of the crime: political persecution or 
social intolerance.  
 
This framework, based on legal concepts, reflects CINEP’s interest in ensuring that 
crimes typified in international law are eventually investigated and their perpetrators 
prosecuted, by national or international courts.30 The classification of events reflects 
the views of CINEP on the Colombian conflict and the way the legal frameworks 
mentioned apply in the Colombian context. For instance, while abuses against 
                                                
30 Priests associated with CINEP have played a crucial role in bringing cases to the Inter-American 
Human Rights Court, which have often led to politically-embarrassing decisions for the Colombian 
government. 
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civilians committed by guerrillas are not classified as violations of their human 
rights, paramilitary abuses are; this is because, in CINEP’s view, only states can 
violate human rights and the paramilitaries are state’s agents. On the other hand, 
most crimes committed by guerrillas are recorded and classified as infractions to the 
international humanitarian law and it is under this category that N&N records most 
crimes committed by guerrillas. 31  
 
Thankfully, the reports not only include aggregate data but also a description of each 
event, so it is possible to reclassify and aggregate the events using different variables 
and criteria (see Facsimile 2.1). For instance, in the particular case of guerrillas’ 
abuses, N&N does report such abuses; how they are classified is a different matter.32 
 
Other limitations of N&N as a source of information are related to difficulties in 
obtaining accurate information on specific kinds of events. For instance, only cases 
of massive displacement, that catch the eye of the media and the NGOs, are reported 
by N&N, as well as others caused by specific threats towards individuals, who report 
them to local NGOs. Hence, individual, anonymous cases of displacement, mostly 
from rural areas, are not reported. Similarly, data on kidnappings, ‘forced 
disappearances’ and other forms of abduction are not entirely reliable because the 
media and NGOs usually report the moment when the victims are captured but not 
necessarily follow each case until the victim is released or his or her fate is known. 
 
There are also limitations associated with ‘blind spots’ in data collection, that is, 
geographic areas where the access of both media and NGOs is limited and where the 
local priests showed less interest and disposition in gathering and reporting cases of 
violence. Interestingly, these blind spots are not necessarily the more violent zones, 
which journalists, officials and NGOs manage to access usually shortly after a major 
event has occurred; they are more likely to be zones well under control of a faction 
                                                
31 The classification rules regarding crimes committed by guerrillas and paramilitaries are justified on 
legal grounds. Although these rules are debatable, a discussion on this goes beyond the scope and 
methodological needs of this research. 
32 It can be argued that these biases in the categorisation of events might point towards less visible 
forms of bias, e.g. misreporting or omission of events. However this claim is more difficult to assess a 
priori, without any reference to specific cases. Whilst it is impossible to triangulate each of the events 
reported by N&N in the Middle Magdalena Valley (more than 2,500), I used other sources such as 
local newspapers and interviews to check the accuracy of some significant events, as well as the 
plausibility of the more general trends. 
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and the population is not likely to denounce any abuse. 
 
Facsimile 2.1. Section of a typical page of a Noche y Niebla report 
 
Source: Noche y Niebla 25: 23. 
 
 
Beside these limitations and potential biases, there are some virtues worth to 
mention, such as the fact that there is a ‘conceptual framework’ in which the 
categories used in the reports are discussed and defined, providing an accurate 
picture of the range of events included in the reports. Furthermore, the framework 
has remained unchanged since the publication begun, allowing inter-temporal 
comparisons as well as the construction of time series. The most important strength, 
though, is the detailed account of most events, which made possible the development 
of a detailed dataset that goes beyond the basic details (e.g. type of events, municipio 
and year) and covers details such as the number of casualties, their occupation and 
the warring parties involved. Furthermore, whenever a significant event, trend or 
tipping point was detected in the data, it was possible to go back to the original 
record and evaluate its significance considering the full details of the situation and 
the context in which it had happened. This level of detail was not available in other 
datasets considered at the beginning of this research, e.g. the one held by the 
National Planning Office. 
 
It is worth noting that this is not the first time that the N&N reports are used for the 
purpose of analysing the Colombian conflict. CINEP researchers have studied recent 
trends in political violence in Colombia based on these data (Gonzalez et al. 2003). 
Also, a team of scholars at Royal Holloway College developed a dataset based on 
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these reports (Restrepo et al. 2004a). However, the criteria to screen and classify the 
events, and the variables themselves, are different and both datasets were unavailable 
by the fieldwork started.33 
 
From the reports to the dataset. Although the N&N reports have been published 
both in print and on the Internet, there is limited access to the database as such and, 
as noted above, the categories used by CINEP might not be suitable to certain 
research aims. Therefore, in order to use the data, it was necessary to transform the 
narrative accounts provided in the reports into actual variables and then record the 
values in a spreadsheet or database—in this case an MS Access database. To do so, it 
was necessary to go through all the quarterly reports, looking for events occurred in 
the region (43 municipalities in six departments), and then fill in the database form 
(see Facsimile 2.2). This was done during the second quarter of 2005 and for this 
reason the dataset covers only events occurred between July 1996 and December 
2004. 
 
Each record (event) consists of seven sections: 
 
a) Identification, e.g. date, municipality, urban/rural area, issue and page numbers. 
b) Factions/actors involved, e.g. guerrillas, paramilitaries, civilians, etc.  
c) Description of the event—based on a predefined list.  
d) Number of dead, injured and abducted victims in the event, specifying also age 
and gender when the information was provided. 
e) In the case of civilians, a general description about the occupation or social role 
of the victim, e.g., peasant, student, shopkeeper, politician. 
f) General description of the buildings, houses, cattle or any other assets stolen or 
destroyed.  
g) Finally, a set of fields to record how the event was classified by N&N according 
to their own conceptual framework, e.g. infraction to International Humanitarian 
Law. 
 
                                                
33 When I tried to obtain the CINEP’s database, I was told the data was already in the public domain, 
in the reports; this answer was true but not useful. At the time I contacted the Royal Holloway 
College team, they still were processing the data so I only could obtain data on civilian killings for 
two municipios. 
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Facsimile 2.2. MS Access data capture screen 
 
 
 
 
After all the events occurred in the region and reported by N&N were recorded in the 
database, several consistency checks were performed, and in this way a number of 
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errors and omissions, occurred during the data entry were corrected. Given the 
importance of civilian killings as a dependent variable, all the records with civilian 
deaths were double checked against the original reports to ensure their accuracy.  
 
Furthermore, a number of events that could have occurred in the absence of armed 
conflict were deemed irrelevant and therefore excluded from the subsequent 
analysis. For instance, events motivated by ‘abuse of authority’ or ‘social 
intolerance’, and committed by government forces, were excluded from the dataset 
for the purpose of analysis, as they are not directly linked to the armed conflict and, 
as the definition suggests, they probably would have occurred anyway, even in the 
absence of conflict. Events classified as ‘motivated by social intolerance’ and 
committed by guerrillas and paramilitaries were included, though. A few 
kidnappings committed by unknown actors, were also excluded, as there is no 
evidence of political motivation or relation to conflict.  
 
 
Finally, several killings in which the identities of victims and perpetrators were 
unknown were excluded from the analysis. In all, 139 events were left aside; the 
resulting dataset records 2,378 events deemed relevant for analysis. This dataset was 
used as a source to gauge the intensity and nature of armed conflict (e.g. hostilities, 
combatants killed in action, warring parties involved) as well as to measure the 
civilian death toll—one of three key dependent variables used in this research to 
gauge and analyse the intensity of violence against civilians.  
 
 
2) The forced displacement registry 
 
The most important sources of data on forced displacement in Colombia are the 
official displacement registry and the reports produced by the NGO CODHES. 
However, CODHES only gathers information on the number of displaced people 
arriving in a town, based on estimates provided by local NGOs, the Church and other 
sources. By contrast, the official, known as SUR (Sistema Unico de Registro, or 
Unified Register System in English), is based on information provided by the 
victims themselves, including data on their places of origin and arrival and details on 
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the members of the household and the assets they left behind, e.g. land, cattle, 
equipment. Although most of the data are inaccessible under privacy and security 
considerations, for several years the government published a statistical summary 
with quarterly data disaggregated at the municipal level, including data on the 
number of individuals and households leaving and arriving in each municipio 
because of violence. These summaries, published as Excel spreadsheets, were 
available online and updated periodically. 
 
It is important to mention that the SUR only aims to capture data on displacement 
caused by violence and not other forms of migration—either forced or voluntary. 
Thus, applicants to the SUR must provide a brief account of the events that led to 
their displacement and, ultimately, local officials decide whether the applicant 
should be included in the registry. In some cases this had led to allegations that 
officials are excessively restrictive and therefore the aggregate figures underestimate 
the actual magnitude of the phenomenon. Also, it is often said that some displaced 
individuals prefer not to be included in the register, as the meagre benefits provided 
by the state are often outweighed by the costs associated with the stigma of being 
displaced, as they are often assumed to be guerrillas. The case for an underestimation 
of the actual figures is backed by CODHES, whose statistics are usually higher than 
those produced by the SUR.  
 
Furthermore, data gathered during the 2005 Population Census shows that in several 
rural areas of the Middle Magdalena Valley the population figures were well below 
the official demographic forecasts (based on the 1993 Census) but the gaps could not 
be explained by forced displacement; in other words, the observed population losses 
were larger than the aggregate displacement figures, leaving room for unrecorded 
forced displacement.34 Despite these caveats, the SUR remains the most reliable 
source and the only one that offers figures on the number of households leaving each 
municipio.35 
 
                                                
34 This, of course, is assuming that the Census offered a reasonably good approximation to the actual 
population (something that cannot be taken for granted in conflict zones), and the forecasts did not 
overestimate the population growth. 
35 Data compiled by CODHES is based on estimates provided by key local informants and, crucially, 
only reports figures on displaced people arriving to a municipio. 
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3) The official dataset on kidnappings 
 
At first sight, kidnapping may look as an unambiguous form of violence. However, 
this category includes a variety of disparate events that differ in their in crucial 
aspects such as their duration (from hours to years), outcome (from quick release to 
death) and the captors (guerrillas, petty criminals, paramilitaries) and consequently, 
in the way each event is classified. Furthermore, the accuracy of the information on 
kidnappings and other forms of abduction and detention of civilians depends to a 
good extent on the ability of the monitor to follow each case until the captors are 
identified, a demand is made or, eventually, a corpse is found.  
 
Two databases were initially considered as sources of information for the current 
research: VNN and the official database, kept by Fondelibertad, a government 
agency, and obtained by the observatory. The codification of events in these 
databases followed different categories—one based on human rights and 
international humanitarian law, the other on the Colombian penal code. In addition, 
they relied on different primary sources and, therefore, it is not surprising that their 
figures do not match.  
 
The main differences between both sources are the following. First, the 
Fondelibertad database records all abductions under the category of kidnappings and 
only acknowledges non-state actors as captors; by contrast the VNN records two 
other forms of abduction of civilians—forced disappearances and arbitrary 
detentions, carried out by state or non-state actors. Second, whereas VNN only 
offers information on kidnappings related with armed conflict, Fondelibertad 
records kidnappings in general, including those committed by petty criminals; 
furthermore, Fondelibertad classifies kidnappings depending on their motivation—
political, economic or unknown—and in several cases offers details regarding the 
ransom demanded. Third, whereas VNN reports and classifies the events based on 
information immediately available after the victims are captured, Fondelibertad 
monitors each case, e.g., whether the victim was released, or died or remains captive, 
keeping the database up to date. Fourth, as should be evident by now, the data 
gathered by Fondelibertad is far more detailed than that recorded by VNN. Fifth, as 
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the figures suggest (see Table 2.1), there seems to be a bias on both sources 
regarding the number of cases they report: insurgent abductions seemed to be more 
likely to be reported by Fondelibertad than by VNN and the opposite happened with 
paramilitary abductions.  
 
Table 2.1. Victims of kidnapping, forced disappearance and arbitrary detention, 1996-2004 
Variables Kidnappings Forced disappearances 
Arbitrary 
detentions 
Sources Fondelibertad VNN VNN VNN 
Guerrillas 965 559 0 56 
Paramilitaries 110 1 120 121 
Government   1 104 
Unknown 276 2 42 1 
Mixed   10 57 
Others * 61    
Total 1,412 563 173 339 
Notes: Based on: Fondelibertad and VNN dataset. 
* Petty criminals or victims’ relatives. 
 
 
Despite these and other biases, evident when reading the records (e.g. references to 
the success of the police in liberating or forcing the release of hostages) the 
Fondelibertad dataset was found superior in terms of accuracy and detail. In 
particular, the fact that it records the suspected motives of each kidnapping and also 
the sums of money demanded in ransom kidnappings offered a clearer insight into 
the rationale for this form of violence.36 
 
 
4) Other datasets  
 
Economic, independent variables could play a role in explaining the levels of 
violence experience in the region. In most cases these time series were readily 
available from the sources. Dataset on fiscal transfers, local public expenditure, oil 
and gold royalties and coca growing areas, were obtained from the National Planning 
Office, the Institute of Mining and Geology (Ingeominas) and the local branch of the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Finding information on agricultural 
                                                
36 It should be noted that forced disappearances, a trademark of political violence in Latin America, 
could not be fully taken into account in the analysis. Although both N&N and Fondelibertad provide 
data on people captured by the warring parties, its accuracy is limited either because the sources do 
not necessarily track the cases, e.g., whether the victims are later found dead or alive, as is the case of 
N&N, or because they do not provide information about civilians unlawfully captured by the 
government, as is the case of Fondelibertad. 
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activity at the municipal level for all the municipios was less easy as national offices 
only held information disaggregated at the departmental level. To this effect, it was 
necessary to visit or contact the departmental agricultural offices in Bucaramanga, 
Medellin, Valledupar and Cartagena and obtain from them copies of the municipal 
yearly surveys carried out in the past, from 1996 onwards. Thanks to this 
information it was possible to test hypotheses regarding the effect of agriculture and 
cattle ranching on violence.  
 
 
2.2.2 Qualitative sources 
 
While the datasets just mentioned were invaluable in conveying a comprehensive 
and precise picture of the forms, magnitude and evolution of armed conflict and 
violence in the Middle Magdalena Valley, two sources were used to identify and 
trace relevant social and political events and processes: newspapers and interviews.  
 
 
1) Newspapers 
 
Using archives of national and regional newspapers stored at CINEP, PDPMM and 
public libraries, it was possible to compile more than 1,000 newspaper and magazine 
clips about political and conflict-related events in the Middle Magdalena Valley. The 
sources include newspapers such as El Tiempo, El Espectador, Vanguardia, Voz, El 
Nuevo Siglo, El Colombiano, El Pais, El Heraldo and El Universal and the weekly 
magazines Semana and Cambio. Some of these papers have national scope and 
circulation nationwide, but others are restricted to particular departments and 
regions.  
 
Although the large majority of the clips collected were news reports, rather than 
editorial or opinion pieces, as any piece of journalism, they reflect editorial lines, 
political constraints and ideological biases. This is especially so when it comes to the 
coverage of armed conflict (e.g. the outcome of a combat): most of the clips 
reviewed echoed the official line and they rarely questioned the accounts produced 
by the authorities, unless they were reporting critical views made by other actors or 
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organisations, e.g. civil servants, priests, NGOs, international agencies. This is both 
a reflection of the journalists’ cognitive and political biases and a result of the 
editorial constraints enforced by media companies, political actors and armed 
organisations. For instance, during the paramilitary campaign of 2001 in 
Barrancabermeja, journalists who produced revealing reports from the frontline, later 
found that they were never broadcasted by news programmes in Bogota; they also 
have faced threats from officials and armed organisations who objected any sort of 
media coverage over certain events (CINEP & Credhos 2004: 129, 133).  
 
That said, newspapers were an invaluable source of information for this research, 
crucial to carry out the analyses presented in Ch. 5 and 6. They were particularly 
useful in reconstructing the time scale of certain episodes, in obtaining details about 
significant events detected in the datasets or mentioned by authors and interviewees, 
and in grasping the perception of various authorities and actors, including members 
of armed organisations, on the development of the armed conflict. 
 
 
2) Interviews 
 
The main purpose of the interviews was documenting and tracing certain processes 
and episodes of interest and, since most of them occurred in the recent past, it was 
possible to obtain first-hand accounts of episodes of interest from key informants 
who were actually involved in them. The identification of interviewees was made on 
the basis of the knowledge that each source had about particular events. Since the 
research strategy did not involve a systematic comparison of cases, the 
questionnaires varied across locations depending on the specific experience each 
source had. Accordingly, each interview started with a limited set of specific queries, 
which usually led to further questions depending on the answers provided by each 
source.  
 
The staff at the peace observatory in Barrancabermeja were particularly helpful in 
identifying potential interviewees depending on the subject. Likewise, the 
interviewees themselves sometimes suggested names of other potential informants. 
In all, 33 informants were approached and interviewed in Barrancabermeja, Bogota, 
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Bucaramanga and Santa Rosa (see Box 2.2). In general, most interviewees were 
cooperative and the fact that most of them were contacted through informal networks 
and by trusted friends and former colleagues was of great help in dealing with 
sensitive issues (e.g. friendship with insurgents) despite the fact that I was an 
outsider. However, a few refused to be recorded or asked not to be named. One of 
them denied any knowledge of the issues he was asked (despite reassurances from 
other sources that he effectively knew about them) and another simply declined the 
interview arguing concerns over their personal security. 
 
All the informants were civilians and the attempts to contact some mid-level cadres 
of armed organisations who were in prison were fruitless. For legal and security 
reasons, I did not attempt to contact any active insurgent cadres. The unavailability 
of primary sources on the paramilitary side was less of a problem than it was on the 
insurgent side as the former were interviewed in several occasions by regional and 
national newspapers; the extensive interviews carried by Aranguren (2001) also 
provided plenty of details about the paramilitary strategy in the Middle Magdalena 
Valley and Barrancabermeja. However, there is no doubt that more light could be 
shed on the issues dealt with on this research if they were available and ready to talk. 
Although there is hope that the ‘justice and peace’ process promoted by the Uribe 
administration will yield significant revelations about the perpetrators and motives of 
several crimes, so far this expectation has not been matched by the facts.  
 
2.3 From the evidence to the questions and debates: combining 
quantitative and qualitative sources and methods 
 
Ch. 1 identified three possible answers to the question of why there is violence 
against civilians in the context of an armed conflict as well as key issues connected 
with that question, such as the uneven distribution of violence across social groups 
and classes, the role of civilians themselves in assisting armed organisations through 
collaboration and so-called ‘alliances’ and the criminalisation of armed conflict.  
 
Box 2.2 List of interviewees 
I-1 Artemio Mejia, PDPMM staff in San Pablo, formerly a politician 
I-2 Cecilia Alarcon, leader of an organisation of displaced women in south 
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Bolivar 
I-3 Delmar Burgos, politician, former mayor of Santa Rosa  
I-4 Eduardo Diaz, priest and university professor, based in Barrancabermeja in 
the 1970s and 1980s 
I-5 Eugenio Blanquicet, president of the local association of ‘juntas de accion 
comunal’ in Barrancabermeja 
I-6 Teofilo Acuna, president of the south Bolivar miners’ federation 
I-7 Fernando Acuna, retired, formerly member of the oil workers’ union 
I-8 Fernando Fontalvo y Daniel Medellin, politicians, leaders from Santa Rosa 
I-9 Francisco Campo, human rights activist and politician from 
Barrancabermeja 
I-10 German Bueno, ELN sympathiser in the 1970s and 1980s 
I-11 German Plata, director of the PDPMM’s observatory, human rights’ activist 
I-12 Gilberto Guerra, president of the Cimitarra River Valley Association 
I-13 Guillermina Hernandez, grassroots leader, Barrancabermeja 
I-14 Jacqueline Rojas, member of OFP, a women’s Organisation 
I-15 Jaime Pena, father of one of the victims of the 16 May 1998 massacre 
I-16 Julio Delgado, retired, former member of the departmental assembly 
I-17 Luis Briceno, economist, advisor to the PDPMM on economic issues 
I-18 Nilson Davila, sociologist, advisor to the PDPMM on forced displacement  
I-19 Pablo Arenales, member of a Bogota-based NGO 
I-20 Raul Devia, university professor and researcher, he directed a research 
project on the extraction of timber in the Cimitarra River Valley 
I-21 Regulo Madero, human rights activist and politician from Barrancabermeja 
I-22 Ricardo Polo, consultant, officer of the National Rehabilitation Plan in the 
Middle Magdalena Valley in the late 1980s 
I-23 Rosario Saavedra, sociologist, she worked with father Eduardo Diaz in 
Barrancabermeja in the 1970s 
I-24 Susana Farfan consultant, officer of the National Rehabilitation Plan in the 
Middle Magdalena Valley in the late 1980s 
I-25 Douglas Alvarado, merchant and farmer, Santa Rosa 
I-26 Pedro Fandino, merchant and farmer from Santa Rosa 
I-27 A merchant from Santa Rosa, who asked not to be named 
I-28 Rosalba Rondon, miner from Santa Rosa 
I-29 Jose Felix Montoya, local delegate of a NGO funded by Plan Colombia, 
Santa Rosa 
I-30 Luz Marina Mayorga, miner, Santa Rosa 
I-31 Ramiro Barreto, councilman, Santa Rosa 
I-32 Alirio Rey, development secretary in Santa Rosa 
I-33 A merchant from Santa Rosa, who asked not to be named 
 
Notes: 
 
Interviewees 11, 20 and 26 to 33 asked not to be recorded. Interviewees 27 
and 33 asked not to be named. Interviewee 13 made informal commented 
on the topics suggested but declined a full interview. 
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It also discussed the methodological challenges associated with these debates. This 
part specifies how the methods and sources described above were used to address the 
question and the issues just mentioned. It also illustrates the advantages of 
combining quantitative and qualitative data and methods to that effect. 
 
Regarding the central research question the dissertation employs quantitative 
methods to assess the relevance of the alternative explanations outlined. The 
descriptive evidence provides significant clues, particularly in the case of 
kidnapping, as the official dataset provides detailed information about the motive 
behind each individual case. However, the dissertation employs econometric 
techniques to analyse the spatial distribution of conflict-related violence across the 
region. Three sets of independent variables are included in the regressions: the first 
set is aimed to assess whether violence was used in direct connection with the armed 
struggle and includes variables such as the number of hostilities and combatants 
killed in action. The second set of variables captures economic variables and 
includes data on the production of gold and coca as well as on cattle stocks and local 
public finances; it is aimed to assess whether violence might have resulted from a 
struggle over such resources. The third set includes control variables. These analyses 
are presented and discussed in Ch. 4. 
 
The dissertation also uses quantitative evidence to explore other issues mentioned 
above. The first concerns whether different social groups and classes are unevenly 
targeted by armed organisations and, if so, what does the disparity tell us about the 
goals they pursue in using and abusing civilians. For this, the analysis relies on the 
descriptions and categories reported by the sources about the occupation and social 
status of victims of killing and kidnapping; after coding, the data show the disparities 
in the levels of violence faced by people in different occupations. In the case of 
Barrancabermeja, the analysis takes into account the socio-economic level of the 
neighbourhoods where the killings occurred, as measured by the local authorities. 
Despite missing observations and the (sometimes) blurry descriptions provided by 
the sources, the data sheds light on an issue neglected by most scholars so far. These 
issues are discussed in Ch. 5 and 7. 
 
The second issue is the prevalence of opportunistic alliances between individual 
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civilians and armed organisations; according to Kalyvas (2006) the presence of such 
alliances would lead to higher levels of selective, homicidal violence in disputed 
areas dominated by either armed organisation, resulting in a distinctive pattern of 
violence across zones of territorial control. These zones are coded using quantitative 
criteria and, in particular, data on the intensity of armed conflict (i.e. hostilities and 
combatants killed in action); based on this zoning the observed and expected patterns 
of violence are contrasted and discussed. Due to the informational demands of this 
quasi-experiment, its application is limited to Barrancabermeja, the largest town in 
the region. The case of Barrancabermeja is discussed in detail in Ch. 6. 
 
The third issue is the criminalisation of armed conflict and violence. One of the 
aspects that casts doubt over the motives of armed organisations, especially 
insurgents, in using violence against civilians is the scale of ransom kidnapping. An 
implication of Naylor’s hypothesis on the funding sources of rebel movements 
(1993) is that those interested in building a constituency and developing a social 
base would restrict ransom kidnappings to zones they do not control (see Ch. 1). 
Interestingly, this pattern is not matched by the observed distribution of ransom 
kidnappings across zones of territorial control in the region, a result discussed in Ch. 
7.  
 
Furthermore, quantitative data are critical in providing an accurate picture of the 
magnitude of conflict and the scale and forms of violence used against civilians by 
the state and armed organisations; descriptive data provided throughout the 
document, and especially in Ch. 4, are helpful in keeping the analysis grounded and 
in taking a critical view on secondary sources. 
 
While quantitative data and analysis provide valuable insights into these issues, 
qualitative sources (e.g. newspapers, interviewees and secondary sources) are of 
critical importance to interpret quantitative results, assess their significance and 
derive theoretical implications. A solid grasp of the actual processes and stories that 
lie behind the events captured in datasets enables us to re-formulate and adjust the 
hypotheses based on ‘plausible stories’ (Elster 1989: 8) rather than on ‘educated 
guesses’ (Kalyvas 2006: 3). For instance, the distribution of violence across zones of 
territorial control in Barrancabermeja (Ch. 5) is at odds, in several respects, with the 
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theoretical predictions; thanks to the availability of qualitative data, in particular 
interviews and extensive news reports from local and regional newspapers, it is 
possible to discuss such ‘anomalies’ and their significance using evidence, rather 
than speculation, as a reference. 
 
The nature of collaboration and alliances is also explored using qualitative sources; 
Ch. 6 in particular relies on interviews, news reports and secondary sources to show 
how armed organisations build alliances with social organisations, politicians and 
local elites to extend and strengthen territorial control and political control. 
Qualitative sources are also used to triangulate quantitative sources; for instance, 
data obtained from datasets can be crosschecked against accounts obtained from 
newspapers or secondary sources. Likewise, significant events found in the datasets, 
e.g. with a heavy weight on the aggregate data or with important implications on the 
coding of events or their interpretation, are double-checked and further explored 
using sources such as newspapers, interviews and reports published by NGOs. 
Moreover, qualitative data were the source of the most important dataset used in the 
dissertation: the narrative, descriptive accounts provided in a series of reports on 
political violence and human rights produced by a Colombian NGO, were tabulated 
and coded into a dataset, as explained above (section 2.2.1).  
 
More generally, qualitative data are used to provide a picture of how certain key 
processes developed and to get a grasp on the perceptions and motives of the 
organisations and actors involved and understand the relations between them. For 
instance, the narrative accounts provided in Ch. 5 and 6 show are crucial to 
understand the contribution of paramilitary forces to the counterinsurgent campaign 
as well as their operative relation, on the ‘battlefield’, with government forces. 
Likewise, interviews, made by the author or obtained from newspapers or secondary 
sources, offer an insight into the attitudes of representative members of the local and 
regional elites vis-à-vis the state and armed organisations and are, thus, helpful in 
understanding the concrete shape that concepts such as alliances and collaboration 
acquire on the field. 
 
The use of quantitative and qualitative methods and data in the dissertation is, thus, a 
response tailored to the specific questions posed by the theory and to the limitations 
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and possibilities opened by the data. It echoes the views of social scientists who see 
in this combined strategy an opportunity to provide a ‘more complete answer to a 
research question’ (Bryman 2006: 612). Although, strictly speaking, the dissertation 
does not follow the principles of ‘analytical narratives’ (in particular the use of game 
theory and rational-choice formal modelling), it shares with this approach its interest 
in locating and tracing the processes that generate an outcome of interest and in 
identifying and exploring the mechanisms involved (Bates et al. 1998: 12). 
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3. THE MIDDLE MAGDALENA VALLEY: A HISTORY OF 
CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE 
 
 
 
The Middle Magdalena Valley (also known in Spanish as Magdalena Medio) is a 
natural region rather than an administrative or political unit that comprises the areas 
along the Magdalena River, roughly speaking between the towns of La Dorada, in 
the department of Boyaca, and El Banco, in Magdalena. In this sector, the valley is 
bounded by two mountain chains: the Central cordillera on the west and by the 
Eastern cordillera and sierra San Lucas on the east.  
 
The region comprises marginal areas often seen as the ‘backyards’ of several 
departments; this is particularly evident in departments such as Bolivar, where the 
relation between the towns and the capital, Cartagena, is limited to bureaucratic and 
electoral matters. Even Barrancabermeja, home to the largest oil refinery in 
Colombia for nearly a century, has remained a marginal town in economic and 
political terms in the national context. However, throughout the years, the region has 
been home to radical political movements, insurgencies, paramilitary groups and 
drug mafias and, as such, has had a history of armed conflict and political violence. 
 
The first part of this chapter examines the factors that may have contributed to the 
emergence and persistence of political violence in the region. The second describes 
the emergence and consolidation of the organisations that would play the crucial 
roles during the period of study, that is, insurgent and paramilitary groups. The third 
part provides a quantitative account of the magnitude of armed conflict and violence 
during the late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s in the Middle Magdalena Valley. 
Finally, the relevance of the research question and debates is discussed with 
reference to the setting, actors and history of the region. 
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3.1 The roots of conflict 
 
Until recently, and for decades, the Middle Magdalena Valley was a region where 
political radicalism, insurgencies, insecurity and violence throve. Indeed, it was the 
cradle of important guerrilla and paramilitary organisations such as the ELN and the 
MAS. This section identifies and discusses several factors that may have contributed 
to this situation and suggests causal connections between recent armed conflict and 
violence, in its wider sense, and the specific social, economic and political 
conditions of the region over the last century. 
 
 
3.1.1 The role of the state 
 
The first factor to be considered is the role of the state. Until the late nineteenth 
century, most of the region remained unpopulated, with the exception of a couple of 
towns along the river, which was, for centuries, the main way of communication 
between the Colombian capital, up in the Andes, and the world.37 From the 1870s, 
the construction of several rail lines across the region made easier the transportation 
of coffee and tobacco from Antioquia, Caldas and Santander and attracted 
migrations, prompting the development of villages and rural areas along the rail 
lines. Later, in the first decades of the twelfth century, oil prospects were asserted in 
different locations along the valley and several foreign companies, such as Texas Oil 
Company (Texaco), Tropical Oil Company (later Esso Colombia), Socony-Vacuum 
Corporation (later Mobil Oil Company), Richmond Petroleum Company and Shell, 
landed in the region to drill and extract oil, attracting even more immigrants. 
 
As the state proved sluggish in providing housing, infrastructure and social services 
to the population, the development of the new settlements was funded and promoted 
by oil companies. In Barrancabermeja, as soon as the Tropical Oil Company (Troco), 
                                                
37 Barrancabermeja, for instance, did not appear on the maps until the early twentieth century. It is 
unclear whether a village called Puerto Santander, displayed in a map by 1851 in a similar location 
was its actual predecessor (Aprile-Gniset 1997). 
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a branch of the Standard Oil, begun its operations to explore and extract oil in 1920, 
the departmental government (Gobernacion) created a new municipality and 
established a local administration so that it could quickly respond to the needs of the 
company (Aprile-Gniset 1997: 87, 161). Unable to cope with the fast growth of the 
town during the 1920s, the local authorities had to rely on Troco to build the basic 
local infrastructure, including water pipelines, the hospital and a prison and even in 
providing electricity to the town. Thus, Troco became not only the main taxpayer but 
also the main contractor to the local government, whose actual role seemed to be 
providing security: by the mid-1920s, out of 300 local civil servants, 190 were 
policemen (Aprile-Gniset 1997: 153, 226, 231-236).  
 
Likewise, Shell played an important role in developing two new towns across the 
river—Casabe (later known as Yondo) and Cantagallo (Murillo 1994)—where the 
company built what locals then called ‘a city amid the jungle’, including not only 
homes but a church, a hospital, a school and the embankment that, still today, 
protects the town from the seasonal flooding. The relative absence of the state meant 
that, until the 1960s (when Shell returned the oil fields to the Colombian state), the 
town lived in relative isolation from political trends and events. For instance, the 
political earthquake caused by the killing of the Liberal caudillo and presidential 
candidate Jorge Eliecer Gaitan in 1948, which prompted an outbreak of violence 
across the country, was barely felt in the town (Murillo 1994).  
 
The role that private companies played in some towns, was performed in others by 
the Church. In Santa Rosa, for instance, Jesuit priests such as Luis Arocena, 
Anastasio Calderon and Gabriel Caro led the construction of schools, water pipelines 
and a new church (I-8, I-16).38 However, in rural areas, grassroots organisations or 
communities themselves, through informal arrangements, managed to allocate 
resources, e.g., plots to colonists who arrived looking for land at the edge of the 
frontier of colonisation (I-16). Likewise, peasants in the Cimitarra River often built 
their own schools but struggled to get the government to appoint and pay for 
teaching staff (I-4). As late as 1993, the percentage of homes lacking access to basic 
services in areas such as south Bolivar was in the range of 40 to 60 per cent, 
                                                
38 A full list of interviewees (I-1, I-2, etc.) is provided in Chapter 2. 
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compared with a regional average of 10 per cent.39 
 
Admittedly, state absence was not the rule across the whole region; some towns and 
rural areas were better integrated to the domestic economy and enjoyed better access 
to infrastructure and basic services. Roughly speaking, towns and villages located on 
the east side of the valley, in the departments of Santander and Cesar, enjoyed better 
access to basic state services and benefited from the proximity of main roads and rail 
lines built to connect the Atlantic coast with cities such as Bogota and Bucaramanga. 
However, the presence of the state in towns, and especially in rural, mountainous 
areas, on the east side was precarious and the provision of infrastructure and services 
was often assumed by private actors and communities. Furthermore, in vast rural 
areas the police and the army were, at best, absent and, at worst, repressive and 
heavy-handed; this created favourable conditions for the emergence of peasant self-
defences who protected the colonists against petty criminals, government forces and 
voracious land grabbers.40  
 
Repression also created favourable conditions for the emergence of insurgencies. 
The early ELN had in their ranks former members of the Liberal guerrilla led by 
Rafael Rangel. Rangel was one of the top cadres of the ‘popular government’ 
installed in Barrancabermeja in response to the killing of the Liberal leader Gaitan in 
Bogota in 1948. His death caused widespread political turmoil and prompted the 
Conservative government to adopt repressive measures. In Barrancabermeja, the 
national government appointed a military mayor pushing Rangel into clandestinity, 
where he launched a small guerrilla group to resist the Conservative repression, 
implemented by the Police and armed bands (Vargas 1989). Although this guerrilla 
group later demobilised during the Rojas government, some members would later 
join the ELN (Safford and Palacios 2002: 347-350; Vargas 1989). 
 
 
3.1.2 Social and economic conflicts 
                                                
39 Figures based on the 1993 National Census; the regional average includes approximately 60 
municipios.  
40 Although peasant self-defences often turned into banditry, in some regions they were direct 
predecessors of the guerrilla movements of the 1960s. The origin of the FARC, in particular, is 
directly related to ‘armed colonisation’ in areas such as Marquetalia and Sumapaz (Marquez 1990, 
Pizarro 1991).  
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Since the late nineteenth century, the Middle Magdalena Valley has been the stage of 
social conflicts involving urban workers, peasants, landowners, local authorities, the 
national government, and domestic and multinational companies. Following Alonso 
(1997), three axes of social and economic conflict can be identified in the region: an 
agrarian conflict, over land ownership; a labour conflict, between workers and 
companies; and a urban social conflict, involving poor, marginalised urban 
communities, over the provision of housing and infrastructure.41 
 
 
1) The agrarian conflict 
 
The development of inner frontier areas in the region prompted conflicts over 
property rights, which were common all over the country since the 1870s. The nature 
of these conflicts has been best summarised by LeGrand (1986: xvi): 
 
Generally, frontier expansion occurred in Colombia in two successive stages. First, 
peasant families moved into frontier areas and cleared and planted the land, increasing 
its value by the labour they incorporated into it. These pioneers resembled peasant 
proprietors in other parts of the country, but with one crucial difference: they did not 
hold legal title to the land they farmed. In the second stage, well-to-do land 
entrepreneurs appeared on the scene, intending to form large estates and convert the 
earlier settlers into tenant farmers by asserting property rights over the land. This basic 
conflict of interests between self-provisioning settler families and elite investors intent 
on controlling the settlers’ land and labour was intrinsic to the Colombian frontier 
experience.  
 
These conflicts were a crucial issue in the national political agenda from the 1920s to 
the 1970s, fuelling social movements and violence at several points of Colombian 
history. Although the Liberal administrations and the Supreme Court provided legal 
frameworks favourable to small settlers (colonos) in the 1920s and 1930s, the central 
government was unable to enforce them and the bonds between regional and local 
authorities and elites hindered those efforts. There are no detailed accounts of how 
these conflicts evolved in the Middle Magdalena Valley but LeGrand reported that 
the first colono league was established in Berrio in 1921, to challenge a grant 
requested by a land company (1986: 128).  
 
                                                
41 Alonso (1997) identifies a fourth axis—political-institutional—discussed later. 
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To a good extent ‘la violencia’ was triggered by events in the national political 
arena, but local interests played an important role in the materialisation of violence, 
as ‘death threats and burn outs compelled many peasants to sell their fields cheaply 
or simply abandon them, leaving the land consolidated in the hands of those who 
initiated such tactics’ (LeGrand 1986: 163). That was the case of Cantarranas, in San 
Vicente, where armed bands hired by Conservatives managed to displace Liberal 
landowners (Vargas 1989: 40). In Berrio and Wilches, the Police hunted Liberals 
thereby allowing Conservatives to loot or destroy their possessions and take hold of 
their lands (Bonilla 1994; Alonso 1994). 
 
Oil companies were also involved in land conflicts, the most notorious of which was 
prompted by the acquisition of two large estates by Texaco, in 1957, which 
happened to include both colonos’ and middle landowners’ plots (Medina 1990). 
Similar conflicts, of lesser magnitude, occurred in lands owned by other oil 
companies, such as Shell in Casabe (Yondo), and were later reactivated in the 1960s, 
when several oil fields were handed back to the Colombian government and a wave 
of colonos entered those lands. The role of Shell in these conflicts has been further 
documented by Zamosc in his work on the peasant movement in Colombia (1986). 
He identified the Middle Magdalena Valley as one of five geographic areas of land 
struggle in the 1960s42 and described how Shell pushed out ‘a large number of 
colonists who were trying to resettle after fleeing from ‘la violencia’ in the 
highlands’ and, later, ‘organised [a] force of private guards to destroy the crops and 
evict the squatters’ in rural areas close to Barrancabermeja (1986: 43). However, 
when Shell’s contract expired in the late 1960s, Ecopetrol, the state-owned oil 
company, overtook the exploitation of the fields and the agrarian reform agency 
granted titles to the peasants over 160,000 hectares in rural areas of Barrancabermeja 
and Yondo such as Campo Casabe, El Tigre, and San Luis Beltran (1986: 43). 
 
These conflicts acquired a new dimension in the 1980s, when drug bosses moved 
into the region and acquired large extensions of land as well as cattle stock as a way 
to launder their money into safe, lightly taxed assets. Pablo Escobar, for instance, 
founded his infamous Hacienda Napoles, an extravagant estate with a private zoo, in 
                                                
42 The other areas being southern Atlantico, lower Sinu, the Banana zone and the Casanare llanos 
(Zamosc 1986: 42). 
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the rural area of Puerto Triunfo. As guerrillas increased the protection fees they 
charged to cattle ranchers, drug bosses created their own private militias which, 
together with other paramilitary organisations escalated violence and managed to 
expel the insurgency from the southern part of the valley. However, in the long term, 
productivity improved as ‘industry-financed paramilitary groups increased the safety 
of property in the region and the level of rustling declined’ (Sarmiento and Moreno, 
cited by Thoumi 1995: 239). But the cost of these improvements was borne by small 
landowners and rural workers who had to emigrate because of the violence; 
furthermore, old landlords who still paid protection fees to the insurgency were 
targeted by paramilitary groups and, in the end, preferred to sell their lands to the 
newcomers, reinforcing the ongoing process of land concentration (1995: 239). 
 
Conflict over land and property rights continued in the 1990s, exemplified by the 
cases of Hacienda Bellacruz  and the gold mines of sierra San Lucas. In the first 
case, a dispute emerged between the Marulanda family, owners of the 12,000 
hectares estate, and a group of 450 households who occupied about a sixth of the 
property in 1986; after an inconclusive legal battle, many families were forcefully 
evicted in 1996 by a militia but the Marulanda family denied any involvement in the 
these events. However, a Police report cited by the source claims that, in 1995, the 
Marulanda family may had reached a deal with the paramilitary boss Victor 
Carranza to bring a paramilitary squad to ‘clean-up’ the area (Amnesty International 
1997). In the second case, the Illera-Palacio family claimed the right to extract gold 
from a rural, isolated area of south Bolivar, controlled by the insurgency, where 
small miners had been digging for decades using archaic techniques but lacking legal 
titles over the mines (Loinsigh 2002: 67). Although miners have feared that the 
investors’ appetite for the industrial exploitation of these mines could prompt 
violence by private militias or paramilitary groups, or state-enforced expropriations, 
this risk had not materialised, at least until the mid 2000s (I-6). 
   
 
2) The labour conflict 
 
Conflicts between workers and companies were common in the region since the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. The Magdalena River was the stage of the first 
  
 88 
large workers’ strikes in the 1910s, organised by longshoremen (‘braceros’); in the 
1920s and 1930s, rail and oil workers also resorted to strikes as a way to demand 
improvements in working conditions and found that the government was ready to 
repress such movements and to back massive laid-offs of workers, as the strikes 
were deemed illegal. These movements led to the creation of some of the first 
Colombian workers’ unions, including USO, the oil workers’ union, founded in 
1938, which played an important role in the social and political life of the region 
since then (Archila 1989). 
 
The extraction and processing of oil generated some of the economic conditions 
from which social struggle and political conflict would emerge throughout the 
century: on the one hand, oil workers mobilised to expand their rights and increase 
their salaries and, after decades of successive strikes and negotiations, managed to 
reach benefits and privileges above those usually granted to workers in similar jobs 
in different industries. The first oil workers’ strike was held in 1924 and involved 
3,000 of them; it led to the creation of Sociedad Union Obrera, later rebranded 
Union Sindical Obrera, USO, which would become one of the most important 
workers’ unions in the country.  
 
Communist activists such as Raul Mahecha played an important role in organising 
the first strikes but the workers’ political leanings would turn towards the left wing 
of the Liberal Party from the 1930s (Archila 1986: 123). This pattern remained 
throughout the years and a union leader, interviewed in 1986, reported with 
disappointment that the vibrancy of the labour movement did not translate into 
electoral success, as workers supported candidates from the traditional parties rather 
than those in the Left (Delgado 2006: 122).  
 
However, labour unions from the oil and cement sectors actively promoted the 
organisation of poor urban communities and rural workers. In Barrancabermeja they 
supported the squatter movement and were involved in the creation of some illegal 
settlements (more on this below). In Puerto Nare, they tried to organise agricultural 
workers’ unions, but these attempts were often crushed by cattle ranchers, agro-
industrialists and merchants, unhappy to see their workers and providers organised 
(Delgado 2006: 120). Although the unions were politically vibrant in the 1970s and 
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during the early 1980s, its character gradually changed. While the USO had been an 
active, if not disinterested, promoter of popular mobilisation in the 1960s and 
1970s—civic strikes often started shortly after a labour strike had been declared—in 
the 1980s they distanced themselves from the popular movement, narrowing their 
agenda to labour and energy policy issues (Briceno 1993). 
 
According to Delgado, during the 1990s, the most active labour unions in the Middle 
Magdalena Valley were those in the following sectors and industries: oil, education, 
cement, palm oil, health and public utilities. Interestingly, less than half of the 123 
strikes held between 1990 and 2001 in the region were related to the labour struggle 
as such, i.e. negotiating better salaries and conditions of work; most were related 
with political issues, including government policies and human rights. Workers’ 
discontent with government policies was not surprising, as the 1990s saw the 
implementation of several economic reforms that, broadly speaking, reflected the 
spirit of the Washington Consensus (e.g. deregulation of labour and financial 
markets, privatisation of several state-owned companies). As for human rights 
abuses, it must be noted that labour disputes were increasingly permeated by the 
armed conflict: on the one hand, threats, and actual acts of violence by the 
insurgency, against companies and their owners increased during the strikes; on the 
other, as paramilitary groups gained strength across the region, they targeted union 
leaders and their headquarters. 
 
The sympathy of the labour unions, or at least of some of their members, towards the 
insurgency and their revolutionary ideals, was sometimes conspicuous and can be 
traced back to the Communist ideals of Mahecha and other Communist activists. The 
affinities between the labour movement and the insurgency led some observers to 
believe that the strike of 1977 was actually a preface to revolution (Briceno 1993; 
Delgado 2006). Moreover, workers’ strikes often seemed to be backed by 
kidnappings, bombings and other acts of violence and there are even those who 
believe that the strikes in general, pacific or not, were orchestrated by the insurgency 
as a means to destabilise the national economy (I-7). Indeed, Gonzalez and Jimenez 
(2008) claimed that up until 2000 most, if not all, members of the union’s board of 
directors acted on behalf of the FARC and the ELN and channelled funds towards 
the insurgency. Although the sources of these claims are obscure, in the late 1990s 
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and early 2000s, several members of the USO were prosecuted and condemned by 
rebellion (Delgado 2006).  
 
However, union leaders were targeted by undercover official agents (more on this 
below) and, increasingly, paramilitary organisations. For instance, in 1986, a 
paramilitary group based in Puerto Boyaca killed the chief of the Cementos del Nare 
union; during the following years other members of the same union were threatened, 
killed or ‘disappeared’ by counterinsurgent organisation such as MAS and AUC 
(Delgado 2006: 123-5). 
 
 
3) Urban conflict 
 
Urban conflict was largely confined to the largest towns in the region and, in 
particular, to Barrancabermeja. As the population grew, urban dwellers struggled to 
access housing, infrastructure and social services, the provision of which was always 
lagged behind the needs of the increasing population. Troco’s work force quickly 
grew from 100 in 1916 to 4,000 in 1923, attracting large numbers of people looking 
for jobs and opportunities in the oil fields and the refinery or, alternatively, in the 
nascent local economy—from the town hall to the shops, from bars to brothels, and 
from the fisheries to the lands that fed the growing population, which almost doubled 
from 1928 to 1938 (Aprile-Gniset 1997: 212). Not surprisingly, the provision of 
housing and local infrastructure, e.g. water and sanitation was insufficient. While the 
Company provided first-class accommodation to its foreign staff and skilled 
employees within gated communities, blue-collar workers faced increasing housing 
costs in poor conditions. The shortage of housing and local infrastructure became a 
chronic condition of the city during the rest of the century, aggravated by new waves 
of immigrants pushed by violence in the 1950s and 1980s or attracted by the 
expansion of the refinery in the 1960s.  
 
During the 1960s, squatters invaded idle plots of land especially on the eastern side 
of the city and, by 1970, at least fifteen barrios de invasion existed (Mosseri 1970: 
57). By 1976 Barrancabermeja was the nineteenth most populated city in the country 
but the fourth with more illegal settlements (Garcia 2006: 136). Politicians, priests, 
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oil workers and grassroots leaders, all contributed to plan and consolidate these 
invasiones, although not necessarily in a collaborative way. Both the ANAPO party 
and left-wing Liberals (e.g. FILA and MRL) promoted the creation of barrios such 
as Chico, Maria Eugenia, Primero de Mayo and Veinte de Agosto. According to 
Diaz and Saavedra, ‘representatives of traditional political parties are involved at the 
initial, planning stages of an invasion. However, as the invasion takes place and 
squatters clash with the authorities, they disappear, only to reappear later, when the 
invasion has been consolidated; some times they create juntas de accion comunal to 
gain sympathy for their [political] movements and get votes’ (1986: 47). This 
patronage was reflected in the names of the neighbourhoods: USO promoted the 
barrio Fermin Amaya, named after a union leader killed in the 1970s, but as the 
FILA gained political control over the neighbourhood it was given a less politically 
charged name: Arenal—sandbank (I-18).43 
 
While the new barrios provided roof to many households, the provision of basic and 
social services and infrastructure, e.g. water and sanitation, electricity, roads, 
schools, advanced at a painfully slow pace. Moreover, even in formal, well-
established neighbourhoods, the poor quality of such services, water in particular, 
was a recurrent cause of dissatisfaction, evident in recurrent demonstrations and 
‘civic strikes’, in which people was supposed to stop their usual activities and gather 
in public places to show support for the cause.44 
 
In early 1975, for instance, popular unrest grew, galvanising the support of several 
social sectors including workers unions, teachers and the clergy, and a civic strike 
was organised to demand the investments needed to improve the quality of services. 
The strike was presided by a directive board and a central committee, with 
                                                
43 Juntas de Accion Comunal were created by the law in 1958 as an officially-endorsed form of 
popular participation and representation at the grassroots level; every barrio, in towns and cities, or 
vereda, in rural areas, is allowed to have only one junta. The law also set their structure and rules and 
they must register with the local authorities in order to be recognised. Juntas play a central role in 
local politics, especially in poor areas, where people’s needs are still centred on the provision of basic 
infrastructure; they traditionally perform their function by engaging in patron-client relations with 
local politicians and, thus, have been usually attached to traditional parties and tend to avoid 
confrontations with local authorities. 
44 Thus, during an ‘ideal’ civic strike, no buses or taxis would be seen and schools, shops and offices 
should keep their doors shut; people would gather in parks to share a meal (‘olla comunal’), enjoy the 
entertainment of local artists and, at some point, march along the downtown towards a significant 
place of the city. 
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representatives of the participating organisations and neighbourhoods; these organs 
were linked to comites de barrio, ensuring a quick and effective communication and 
implementation of decisions. Interestingly, professionals and juntas de accion 
comunal, traditionally linked to the political parties, only participated in the first 
days of the movement, when the negotiations with the government opened; however 
they disliked the radical stance taken by most of the leaders involved in the strike, 
withdrawing their support (Diaz and Saavedra 1986: 5).  
 
During the 1975 strike, most of the normal activities in the city were interrupted and 
the refinery operated only at a fraction of its full capacity; despite the heavy presence 
of the Army and the Police, the civic strike organisers managed to avoid clashes with 
them and prevented acts of sabotage planned by radicals. They also managed to 
voice their concerns directly to President Lopez in Bogota, but no much more than 
that. Popular mobilisation ebbed down in a matter of weeks (Diaz and Saavedra 
1986; I-4). Three years later, only fifty-nine per cent of the population had access to 
water, still not potable and with ‘deficient colour and smell’. Only military and 
industrial facilities, El Rosario estate (home to Ecopetrol’s officials and engineers), 
and the USO headquarters, had access to good quality drinking water (Quiceno et al. 
1979). By 1993, almost eight percent of the urban homes still lacked a connection to 
the local water grid.45  
 
While the civic strike of 1975 is one of the most remembered, popular mobilisation 
over housing and access to basic services continued during the 1970s and 1980s. 
This was the dominant theme in public demonstrations in those years: more than 
sixty between 1975 and 1989 (Garcia 2006: 141). Although most of them were 
articulated around the needs of specific neighbourhoods, wider civic strikes were 
held in 1977, 1982, 1983 and 1987, prompting some times repressive measures such 
as the appointment of military mayors, curfews, restrictions to the right of assembly 
and even the militarization of the USO headquarters, as was the case in 1977 
(Castilla 1989). 
 
Interestingly, Catholic priests played a significant role next to unions’ and 
                                                
45 The 1993 figure is based on data from the 1993 Population and Housing Census. 
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grassroots’ leaders in both the squatter and the civic movement. Priests became 
advisors to the squatters and sometimes mediated between them and the local 
authorities. For instance, in 1971 squatters incited by members of ANAPO, invaded 
a plot, unsafely close to the railway; after negotiations with Beneficencia de 
Santander, a government body in charge of providing social assistance to the poor, 
the Church obtained an idle plot of land to which most of the squatters were 
relocated and thus barrio La Esperanza was created (Diaz and Saavedra 1986: 57). 
Similarly, in 1975, during the development of barrio Primero de Mayo, priests 
mediated between the squatters and the Army during the first hours of the invasion. 
Although they were evicted, the priests put together a list of households and 
negotiated a solution with the mayor, an active military officer appointed from 
Bogota, who agreed to buy the land on which the barrio was finally built, with 
technical support from the local planning office (I-4). Some priests were particularly 
wary of traditional party politics and tried to keep politicians at bay or at least to 
prevent what they saw as a negative influence in the squatter movement. 
 
 
3.1.3. Ideology and the Cold War  
 
The active role of the Church was not a coincidence. Echoing the Second Vatican 
Council (1962-5), the Latin American Episcopal conference, CELAM in Spanish, 
officially endorsed the doctrine that came to be known as ‘liberation theology’, put 
forward by a group of bishops, like the Peruvian theologian Gustavo Gutierrez, who 
coined the term. During the second half of the 1960s CELAM became ‘the major 
think tank that first formulated liberation theology and the major organisational base 
from which it was propagated’ (Smith 1991: 134). During the 1960s, Liberation 
Theology reached its heyday and members of the clergy were actively involved in 
the promotion of popular organisations and unashamedly assumed a more political 
role.46 
 
In Barrancabermeja, Pastoral Social, the branch of the Catholic Church in charge of 
                                                
46 However, Conservative bishops managed to regain the top positions within CELAM in the 1970s, 
reflecting a changing political consensus that favoured a less radical approach to the social role of the 
Catholic church (Smith 1991). 
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dealing with social and community issues, declared in a document dated in 1976 that 
the Gospel ‘is a source of enlightenment and encouragement for the development 
and liberation of the people and the peoples, and should lead Christians to a personal 
conversion and to a serious engagement in structural economic, political and 
cultural change’ (Pastoral Social 1976: 1, italics added). However, they 
acknowledged, the Gospel did not provide them with a ‘methodology for action’, 
which could only be found in social sciences, as they contained ‘the elements to 
analyse the reality and undertake effective solutions’ (Pastoral Social 1976: 2).  
 
This is how members of the local branch of the Catholic Church’s Pastoral Social 
described their methodology: ‘We begin with the needs expressed by the people and 
take them seriously; by fighting to overcome those needs, we try to advance a 
process, an organisation towards a fundamental change, going beyond the solution of 
the most immediate needs’ (Pastoral Social 1976: 2). This methodology led, for 
instance, to the creation of ‘housewives clubs’ in poor neighbourhoods, where 
women prayed, learned basic skills (e.g. cooking, sewing, preventive health) and, 
most importantly, were actively involved in reflections about the political and 
economic roots of the problems that affected their households. This ‘formacion’, as 
it is often referred, was assisted by priests and counsellors trained by CINEP (I-23). 
‘Housewives clubs’ later evolved into the Women’s Popular Organisation 
(Organizacion Femenina Popular), OFP, a NGO that still existed in 2007 and 
carried out projects in areas such as housing, health, legal advice and access to food 
at affordable prices.47 Similarly, Pastoral Social was involved in the creation of 
youth groups in which political discussions were mixed with activities such as sports 
and cultural festivals. 48 
 
These activities were not always welcomed by local politicians and activists 
affiliated to the Liberal party; they felt their turfs invaded by the priests, who openly 
                                                
47 The OFP’s radical political stance is captured in their anthem, written on a wall in their 
headquarters in Barrancabermeja: ‘If our daughters starve to die/ if naked they cannot attend school/ 
the rich are not to be blamed/ but the cowards who refuse to fight/ If we live in slums/ if we cannot 
earn the bread/ it is because the government/ exploits us and repress us’. It does not rhyme in Spanish 
either. 
48 In essence, this methodology was the same employed in ‘base ecclesial communities’ across Latin 
America, based on Paulo Freire’s ‘method of conscientisation’ to teach ‘community members how to 
do critical social analysis’ (Smith 1991: 107). 
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criticised the patron-client relationships fostered by so-called politiqueros—a 
demeaning term for politicians (Pastoral Social 1986: 48). The active role of the 
Church raised suspicions about their actual aspirations and the reach of their pastoral 
duties. During the 1975 civic strike for instance, their support to popular 
mobilisation was interpreted as evidence of ‘political, partisan ambition’ and some 
priests were even accused of inciting and carrying out acts of violence; the clergy, 
led by the bishop, emphatically denied these allegations, arguing that their actions 
merely reflected the CELAM doctrine (Diocesis de Barrancabermeja 1975a, 
1975b). 
 
But some priests went further than just political activism. Camilo Torres, for 
instance, a cleric and university professor joined the ELN in 1965 and was killed the 
following year in a clash with government forces, as he tried to ‘earn’ his first rifle. 
He then became a hero and, curiously, his death beckoned even more students, 
priests and nuns to join the insurgency (Medina 2001: 169-170). Among them were 
the Spaniard priests Domingo Lain, Antonio Jimenez and Manuel Perez; the latter 
would become the top commander of the insurgent group Ejercito de Liberacion 
Nacional (ELN or National Liberation Army) until his death, by natural causes, in 
1999. 
 
However, it was the Cuban Revolution, in 1959, which exerted a crucial influence 
over the minds of a whole generation and, indeed, had a direct, tangible connection 
with the emergence of insurgent groups in the Middle Magdalena Valley. In 1962, 
sixty young students were invited by the Cuban government to study in the island; as 
the missile crisis erupted, most of them flew back to Colombia, but a group of 22 
stayed in Cuba receiving military training. In 1964, they returned to the country and 
founded the ELN, choosing San Vicente, in the department of Santander, as their 
initial base of operation (Medina 2001: 68-82). 
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3.2 Emergence and consolidation of armed organisations  
 
This section describes the origin of insurgent and paramilitary organisations in the 
Middle Magdalena Valley, focusing on those that were still operating at the 
beginning of the period of study, that is, by the mid1990s.  
 
 
3.2.1 Insurgencies  
 
The first part of this section focuses on two guerrilla groups established in the region 
in the 1960s: the National Liberation Army, ELN, and the Colombian Revolutionary 
Armed Forces, FARC. It relies on secondary sources which, unfortunately, are 
scarce and provide a patchy picture of the events. In comparison with the early years 
of the ELN, which have been thoroughly documented by Medina (2001), the history 
of this movement after 1980 and the evolution of the FARC in the region have been 
studied in lesser detail. 
 
 
1) The National Liberation Army 
 
The creation of the ELN was led by a group of young intellectuals, members of a 
‘brigade’ trained in Cuba, who believed that the peasants and not the urban workers 
had the crucial role in the revolutionary process. Paradoxically, most of their 
followers were students, USO unionists and priests (Medina 2001: 215-230). They 
established the first base in San Vicente, in 1964, and launched an attack on the town 
of Simacota in 1965, when they proclaimed their existence and launched a twelve-
points political programme that included reforms aimed at ‘giving power back to the 
people’, an ‘agrarian revolution’ and a broad range of vaguely stated institutional 
reforms.  
 
In 1965 they blew up an oil pipeline for the first time, near Barrancabermeja, as part 
of their campaign to nationalise the oil and mining industries; in 1969 they carried 
out the first kidnapping (Medina 2001: 145, 248). Despite the internal disputes that 
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characterised the group in its early years, which often led to executions, they 
managed to expand their operations across the region and by 1972 they already had 
branches in San Pablo, Yondo, Remedios, Segovia, Amalfi and Anori. However, 
they suffered heavy blows such as the detention of 210 sympathisers in Bogota, 
Medellin and several towns in Santander, in 1969, and the counterinsurgent 
offensive launched by government forces in 1973 (Operacion Anori), when they 
were nearly defeated. Later, they blamed these blows on their excessive confidence 
on the level of popular support they enjoyed (Medina 2001). 
 
After further internal disputes that led to executions, suicides and even madness 
among some of their leaders (Medina 2001: 326-341), the organisation re-emerged 
in the late 1980s and made an effort to increase popular collaboration and to ‘make 
coincide the armed struggle with the interests of sectors of the population’, in 
particular in the areas where they operated (Peñate 1999: 79). A report, published by 
an active military officer, indicated that the recruitment process adopted by the ELN 
ensured that not only individuals, but their households as a whole, supported the 
armed struggle not only politically but also operationally, providing food and shelter 
to the insurgents. Accordingly, the first step of recruitment was the creation of study 
groups from which only the most committed individuals were picked, trained and 
eventually given a gun. Furthermore, they tightened the rules in order to improve 
discipline and minimise the mistreatment of civilians and developed a vast network 
of supporters in the cities, most of them belonging to the middle-class (Villamarin 
1995).  
 
However, the crucial element in the ELN’s comeback seemed to be the funding 
obtained, via extortion, from the firms in charge of building, operating and 
maintaining oil pipelines across the country. For instance, is it estimated that the 
German firm Mannesmann, in charge of building a major oil pipeline across the 
country, had to pay up to $4 million in protection fees. Thus, since the 1980s, oil 
pipelines became a lifeline to the ELN, as the group exacted large sums of money 
from firms contracted to put together new lines or to repair the tubes every time they 
blew them up; furthermore, they often demanded the recruitment of locals as 
workers and the provision of aid and public works to rural communities, thus 
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increasing their standing in the eyes of the population (Peñate 1999: 92-3).49  
 
Although we lack reliable figures, this was probably a significant source of funding 
for the ELN in the Middle Magdalena Valley, as the region is traversed by several 
pipelines that connect the oil fields with the refinery in Barrancabermeja and the 
distribution centres were petrol and other derivatives are pumped to the demand 
points such as Bogota, Medellin and Bucaramanga. At any rate, the impact of ELN’s 
attacks on the oil production was sensible and both Ecopetrol, the state oil company, 
and British Petroleum Company expressed concern about the consequences of such 
attacks and the sustainability of some operations (El Tiempo 3 July 1997). 
 
A second element in the re-emergence of the ELN was their involvement in local 
politics, a practice they copied from the FARC, which enabled them to access public 
funds and channel public spending towards their supporters. Until the 1980s, local 
budgets were often insignificant, but municipalities with mineral resources received 
significant royalties; however, after the decentralisation reforms of the early 1990s, 
all local authorities received increasing amounts of funds that, despite being 
earmarked, could be used to further the political interests of mayors, councilmen 
and, now, the insurgency. ‘Armed clientelism’ is the term coined by Malcolm Deas 
to describe this phenomenon where insurgencies adopted and adapted customary 
practices of the traditional mainstream political parties and developed alliances with 
local politicians belonging to those parties. These alliances enabled the ELN to 
channel funds to areas and populations where they wanted to gain allegiance (Peñate 
1999: 79-89).  
 
Although these strategies helped the ELN to grow roots within social organisations 
and political movements and also to expand their geographic presence, from 22 
fronts in 1989 to 45 in 1997, they did not lead to an actual strengthening of their 
military capabilities. According to Aguilera, this may be explained by the lack of 
military training and equipment, an excessive interest in local politics over military 
achievements and, last but not least, by the ELN’s reluctance to participate in the 
coca economy (2006: 228, 235-242).  
                                                
49 It is worth noting a similar sort of racket was later extended to the energy grid and, during the 
1990s, insurgents frequently blew up electrical towers in rural, isolated areas. 
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Furthermore, the ELN’s attempts to expand their operations in cities would 
eventually prove counterproductive and, added to the widespread use of kidnapping 
as a source of funding and political pressure, would become lethal in the years to 
come. As noted above, for many years the ELN did not see the cities as crucial 
arenas in their struggle; cities such as Barrancabermeja were seen as a logistic hub 
and their sympathisers’ homes as guns hideouts, refuges for wounded men or simply 
as places to have some rest. Furthermore, they were often present at public 
demonstrations and civic or labour strikes, showing their ‘support’ to popular 
mobilisation and carrying out a range of activities, from spreading nails on the roads 
to ensure the success of ‘civic strikes’ to actually clashing with police or the army (I-
4, I-10, I-23). But this kind of ‘support’ and its consequences were not always 
welcome. Skirmishes and fire exchange between the police and militias often meant 
that pacific demonstrations had to be aborted and negotiations with the authorities 
precluded. Thus, the use of violence during strikes sidelined the activists and 
ultimately led to apathy and fear among the people (I-7, I-10, I-11).50  
 
Furthermore, these civic strikes disrupted the normal functioning of the local 
economy. The death of USO leader Manuel Chacon in early 1988, for instance, 
murdered by an active member of the Navy, provoked turmoil and disrupted the 
economic activities in the city for five days, causing a shortage of basic goods. 
Shops and markets could not reopen because of the ‘intimidation’ and harassment of 
protesters who stoned any moving vehicle on their sight (Human Rights Watch 
1996: 30; Vanguardia Liberal, 20 and 21 January 1988). Following this episode, the 
small merchants’ association complained to the government in Bogota about the 
frequency of civic strikes—seven in eighteen months, according to their own 
account—and the bad name that the climate of agitation had given to the city. ‘These 
most absurd actions, in the guise of civic strikes, reads the letter, damage the local 
economy and deprive our land from any possibility of investment, progress, 
opportunities or jobs’ (Vanguardia Liberal, 27 January 1988).  
 
                                                
50 A similar feeling seemed to be held by some members of USO; a former top member, interviewed 
for this research, suggested that the union’s decisions regarding the conduction of strikes and 
negotiations with the government were manipulated ‘from the mountains’ (I-7). 
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To make things worse, the ELN tried to strengthen their foothold in the cities by 
creating militias of young men. However, these militias had no roots in the existing 
social and political organisations; they were simply an attempt for the ELN to gain 
acceptance in the poorest neighbourhoods by using force against petty criminals and 
street-level drug dealers (Aguilera 2006: 238-9). In Barrancabermeja, the local 
militia was known as Urban Front of Resistance Yariguies, or FURY, and most of 
its members (milicianos) lived in poor barrios in the city’s northeast. Unlike 
guerrillas, milicianos did not receive significant military training or indoctrination; 
an interviewee, who used to teach doctrinal issues to militiamen in the mid-1990s, 
described how the young recruits had no clue about the revolutionary aims of the 
organisations: ‘they did not know about class struggle, or capitalist society or 
socialism, all they knew was how to use their guns’ (I-10). Several interviewees 
portrayed a similar picture, emphasising the militiamen’s lack of ideals and 
ideological indoctrination (I-4, I-5, I-7, I-9, I-10, I-11).  
 
Soon, milicianos were found abusing the population or trying to keep their sympathy 
with robinhood-esque tactics. Owners of very small businesses, like corner shops, 
were extorted, causing rows with political activists, union leaders and guerrillas 
themselves, with whom they were often related. Milicianos left bars without paying 
the bill or fare-dodged in public transport vehicles, whose owners are often low-to-
middle income householders, thus denting their livelihoods. Banks and shops were 
robbed for personal profit, especially near Christmas, with the commanders’ 
approval. Some were available for hire by civilians to settle accounts or intimidate 
foes. Small cattle-ranchers or raw meat merchants were assaulted to steal their 
produce to be ‘redistributed’ in poor neighbourhoods (I-10, I-11, I-15). Furthermore, 
the scramble for resources was so intense that often guerrillas belonging to different 
organisations, or even to different units within the same organisation (e.g. ELN’s 
FURY and Capitan Parmenio) targeted the same businesses for extortion. According 
to an interviewee, the ELN units, in particular, were strained by the central 
command’s thirst for resources (I-10).  
 
To conclude, despite internal disputes and heavy blows inflicted by government 
forces, the ELN managed to stay alive and expand in the Middle Magdalena 
Valley—and in other Colombian regions; after thirty years of armed struggle they 
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still did not pose a serious, existential threat to the state and, in fact, had developed 
local alliances with the traditional parties. However, their operations did impose a 
burden not only on multinational companies and large landowners but also on small 
merchants, cattle ranchers and local politicians. As Aguilera put it, throughout its 
existence the ELN remained ‘a not very combative organisation, that does not 
sustain or diversify its warfare methods, behaves as a kind of insurgent rural police 
and privileges sabotage (blowing oil pipelines and electric towers, blocking roads) as 
the main form of combat’ (2006: 241). 
 
 
2)  The Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces  
 
While the FARC has been the largest insurgent group for many years in Colombia, 
in the Middle Magdalena Valley it has played a secondary role, at least since the 
mid-1980s; the reasons for this will become evident later. The most important 
difference between the two groups and, indeed, between the FARC and most 
guerrilla groups in Latin America is its origin. Unlike most (if not all) of them, the 
FARC was not created by rebellious intellectuals; rather, it emerged as an armed 
self-defence movement created by Liberal and Communist peasants in response to 
the sustained attacks of large landholders, the Police and the Army all over the 
country, in a process that began before the Cuban Revolution and that finally led to 
the foundation of the movement in 1965 (Pizarro 1991). In this sense, compared to 
other Latin American revolutionary movements, the FARC is exceptional. As 
Wickham-Crowley pointed out, while ‘guerrillas and peasants typically came from 
profoundly different “social worlds”, in Colombia we encounter a fundamental 
exception to this generalisation’ (1992: 145). As such, agrarian issues were 
paramount in their political agenda, which was ‘anti-monopolist [in relation to land 
ownership] rather than anticapitalist’ (Ramirez 1990: 66). They formally mutated 
into a fully-fledged revolutionary movement in the early 1980s. 
 
Although the Middle Magdalena Valley did not lack its own peasant self-defences—
two of such groups reportedly operated in the Carare Valley, in Santander, and 
Puerto Boyaca in the 1960s (Medina 1990)—the creation of a FARC front (their 
fourth nationwide) in the region was largely the result of a decision made by the 
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organisation in 1968, during its Third Conference (Ferro and Uribe 2002a: 29, 181). 
During the early 1970s, the FARC and the Communist Party gained political 
influence and built a modest military strength in these areas and were welcomed by 
locals, as they put a halt to petty criminals and cattle raiders (Alonso 1997: 128). But 
it was in the 1980s when they managed to spread their activities throughout the 
country and gain visibility in the national political arena; official figures show a 
four-fold increase in their manpower and fronts, which went from eleven in 1980 to 
46 in 1990 (cited by Velez 2001: 223). Despite their vigorous growth, in the late 
1990s their peasant origins still permeated their goals and strategies, as Ramirez 
(2001) has argued: first, because, on close inspection, their political programmes 
could be better described as reformist (‘typical of any nationalist petty-bourgeois 
group’) rather than revolutionary and, second, because of the importance they still 
gave to controlling, consolidating and protecting territory, just as when they were 
guardians of the so-called ‘independent republics’, back in the 1960s. 
 
At any rate, it is widely believed that their expansion was funded with resources 
obtained from the thriving drug economy. Based on interviews in Caqueta, in the 
south of the country, Ferro (2000) documented how, back in the early 1980s, the 
FARC were initially reluctant to allow peasants to grow coca but eventually 
accepted it and learnt to regulate, police and tax the coca paste market, setting prices 
and fees, preventing abuses and theft, and forcing growers to keep some staple crops, 
necessary to feed their troops. Later, they became a part of the drug trade chain, 
apparently in an effort to prevent the paste to be sold to paramilitary traders. 
However, as Thoumi noted, while ‘guerrilla organisations unquestionably depend on 
the illicit drug trade financially […] there is no evidence that they have developed 
significant international marketing networks. In that sense, therefore, there is no 
guerrilla “cartel”’ (2003: 107). 
 
Less uncertain is the importance of kidnappings and extortion as sources of funding 
for the FARC. Indeed, the pressure put on the local elites to satisfy the voracious 
demands of the insurgency, led many cattle ranchers and landowners in the Middle 
Magdalena Valley to sell their lands and leave the region, while others looked for 
ways to resist and eventually became the social base of paramilitary, 
counterinsurgent movements. Although paramilitaries and the Army managed to 
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expel the insurgency from the towns and rural areas in the southern part of the 
Middle Magdalena Middle Magdalena Valley, the FARC managed to establish 
several new fronts in the valleys of the Carare and Cimitarra rivers, in Santander and 
south Bolivar, respectively, as well as in Puerto Wilches, home to large oil palm 
plantations. Seven fronts operated in the region and adjacent areas by the late 1980s 
(Medina 1990, Ortiz 2001, PPDHDIH 2002).  
 
Despite the consistent expansion of paramilitary groups across the country, by the 
mid-1990s the FARC had reached their ‘best military moment ever’ (Rangel 1999: 
48) and were able to launch major attacks on several government’s outposts, killing 
and capturing large numbers of soldiers.51 Despite their involvement in the drug 
business, the FARC remained committed to their political and military goals, 
challenging the state and expanding the areas under their control. Moreover, research 
carried out in the early 2000s revealed how, despite its growth, the organisation 
maintained a hierarchical structure, with well-defined deciding bodies and chains of 
command, a strictly-enforced code of conduct for combatants, and centralised budget 
and financial arrangements, aimed to ensure even levels of funding to all fronts and 
prevent excesses by those better able to raise funds (Ferro and Uribe 2002a).52  
 
Furthermore, they managed to involve civilians in operational roles through the 
creation of a two-tier system of militias: members of the ‘Bolivarian’ militias joined 
the troops on a part-time basis (up to six months per year) and were given a uniform 
and a gun; members of the ‘popular’ militias wore plain clothes and developed tasks 
of surveillance and control. In general, they enjoyed a less strict regime and need not 
to give up their family life, as proper guerrillas did (Ferro and Uribe 2002a: 55-6). 
The very existence of militias made evident FARC’s disregard for the distinction 
between civilians and combatants; indeed, consistent with this principle they did not 
hesitate to target civilian collaborators and were especially keen on those who 
provided information to the enemy. As commander Ivan Rios noted during an 
interview: ‘being unarmed does not mean you are not combatant’ (Ferro and Uribe 
                                                
51 Some significant attacks took place at Las Delicias, on 30 August 1996; Patascoy, on 21 December 
1997; and El Billar, 3 March 1998—most of them in the south of the country. 
52 Since these findings are almost exclusively based on interviews with FARC’s top military cadres, 
they should be taken with a pinch of salt.  
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2002a: 134).53  
 
They also managed to gain influence over local governments in areas where the 
central state’s authority was limited. The La Uribe agreement, signed after the 
national government first approached the FARC looking for a negotiated settlement, 
in the mid-1980s, led to the creation of a political party, the Patriotic Union (UP), 
which was widely seen as FARC’s political wing. After modest electoral successes 
in local and parliamentary elections, members of the UP were systematically 
targeted and eliminated by paramilitaries and members of the army all over the 
country. By the mid-1990s the UP had been wiped out of the national and local 
political arenas, so the FARC developed new mechanisms to influence and control 
local governments, including sabotage and manipulation of local elections as well as 
threats and coercive measures against candidates and elected officials, which they 
justified as attempts to curb the corrupt practices associated with patron-client 
politics (2002a: 140-1). 
 
The historical accounts of the FARC’s expansion and development in the 1990s in 
the Middle Magdalena Valley are less detailed than those of the ELN; in fact, their 
military strength in the Middle Magdalena Valley has always been modest compared 
to fronts based in other regions, especially in the south of the country, and to other 
insurgent organisations based in the same region, especially the ELN. Of course, 
they have been involved in kidnappings and extortion across the region as well as in 
the drug economy, but their role in the 1990s seemed to have been largely defensive 
and aimed to maintain a strong social and political base in areas such as the 
Cimitarra River Valley. This is not surprising given the strength of paramilitary 
groups in the region, which have forced the group to revert the scale and nature of 
their activities to the self-defensive character it had during its early years. 
 
 
                                                
53 Pizarro estimates, rather speculatively, that for every FARC combatant there are four civilians 
providing some sort of support to the organisation, from bookkeeping to transport and health care 
(2006: 189-90).  
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3.2.2 Paramilitaries  
 
As noted above, by the early 1980s, guerrilla organisations had become a matter of 
concern for the government and some regional elites. Indeed, in the Middle 
Magdalena Valley, already in the late 1970s, some peasants and landowners had 
expressed inconformity with the demands and aggressive attitude of the recently 
created FARC’s ninth front. The discontent was such that even members of the 
Communist Party (e.g. Pablo Guarin), became key promoters of counterinsurgent, 
self-defence groups. The government also redoubled its efforts to tackle the 
insurgency by installing new bases in towns such as Puerto Berrio, Puerto Boyaca, 
Cimitarra, Puerto Parra and San Vicente and by appointing military mayors. 
Crucially, military officers encouraged the local elites to create self-defence groups, 
the most notorious of which was based in Puerto Boyaca, the self-branded ‘anti-
subversive capital of Colombia’. The Middle Magdalena Valley Self-Defences, as 
the group was called, carried out their operations initially in Puerto Boyaca and then 
extended their actions to other towns in the southern part of the Middle Magdalena 
Valley, including Cimitarra, Yacopi, Puerto Berrio, Puerto Nare, Puerto Salgar and 
La Dorada (Medina 1990). They were backed by ACDEGAM, the Peasant 
Association of Farmers and Cattle Ranchers of the Middle Magdalena Valley, which 
turned into a political movement and gained seats in the Boyaca’s Departmental 
Assembly and in the House of Representatives. The first elected mayor of Puerto 
Boyaca was also a member of the Association, which also funded the construction of 
several schools and health centres (Medina 1990; Aranguren 2001).  
 
By 1982, the crimes committed by groups like these, and others recently created in 
other regions, such as the MAS, ‘Death to Kidnappers’, prompted an inquiry by the 
Colombian Procurador General.54 In his final report, revealed in 1983, he accused 
59 army officials of promoting ‘paramilitary’ groups in several departments and, in 
particular, of using civilians as spies, informers and assassins to fight the insurgency 
(Jimenez 1986: 117). Some of these organisations received funding from drug mafia 
                                                
54 The procurador is an independent attorney specialised in cases of misconduct by public servants. It 
is worth noting that paramilitary groups had been employed as part of a counterinsurgent ‘civic-
military’ programme put in place by the government against Liberal and Communist guerrillas in the 
1960s and, as Palacios bluntly put it, ‘one of their advantages was that they could carry out dirty 
operations without the involvement of government forces’ (1995: 264). 
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bosses and, in particular from Gonzalo Rodriguez, whose failed partnership with 
FARC prompted an armed confrontation between the two organisations. Both 
Rodriguez and Pablo Escobar, the Medellín ‘cartel’ boss, had bought lands in the 
region and used it as a hub from where drug shipments were dispatched overseas in 
small planes. The participation of drug mafias allowed the paramilitaries to buy 
weapons and hire an Israeli military advisor who trained their militiamen, some of 
whom would later become paramilitary leaders in other regions, such as Carlos 
Castaño and Luis Cifuentes ‘the Águila’. The MAS and the Middle Magdalena Self-
Defences played an important role in eliminating political opposition in these towns: 
the most notable case was that of the Union Patriotica (‘Patriotic Union’ or UP), a 
leftist political party emerged in 1985 and associated with the FARC, which was 
virtually wiped after achieving modest electoral successes in local and Congress 
elections (Medina 1990; Gutierrez and Baron 2005). 
 
However, the Middle Magdalena Valley Self-Defences were increasingly dominated 
by drug bosses, in particular by Rodriguez, who ordered the murder of one of their 
founders and most charismatic figures, Pablo Guarin, in 1987. When the 
government’s ‘war on drugs’ reached a peak, their most important leaders were 
murdered (Henry Perez) or jailed (Luis Rubio), leading to their demobilisation. 
However, they were later reorganised under the leadership of Victor Triana (aka 
‘Botalon’) and Ramon Isaza. By that time, in the early 1990s, the southern area of 
the valley, from Puerto Boyaca to Cimitarra and Puerto Berrio, was relatively clear 
of guerrillas. However, the San Vicente group remained active during the first half of 
the 1990s, and a new group emerged in the northern area of the valley—the Self-
Defences of Santander and Cesar (‘AUSAC’). Other paramilitary organisations 
involved in the killing of civilians were ‘Muerte a Revolucionarios del Nordeste 
(MRN)’, ‘Los Masetos’, ‘Muerte a Revolucionarios del Cesar’ and the ‘Colonel 
Rogelio Correa’ squad, as well as others with colourful names such as Toxicol 90, 
Los Magnificos, La Marca del Zorro, Mano Negra.55 With a few exceptions, these 
groups were short-lived or were involved in just one operation, including some of 
                                                
55 The names of these commandos may give some hints about their nature: Toxicol 90, for instance, 
resembles the typical name of an insecticide or fungicide. La Marca del Zorro refers to the inscription 
left by El Zorro after his incursions. Los Magnificos is the Spanish name of ‘The A-Team’, the 
American TV series. Anecdotically, the Navy Colonel who masterminded the killings of 1992 was 
code-named Hannibal Smith, exactly as the ‘A-Team’ leader. Mano Negra means black hand. 
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the bloodiest massacres. For instance, the Segovia massacre, in November 1988 was 
carried out by the first of the groups mentioned above. The MRN killed 43 civilians, 
apparently in reprisal for the electoral success of the Left in the recent local 
elections; several police and army officers were investigated for their involvement in 
this event (Amnesty International 1996). Likewise, the ‘Colonel Rogelio Correa’ 
squad was involved in a single event in July 1988, when fourteen peasants were 
killed in the rural area of San Vicente. 
 
Other groups were, apparently, more stable.  ‘Los Masetos’, for instance, seemed to 
have been involved in several operations from 1989 to 1995, killing nearly 40 
civilians, including twelve members of an official commission in charge of  
investigating a series of crimes committed by the Army and paramilitary groups, 
killed in January 1989 in La Rochela, in the rural area of Cimitarra (Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights 2007). A group operating under the same name was involved 
in the killing of eight peasants in January 1995; according to a Police report, they 
were organised by the Prada family, from San Martin (in the department of Cesar) 
and funded through protection fees paid by small ranchers (cited by Human Rights 
Watch 1996: Appendix B).56 
 
By the mid-1990s, a new opportunity window for the expansion of paramilitary 
activity was provided by the Gaviria and Samper administrations. They authorised 
the creation of ‘security and surveillance co-operatives’, known as Convivir, 
allowing ‘communities’ to hire the services of security personnel. However, the 
regulations regarding the kind of weapons to be used by Convivir were not clear and 
the ability of the central government to supervise their operation, especially in rural, 
isolated areas was limited—after all, that was the rationale for their creation. 
Although the Constitutional Court overturned the government’s decision in 1997, 
more than 400 co-operatives were created throughout the country, most of them in 
Santander, Cundinamarca, Antioquia and Boyaca (Rueda 1997; Romero 2003: 104). 
By then, paramilitary groups had mushroomed in several regions across the country, 
going from less than 850 men in 1992 to nearly 4,000 in 1997 (Ministerio de 
                                                
56 However, using the names of these organisations to make inferences regarding their existence and 
identities may be misleading. The term ‘masetos’, in particular, was often used to refer to 
paramilitaries, even when they did not belong to the MAS movement. 
  
 108 
Defensa 2000: 10). As Hernan Gomez, a close friend of the paramilitary leader 
Carlos Castaño summed it up, there were several ‘mini-armies’ or ‘fiefdoms with 
armed powers’: 
 
The Castaños in Cordoba and Uraba, the Ramon Isaza’s self-defences and the ones in 
Puerto Boyaca, controlled by Botalon. The forces of San Martin’s rice growers in the 
[Eastern] Plains, the Santander Self-defences supported by cattle-ranchers and 
merchants, the oil palm growers, the vigilantes of some sugar refineries in Valle del 
Cauca, the Aguila’s self-defences in Cundinamarca, the Guajira group, the cattle-
ranchers’ group in Yopal, the ‘traquetos’ in Putumayo and Caqueta, the coca dealers’ 
bodyguards in Arauca and the FARC’s and ELN’s deserters. All of them outlaws and 
anti-subversive (Aranguren 2001: 243). 
 
The fragmented but steady expansion of paramilitary groups across the country also 
continued in the Middle Magdalena Valley. In February 1996, ‘Los paracos’, a 
forty-strong group based in Bellacruz, a 12,000-hectares hacienda that spread across 
the rural area of three municipios, evicted approximately 250 rural families that had 
settled in a legally disputed zone of the hacienda (Amnesty International 1997). In 
April, the ‘Northeast Self-defences’, apparently based in Puerto Berrio, killed fifteen 
civilians in Segovia, Antioquia, on April 1996; the victims lived in a poor 
neighbourhood with strong presence of the ELN (Amnesty International 1996). 
Later, in 1997, they killed two people in Segovia and threatened new actions against 
members of labour unions and civic leaders (El Colombiano 2 April 1997). Smaller 
organisations emerged in the region carrying out sporadic actions: in April 1996, for 
instance, a group known as Dignidad por Antioquia (‘Dignity for Antioquia’) killed 
15 civilians in Segovia, Antioquia, and warned of new actions against guerrillas’ 
sympathisers (El Tiempo 24 April 1996). In addition, paramilitary groups from 
neighbouring departments, such as Cordoba and Sucre, sporadically raided towns in 
south Bolivar (Duque 1996: 46-47). 
 
As evident from the above, until the mid-1990s the paramilitary structure had grown 
in a fragmented and clandestine way, but that would change, at least for a few years, 
thanks to the leadership of Carlos Castaño, commander of the Cordoba and Uraba 
self-defences. After two years of negotiations with fellow paramilitary bosses across 
the country, he managed to create a national confederation in April 1997, known as 
the United Self-defences of Colombia, AUC. The political and military strategies 
developed by the new organisation had an important impact across the country and 
in the Middle Magdalena Valley, reshaping the relation between paramilitary 
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organisations, politicians and the media, refashioning their public image and 
preparing the ground for operations, alliances and mergers that went beyond local 
and regional confines.  
  
Backed by the AUC, Castaño launched a successful public relations campaign aimed 
to revamp the image of paramilitary organisations, presenting them as grassroots, 
anti-insurgent, ‘self-defence’, ‘armed civil guards’ emerged in response to the 
inability or unwillingness of the Colombian government to provide protection to the 
middle class against guerrillas—after all, he argued, the government only cared for 
the interests of the ‘establishment’. He became a public figure and gave interviews in 
magazines and public TV, underscoring the political nature of paramilitary groups 
and their role in the provision of security (Aranguren 2001: 245; Semana No. 934, 
27 March 2000: 24-26).57 In his discourse, he tried to legitimise the use of violence 
against civilians, arguing that they were virtually undistinguishable from guerrillas 
and that they provided essential support for their operation. Recalling the first years 
of his struggle against the insurgency, just after the killing of his father by FARC 
guerrillas, he commented: 
 
We found one of the best mechanisms to fight guerrillas: maybe we could not attack 
them in their camps, but we could neutralise the people who bring them food, drugs, 
messages, alcohol, prostitutes and so on. By doing so, we managed to isolated them and 
this was a very effective strategy. It’s incredible. Nobody taught us that. This was back 
in ‘82 but we are still applying the same strategy […] with the same excellent results. 
(Castro 1996:155). 
 
Indeed, although it has been reported that paramilitaries directly clashed with 
insurgents in the Middle Magdalena Valley using ‘mortars, rockets, armed 
helicopters, and other heavy weapons’ (Spencer 2001: 12), the evidence shows that 
their operations targeted mostly civilians (see Ch. 4), just as the quote above 
suggests. 
 
But Castaño’s mission was not easy, as regional commanders often behaved in ways 
that were not exactly consistent with the alleged principles and goals of the 
                                                
57 The claim to be treated as providers of security rather than criminals, had been expressed before by 
regional groups such as the Magdalena Medio Self-defences, which The creation of the AUC did not 
prevent quarrels and vendettas among paramilitary groups; in fact, it caused tensions between Castaño 
and regional bosses who did not behave as ‘politically correctly’ as his vision and aspirations 
demanded, e.g., the murder of a judicial commission, two DEA agents and two Police detectives 
(Garzon 2005: 85-86). 
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paramilitary confederation. For instance, in 1998 he had to ask Ramon Isaza, by then 
leader of the Middle Magdalena Valley Self-Defences, to stop the embargo he had 
imposed on the distribution of Coca-Cola products in the region. According to press 
reports, Isaza was trying to put pressure on the local distributor of Coca-Cola, who 
owed some money to local businesses, acting in effect as a typical mafia boss. To 
solve the matter, Panamco (Coca-Cola’s subsidiary in Colombia) asked a 
humanitarian organisation to convene a meeting with both paramilitary bosses, in 
which Castaño admonished Isaza and asked him not to target multinational 
companies, as in his view that was something only guerrillas did, and directed him to 
focus in fighting guerrillas (Cambio 8 February 1999). Castaño had other differences 
with Isaza, over extortions; with Cifuentes, over the existence of facilities for the 
production of cocaine in Cundinamarca, and with Triana, over the killing of a team 
of police detectives who were investigating the theft of gasoline in Puerto Boyaca 
(PPDHDIH 2002). 
 
Another problematic aspect in Castaño’s project was the relation between 
paramilitary organisations and the drug business. It is well known that paramilitary 
bosses such as the Aguila had provided protection to Gonzalo Rodriguez’s cocaine 
laboratories in the southern part of the Middle Magdalena Valley (Cambio 26 July 
1999). Diego Murillo and Castaño himself, had actively assisted the Police in the 
hunt and killing of the mafia boss Pablo Escobar, a victory for the Colombian 
government but also for them and for other criminal organisations who took over 
Escobar’s markets, networks and routes (Aranguren 2001: 149-187; Cambio 8 
November 1999).  
 
However, Castaño tried to draw a line between himself, a ‘counterinsurgent, anti-
communist leader’, and the drug mafia bosses from whom, he said, he reluctantly 
obtained funding (Aranguren 2001: 249-254). The funds provided by cattle-ranchers, 
farmers and businessmen were not enough to support the successful operation of the 
paramilitary groups; thus, in order to operate and expand, they ‘had no other choice’ 
than accepting funds from the drugs business, either by taxing growers or by 
accepting funds from mafia bosses. Indeed, he even boasted about their ability to 
take control over coca areas previously held by the insurgency: ‘Today we control 
and collect taxes over 15,000 hectares of coca in Putumayo, taken from FARC 
  
 111 
through combat. We also rule in south Bolivar [in the Middle Magdalena Valley], 
where the ELN did it before. Now we control nearly 20,000 hectares sown by the 
subversion’ (Castaño quoted by Aranguren 2001: 253).  
 
On the military side, Castaño’s strategy involved attacks against insurgent 
strongholds in areas well beyond the original territorial turf of his own regional 
group, based in  Cordoba. For instance, in July 1997 he sent a 120-strong squad to 
the town of Mapiripan, Meta, where they tortured and killed nearly fifty people 
(Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2005). Other attacks took place in sierra 
San Lucas and Barrancabermeja, in the Middle Magdalena Valley; a detailed 
account is offered in Ch. 5 and 6. For the moment, it suffices to note that although 
the AUC initially co-operated with the Self-defences of Cesar and Santander, 
AUSAC, they took control over this organisation in 1999 and eventually created a 
new paramilitary organisation known as ‘Bolivar Central Bloc’, or ‘BCB’, led by 
Julian Bolivar, Carlos Jimenez and Ivan Duque.  
 
While little is known about Bolivar, the profiles of the other two bosses are telling 
about the nature of the BCB. After amassing a fortune as a drug boss in the area of 
Cartago, in the Valle department, Jimenez was contacted by Vicente Castaño, Carlos 
Castaño’s brother, who beckoned him to join the AUC and to lead his own 
organisation, back in 1997 (Semana 9 June 2007). Although the details of this 
partnership are not known, it is likely that the Castaños had seen in him an option to 
consolidate under a single command the operations in the Middle Magdalena Valley 
(Garzon 2005: 87). In any case, it is clear that Jimenez did not intend to leave the 
drug-trafficking business; indeed, he appointed Ivan Duque as his political strategist 
and spokesman. In contrast with Castaño, Duque advocated the involvement of 
paramilitaries in the drug business, not only in terms of funding but also because he 
(said he) believed controlling coca crops areas was an important negotiating card in a 
future negotiation with the Colombian government and the American administration, 
as they could confidently offer to eradicate the crops, thus reducing the supply of 
cocaine to the United States (Aranguren 2001: 247-248). 
 
When negotiations with the Uribe administration started in 2002, with a view to a 
paramilitary demobilisation, tensions within the paramilitary confederate structure 
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escalated. Castaño, and those who urged to take distance from drug trafficking were 
sidelined or simply eliminated. In July 2002, Castaño resigned to the position of 
commander of the AUC. The next year, the BCB smashed the ‘Bloque Metro’, 
whose leader enjoyed the sympathy of Castaño and wanted to purge the AUC of 
drug traffickers. Castaño himself was killed in April 2004 and, with his death, 
paramilitary leaders like Adolfo Paz and Jimenez, closely related with the drug 
business, took the lead of the confederation (Garzon 2005: 87-92). While the new 
paramilitary bosses were not interested in participating themselves in politics, as 
Carlos Castaño probably did, they certainly exerted a significant influence over the 
local and parliamentary elections held in 2002 and 2003. Thanks to this 
manoeuvring, the ad-hoc judicial procedure proposed by the government to deal with 
their crimes, was passed by Congress with little opposition. According to this 
procedure, paramilitaries pledged to demobilise their troops and fully disclose their 
crimes in exchange for short sentences of up to eight years (Alonso et al. 2007). 
 
 
3.3 Armed conflict in the Middle Magdalena Valley, 1988-1995 
 
This section provides a brief overview of the magnitude of armed conflict and 
violence in the years previous to the period on which the rest of the dissertation 
focuses. It is based on reports produced by the Catholic NGO Comision 
Intercongregacional de Justicia y Paz, which were tabulated and compiled at the 
Middle Magdalena Valley Peace and Development Programme.58 This series 
covered a similar range of events to the Noche y Niebla reports but the coding was 
different. It is precisely for this reason that they were not included in the quantitative 
analysis presented in Ch. 4. The data presented in this section contains events from 
January 1988 to December 1995 in 44 municipios located in the Middle Magdalena 
Valley. 
 
During the period, 660 clashes and military attacks occurred in the region—most of 
them were held in rural areas (78 per cent). In the large majority of cases, the 
warring parties involved were government forces and guerrillas (95 per cent) with 
                                                
58 The data was tabulated by Viviana Garcia, an undergraduate student of politics at Universidad 
Nacional, during her internship at the PDPMM in Barrancabermeja, in 2005.   
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the remaining cases corresponding to unknown units or unclear events. The ELN 
took part in more than half of these events and the FARC in approximately thirty per 
cent; EPL insurgents were involved in less than five per cent. In the vast majority of 
cases, these organisations acted separately; only in four events were they involved 
together and, apparently, they clashed among them only in one occasion. Most 
events were concentrated in two areas: first, on the east side of the river, from San 
Vicente to Aguachica, and second, in northeast Antioquia, along the Cimitarra River, 
including San Pablo.59  
 
The total death toll left by these events rose to 1,278, including 99 civilians. Two out 
three combatants killed in actions were insurgents. Approximately 47 per cent of the 
insurgent death toll consisted of members of the ELN, 30 per cent were members of 
the FARC, less than seven per cent were members of the EPL; in other cases their 
affiliation was unknown. Furthermore, 100 guerrillas were captured in similar 
percentages to those shown above. 
 
Justicia y Paz reported the dead of 1,909 civilians in events connected to the armed 
conflict or, broadly speaking, with political motives. Approximately 35 per cent 
were perpetrated by paramilitary organisations, seven per cent by government forces 
and eight per cent by guerrillas; however, in half the cases the author is unknown. 
Altogether, paramilitary organisations killed 672 civilians. The number of civilians 
killed by insurgents rose to 149—forty per cent by members of the ELN. The 
majority of these deaths took place in rural areas of the Middle Magdalena Valley. It 
is worth noting that Justicia y Paz also reported 39 kidnappings during this period, 
of which insurgents perpetrated approximately a half; however, it is likely that these 
figures underestimate the actual scale of this phenomenon. 
 
According to Justicia y Paz, government forces killed 119 civilians for political 
reasons, in most cases by Army units and, in particular, by members of the Nueva 
Granada and Luciano Deluyer battalions; nearly half of those killings occurred in 
Barrancabermeja and San Vicente, where these units were based. In addition to the 
cases were they have been directly involved, military units have often been linked to 
                                                
59 Municipios such as Puerto Boyaca, La Dorada, Puerto Triunfo Nare, Puerto Berrio, in the south of 
the valley registered only a handful of events, probably reflecting the success of the counterinsurgent 
campaign of previous years.  
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paramilitary organisations or death squads operating in the region. For instance, in 
Barrancabermeja, in 1992, gunmen hired undercover by the Navy also carried out a 
series of murders in the city, targeting ELN militiamen but also social activists and 
journalists (CREDHOS 1999; Human Rights Watch 1996: 30-41; El Espectador 20 
April 1998). The Inter-American Court of Human Rights found that members of the 
Army supported the group that carried out the killings of La Rochela and obstructed 
the investigation that ensued (2007). 
 
 
3.4 Discussion 
 
Now that the setting and the main characters involved in producing armed conflict 
and violence in Middle Magdalena Valley have been introduced, it is possible to 
discuss in further detail how the theoretical questions and issues outlined in the first 
chapter translate into specific puzzles and problems in this region. For instance, the 
historical account offered in this chapter highlights the importance of various forms 
of collective action and organisation used by social groups to advance their interests 
(e.g. labour unions, colono leagues, grassroots organisations, squatter movement) 
and their connection with the emergence and consolidation of armed organisations. 
However, scholars have predicted (see Ch. 1), the risks and opportunities created by 
armed conflict may revert this trend leading civilians to privilege their individual 
interests and behave opportunistically, lying and cheating to protect their lives and 
livelihoods. Indeed, scholars such as Pecaut have argued that in Colombia, as armed 
conflict intensifies, civilian collaboration has been increasingly shaped by 
individual, rational calculation as social organisations disintegrate or succumb to 
manipulation by armed organisations (1999: 146, 150). The evidence presented in 
Ch. 6 challenges these views. 
 
Likewise, this chapter raises the question of whether the claims of armed 
organisations to represent the interests of particular classes and social groups—the 
middle class in the case of paramilitaries, the peasant and the poor in the case of 
insurgents—were somehow reflected in their actual behaviour. Scholars have 
discredited this notion and argued that ‘violence is not based on class divisions or 
other collective forms of social identity’ (Pecaut 1999: 145). Thanks to the 
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availability of data on the social background of victims it is possible to examine 
these claims using empirical evidence; Ch. 7 examines the distribution of violence 
across social groups and classes and discusses its significance in terms of 
understanding the relations between civilians and armed organisations. This chapter 
also provided a more detailed picture of the involvement of armed organisations in 
criminal activities and the dilemmas it entailed, evident in internal rifts in the 
paramilitary confederation; it thus raised the question of the extent to which such 
involvement actually weakened their will and ability to pursue their stated political 
and military goals. Ch. 7 discusses this issue and compares the effect of criminal 
activities such as kidnapping and the production of illegal drugs on the relation 
between armed organisations and civilians. 
 
As for the core research question of why did armed organisations use violence 
against civilians, top insurgent and paramilitary commanders openly admitted that 
their organisations used violence against those who collaborated with the enemy and 
questioned the notion of civilian immunity, highlighting the crucial role of the 
population in providing operational support to armed organisations. Indeed, this 
view was consistent with the systematic involvement of civilians in militias 
supervised by the insurgency. While the testimonies of commanders Castaño and 
Rios unequivocally back the hypothesis that violence was used in support of the 
political and military goals of armed organisations, they should not necessarily be 
taken at face value. Other possibilities must be explored and, given the availability 
of various resources, assets and rents in the region, it is worth asking whether 
violence against civilians might have been used, in fact, to increase control over the 
markets, networks and organisations, legal or illegal, that managed and traded in 
such resources.  
 
For instance, as will be shown later, there is evidence that paramilitaries used 
violence against coca growers who tried to sell coca paste to unauthorised buyers 
because they offered a better price. And, considering the history of conflicts over 
access to land and asset stripping by large landowners in the region, it is not 
unreasonable to ask whether violence, in particular massive forced displacement, 
was not aimed to depopulate rural areas and expand cattle ranches and oil palm 
plantations. Hence, violence may have had less to do with collaboration or allegiance 
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and more with extracting an extra rent from the growers or encroach peasants’ lands. 
Lacking detailed records about the specific causes of each individual crime (e.g. 
judicial records), the dissertation uses quantitative analysis to determine whether the 
distribution of violence against civilians across municipios is correlated with the 
distribution of several independent (explanatory) variables, including the magnitude 
of resources such as gold, coca, local budgets and of armed conflict itself. Ch. 4 
presents this analysis and its results. 
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4. SCALE, TRENDS AND AIMS OF VIOLENCE IN THE MIDDLE 
MAGDALENA VALLEY, 1996-2004 
 
 
 
Between 1999 and 2001, violence in the Middle Magdalena Valley reached 
unprecedented levels: the homicide rate grew twofold and only returned to the 
‘normal’ levels (i.e. around 40 deaths per 100,000 pop) after 2002. On average, 166 
civilians were kidnapped every year and the number of people forcefully displaced 
in 2000 was eleven times higher than the previous year. By 2004, more than 110,000 
people had fled their homes. In principle, these tragic outcomes should not be 
surprising. After all, armed conflict, that is, clashes and attacks between armed 
organisations, also grew in intensity: compared to 1999, the number of combatants 
killed in action in 2000 and 2001 rose by approximately fifty per cent. Indeed, 
violence against civilians is often seen as an inevitable consequence of armed 
conflict. However, as discussed in Ch. 1, contemporary conflicts are not always what 
they seem to be and, on closer inspection, armed organisations often turn out to be 
less interested in fighting each other than in the elimination, expulsion or 
exploitation of civilians. In the Middle Magdalena Valley, as in other Colombian 
regions during the 1990s, armed organisations seemed increasingly keen on 
capturing a variety of rents, assets and resources owned, controlled or produced by 
civilians (e.g. land, fiscal transfers, coca paste). This raises the question of whether 
capturing these resources, rather than the actual struggle for territorial control, may 
have been a crucial determinant factor of the scale and forms of violence employed 
against civilians. Were individuals and communities targeted to weaken the military 
operational abilities of the enemy or simply to grab their assets or extort them? 
 
This chapter argues that despite the salience of illegal economies and the relative 
abundance of natural resources such as oil and gold, violence against civilians in the 
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region was driven by political and military goals and, specifically, by the effort made 
by the state and armed organisations to extend and strengthen territorial and political 
control over the region. However, it acknowledges that some forms of violence, in 
particular ransom kidnappings, were aimed precisely at extracting rents from 
civilians. It is based on quantitative data obtained from official and unofficial 
sources, including the VNN dataset described in Ch. 2. 
 
The first part of the chapter highlights a simple but significant point: there was, 
indeed, armed conflict in the region—a military contest for territorial control 
manifested in armed clashes or unilateral attacks armed organisations. This point 
weakens the case for a pseudo-war interpretation of the conflict. This part also 
argues that despite the presence of several insurgent groups and militias, the conflict 
was essentially a two-sided contest between insurgents, on the one hand, and 
government and paramilitary troops, on the other. Although counterinsurgent troops 
suffered more casualties than guerrillas, they managed to weaken the insurgency, 
pushing it back to rural areas and reducing their ability to attack towns and kidnap 
civilians.  
 
The second part examines three forms of violence (killings, kidnappings and forced 
displacement) and shows that only a marginal proportion was a side effect of 
warfare, i.e. ‘collateral damage’—indeed, most attacks were deliberate. Crucially, it 
shows that the scale of violence was not disproportionately higher than armed 
conflict itself, as measured by the civilians’ and combatants’ death tolls, and in 
doing so it weakens the case for a pseudo-war interpretation. However, the 
disaggregated analysis of violence presents a heterogeneous picture that poses 
further questions about the true purpose of violence: while the average ratio of 
civilian to combatant deaths in the region was below 3 to 1, in some towns such as 
Barrancabermeja it was well above 10 to 1, casting doubts about whether armed 
conflict could actually explain such disproportionate levels of violence against 
civilians. Or if, perhaps, the regional average ratio may be flattening out local 
differences and, in particular, hiding localised processes comparable to those seen in 
pseudo-wars. 
 
The third part examines in further detail the role played by the state and armed 
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organisations in producing violence against civilians. It shows that their involvement 
in armed conflict and in violence against civilians do not necessarily go hand in 
hand: government forces were very effective in fighting insurgents but the scale of 
their attacks against civilians was marginal compared to other armed organisations; 
paramilitaries, by contrasts, had a marginal role in fighting insurgents and did poorly 
on the battlefield but were very effective in killing civilians. Indeed, their ratio of 
civilians to insurgents killed is consistent with a ‘new war’ scenario opening the 
possibility, again, that aggregate data and average ratios may be hiding a more 
complex story—one in which some organisations used ‘the fog of war’ as a façade 
for asset grabbing, plundering and exploitation. 
 
To tackle these questions, the fourth part of the chapter examines the spatial 
(municipal) distribution of violence, armed conflict and some of the key economic 
activities in the region. It argues that the distribution of violence fits better into the 
‘classical’ irregular warfare narrative, in which violence against civilians is used to 
increase territorial control rather than to expropriate assets or extract rents from 
civilians. However, it acknowledges that economic resources may have played a role 
in the production of violence in particular areas and cases. 
 
 
4.1 Pushing back the insurgency: trends and outcomes of armed 
conflict from 1996 to 2004 
 
According to data from the VNN dataset, from 1996 to 2004 the Middle Magdalena 
Valley experienced an intensification of armed conflict; in all, there were nearly 500 
hostile events during the period: approximately four in five entailed actual fire 
exchange between combatants while the rest were uncontested attacks (e.g. hit-and-
run attacks and aerial bombardment). Although the number of hostilities remained 
stationary at around sixty events per year, the combatants’ death toll increased 
almost every year, reaching its peak between 2000 and 2002, with approximately 
144 deaths per year (see Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1 Hostilities and combatant deaths in the Middle Magdalena Valley, 1996-2004 
 
Source: VNN.  
Note: Figures for 1996 exclude first half of the year. 
 
 
As seen in the previous chapter, the conflict involved several parties: two 
insurgencies, several paramilitary groups and the government forces. However, this 
was not an all-against-all confrontation: figures on hostilities and casualties show 
that the confrontation was effectively two-sided, with guerrillas on one side, clashing 
with paramilitaries in 68 events and with government forces in 400 events. Quarrels 
within the insurgent camp were rare and paramilitaries and government forces only 
clashed in a handful of occasions (see Table 4.1).  
 
 
Table 4.1 Dead combatants according to groups involved in hostilities, 1996-2004 
Warring forces Government forces Guerrillas Paramilitaries Total 
Government forces 7 440 0 447 
Guerrillas 115 0 244 359 
Paramilitaries 1 90 0 91 
Unknown group 0 0 0 0 
Others/mixed 1 6 0 7 
Total 124 536 244 904 
Source: VNN. 
Note: Figures in columns represent deaths inflicted to a group; figures in rows represent 
deaths inflicted by a group. 
 
 
Overall, the figures show that this was a period of downturn for rebels, losing 536 
combatants. The ELN lost 209 guerrillas, followed by the FARC, with 133 members 
killed; other 94 guerrillas belonging to these two groups were killed during joint 
operations carried out by both groups. The rest were members of minor groups such 
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as the ERP and the EPL or did not have their adscription established or reported. 
Furthermore, the army captured 47 guerrillas over the entire period—approximately 
half of them were members of FARC. Government forces were the most effective 
force in the fight against guerrillas, killing 440 of them, and reporting relatively low 
losses, especially after 2000.60 By contrast, paramilitaries played a secondary role 
but suffered important losses in the course of the hostilities, particularly after 2000, 
when ELN and FARC insurgents joined efforts and managed to attack paramilitary 
camps in south Bolivar (more on this in Ch. 7) (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2). 61  
 
 
Figure 4.2 Dead combatants by group, 1996-2004 
 
Source: VNN.  
Note: Figures for 1996 exclude first half of the year. 
 
 
A simple way to gauge the impact of the counterinsurgent campaign is by looking at 
the total number of events in which insurgents were involved, as recorded in the 
VNN dataset. This is a very rough measure of their ability to carry out all sorts of 
operations, including hostilities but also other typical guerrilla operations such as 
road blockades, kidnappings and attacks on oil pipelines, to name a few. Overall, the 
number of events involving guerrillas dropped from a quarterly average of 33.6 from 
                                                
60 The drop in military casualties may be down to two factors: increased tactical effectiveness of 
government forces, thanks to investments and training funded by the American-funded Plan 
Colombia, and a weakening in the operational capabilities of the insurgency, e.g. to ambush military 
convoys and attack isolated police stations or military posts, due to loss of firepower, intelligence and 
civilian support. 
61 In particular, it is possible that the number of guerrillas and paramilitaries dead is higher, as these 
groups usually hide their losses. The government, by contrast, usually publicises the number of 
soldiers dead and injured. 
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1996 to 1999, to 15.9 from 2002 to 2004. Similarly, guerrilla activity dropped in 32, 
out of 43 municipios, and completely disappeared in 13 municipios. Table 4.2 shows 
data for specific types of events. 
 
 
Table 4.2. Insurgent activity: quarterly averages of events by period 
Events 1996-1999 2000-2001 2002-2004 
Checkpoints and road blockades 4.00 7.00 0.92 
Raids 0.50 0.25 0.08 
Sabotage 1.36 3.25 0.58 
Destruction of civilian property 5.50 3.75 0.67 
Plunder 0.86 2.88 0.08 
Kidnappings (victims) 33.8 40.6 13.9 
Hostilities 15.21 16.13 10.75 
Events other than hostilities 18.29 19.75 5.17 
In towns (‘cabecera municipal’) 9.36 8.00 0.58 
In rural areas 16.79 25.25 14.75 
All insurgent events 33.57 35.88 15.92 
Notes: Based on VNN, except for kidnappings, which are based on the Fondelibertad database. 
The location of some events could not be traced to a specific or unambiguous location within a 
municipio; for this reason towns’ and rural events do not add up to the total. 
 
 
This retreat was far more visible in the towns across the region, where quarterly 
events fell from 9.36 in the first years of the period to 0.58 during the last. However, 
in rural areas the story was slightly different, as their operational ability only fell 
marginally. Even though the army and the paramilitaries did not manage to eliminate 
the insurgents, they forced them to retreat from the towns, allowing local 
governments and businesses to operate normally and, most importantly, gaining 
control over the transit of people and goods across the region, including to and from 
areas where guerrillas still operated by the end of the period. This was particularly 
important in south Bolivar, where paramilitaries managed to cordon sierra San 
Lucas; this enabled them to cut off the insurgents’ supply lines, although at a great 
cost for civilians as will be shown later (in Ch. 6). 
 
As often happens in irregular warfare, hostilities were geographically concentrated. 
Most took place in four contiguous municipios: San Pablo, Yondo, Remedios and 
Barrancabermeja; together, they accounted for 39 per cent of the events. Similarly, 
half the combatants’ deaths were registered in municipios in northeast Antioquia and 
south Bolivar: San Pablo (16 per cent), Simiti (10 per cent), Yondo (9 per cent), 
Santa Rosa (7.7 per cent) and Montecristo (6.7 per cent). While paramilitaries 
clashed with guerrillas mostly in south Bolivar, government forces spread their 
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action over several areas including Barrancabermeja, Aguachica, northeast 
Antioquia, south Bolivar and other municipios in Santander. Four out of five 
combatants killed in action died in events in rural areas. While most hostilities took 
place in rural areas, Barrancabermeja was the town where more combatants were 
killed. 
 
 
4.2 Main forms of violence and their scale 
 
This part provides a disaggregated view of three forms of violence and coercion 
experienced by civilians in the region: killings, kidnappings and forced 
displacement. There are three considerations behind the choice of these variables.  
 
First, compared to these three forms of violence, other forms reported by the sources 
are less unambiguous. For instance, raids on towns and villages usually involve 
attacks against several targets and cause a wide range of damages, including killings, 
abductions, theft, threats, and so on. Similarly, road blockades and checkpoints are 
carried out with different purposes and lead to variable outcomes in term of its 
impact on civilians (e.g. threats, kidnappings, destruction and theft of vehicles). 
Although massacres have been one of the most visible forms of violence against 
civilians, they show great variability in terms of the number of victims; furthermore, 
they do not account for the bulk of the civilian death toll, as most civilians were 
killed in targeted, individualised attacks. Threats and other forms of intimidation 
refer to potential rather than actual events and are likely to be unevenly reported. 
Moreover, since many of them are aimed towards groups or entire communities, an 
aggregate measure would entail some kind of weighting based on the number of 
potential victims, which in most cases is unknown. In the case of looting and other 
events leading to the destruction or theft of goods and assets, the main shortcoming 
is the lack of precision in the accounting of losses. By contrast, the three variables 
chosen to gauge the magnitude of violence are relatively unequivocal and well 
defined. 
 
Second, together they provide a more balanced view of how armed organisations 
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employed violence against civilians. Indeed, for the sake of simplicity and elegance, 
it would have been better to choose only one, such as killings—the most definitive 
and less ambiguous form of violence, as Kalyvas put it (2006: 20)—and surely the 
one on which most quantitative analysts focus. But this choice would have biased the 
analysis both in terms of the perpetrators and the victims of violence. This is 
because, as will become evident later, the warring parties specialised in different 
forms of violence; insurgent violence, for instance, only can be fully grasped by 
taking into account their participation in kidnappings. Neglecting this form of 
violence would lead to underestimate their role in the production of violence. 
 
Third, their political salience in the context of the Colombian conflict: kidnappings 
have provoked recurrent episodes of social mobilisation, backed by the government 
and the media and, arguably, have been a key factor in driving the Colombian 
electorate to the right, in favour of tough measures against the insurgency. Although 
forced displacement has prompted less social and political mobilisation, its sheer 
scale—by 2006, Colombia had the second largest displaced population in the world 
after Sudan (UNHCR 2006: 170)—has attracted international attention from 
humanitarian agencies and still poses a massive challenge to the Colombian state in 
terms of providing welfare and ensuring that the displaced can reclaim the assets 
they lose when fleeing their homes. 
 
4.2.1 Civilian deaths 
 
In parallel with the intensification of armed conflict, during the late 1990s and early 
2000s, the Middle Magdalena Valley experienced a steep increase in the regional 
homicide rate, which rose from approximately 40 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants in 
1996, to nearly 90 deaths in 2000 and 2001. According to official sources (Policia 
Nacional), nearly 6,000 people were killed in the region between 1996 and 2004. 
Although more than half of these deaths were apparently related to petty crime and 
private quarrels, the increase itself was caused by armed conflict: not only the rise in 
combatants killed in action, reported above, but also a vast increase in the number of 
civilians killed in events related, directly or indirectly, with the armed conflict (see 
Figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3. Homicide rate in the Middle Magdalena Valley, 1996-2004 
 
Sources: Policia Nacional (homicides), VNN (conflict related deaths) and DANE 
(population).  
Note: The homicide rate is the number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. As 
the number of conflict-related deaths in the first half of 1996 is unknown, it was 
assumed to be the same as in the second half; thus, in 1996, the lower line doubles 
the VNN figure. Conflict related deaths include both civilians’ and combatants’ 
deaths. 
 
 
To be precise, the VNN dataset records 1,855 civilians killed in conflict-related 
events, that is, killed (or believed to be killed) by armed organisations or by the state 
in connection with the armed conflict.62 This means that, on average, for every dead 
combatant 2.05 civilians were killed during the period; this figure was higher in 
2000 and 2001, when nearly forty-eight per cent of the civilian deaths occurred and 
approximately three civilians died for each combatant (see Figure 4.4). While these 
ratios did not reach the threshold commonly associated with ‘new wars’, they 
certainly raise the question of why did armed conflict had such a disproportionate 
toll on civilians, compared to the combatants’ casualties.  
 
Only eighty-six civilians died in the course of hostilities or as a direct consequence 
of them—that is, approximately one civilian for every eleven combatants. For 
instance, at least eight civilians died in bombings in areas where guerrillas were 
suspected to be hiding. Ten were killed while being used as ‘human shields’ by 
combatants or in other circumstances that put their lives in risk, e.g., when sharing 
vehicles with combatants in disputed areas. Predictably, most cases occurred in 
                                                
62 In particular, some acts of violence by government forces against civilians were not connected with 
the armed conflict and, in principle, could have occurred even in its absence, including cases of abuse 
of authority and ‘social cleansing’ (e.g. attacks against homeless or drug addicts). 
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contested areas such as south Bolivar (more specifically in San Pablo, Santa Rosa 
and Simiti), where forty of them died, and Barrancabermeja, where 22 were killed. 
Moreover, six civilians were killed and 39 injured by landmines.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Civilians’ and combatants’ death tolls, 1996-2004 
 
Source: VNN dataset. 
Note: Figures for 1996 exclude first half of the year. 
 
 
The remaining 1,763 civilians were murdered in 1,040 events different to hostilities. 
In other words, more than 95 per cent of the civilian deaths linked to armed conflict 
could not be attributed to ‘collateral damage’—the bulk occurred in attacks 
deliberately aimed at civilians. In all, paramilitaries killed approximately 43 per cent 
of the victims and guerrillas accounted only for 12 per cent. Government forces also 
did their part, some times in partnership with paramilitaries, but their contribution 
was marginal. In a significant proportion of cases, the crimes were committed by 
unknown actors or armed organisations, for instance when a corpse was found but 
the perpetrators were unknown or when they deliberately hid their identities. Table 
4.3 shows the number of combatants and civilians killed by each group involved in 
conflict. The last column shows the ratio of combatants to civilians by armed 
organisations: while government forces clearly focused on fighting guerrillas, 
paramilitaries and ‘unknown groups’ targeted mainly or exclusively civilians; 
guerrillas killed approximately three civilians for every five combatants. In 
municipios with the highest conflict-related homicide rates, the bulk of the deaths 
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were perpetrated by paramilitaries.63 
 
 
Table 4.3 Civilians and combatants killed by group, excluding hostilities, 1996-2004 
Warring forces Combatants (%) Civilians    (%) Civilians / combatants 
Government forces 447 49.5 28 1.6 0.06 
Guerrillas 359 39.7 211 11.9 0.59 
Paramilitaries 91 10.1 765 43.2 8.40 
Unidentified group 0 0.0 720 40.7 ∞ 
Others/mixed 7 0.8 45 2.5 7.29 
Total 904 100.0 1,769 100.0 1.96 
Source: VNN. 
Notes: Figures in rows represent deaths inflicted by a group. Civilian deaths exclude those 
occurred during hostilities, i.e., ‘collateral damage’ deaths. 
 
 
Although civilians deaths were reported all over the region, they were 
geographically concentrated in a handful of municipios: 38 per cent occurred in 
Barrancabermeja, the largest town in the region, mostly during 2000 and 2001; and 
four adjacent towns in northeast Antioquia and south Bolivar accounted together for 
nearly 24 per cent: Segovia, Remedios, Yondo and San Pablo. Indeed, these 
municipios, had the highest conflict-related homicide rates in the region during the 
period of study, ranging from 44 to 89 civilian deaths per year per 100,000 people.64 
 
 
4.2.2 Kidnappings  
 
This section is based on the official kidnapping database, kept by Fondelibertad, a 
government agency. It recorded 1,412 victims of kidnapping in the region from July 
1996 to December 2004. Only a small proportion of the victims were captured by 
petty criminals and victims’ relatives, 3.9 and 0.4 per cent, respectively; nearly 
twenty per cent of the victims were captured by unknown actors or organisations, but 
there is no indication as to whether at least some of them could have had a political 
motivation or were somehow connected to armed conflict.65 The large majority, 
1,075 (76.1 percent), were captured by guerrillas and paramilitaries: 965 and 110, 
                                                
63 There were two exceptions, though: Segovia, where the Machuca blaze put guerrillas in the first 
place, and Barrancabermeja, where more than half of the victims were killed by unidentified groups. 
64 As follows: Yondo, 88.6; Remedios, 63.0; Maceo, 48.5; San Pablo, 47.7; and Segovia, 43.7. 
Barrancabermeja was sixth with 43.3 deaths per year per 100,000 people. Source: VNN.  
65 Unlike N&N, Fondelibertad does not make any assumptions regarding the political or criminal 
nature of these kidnappings. 
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respectively; nearly half of them occurred in four municipios: Aguachica (21.3 per 
cent), San Pablo (9.5 per cent), Barrancabermeja (9.2 per cent) and Pelaya (8.7 per 
cent). 
 
Kidnappings in the Middle Magdalena Valley experienced an explosive growth in 
1997 and kept occurring at a fairly quick pace until 2001: on average, from 1997 to 
2001, one civilian was captured approximately every two days by an armed 
organisation. As the insurgency was pushed back into the mountains, this trend 
reversed and, by the end of the period, the number of conflict-related kidnappings 
was coming back to the levels seen at the beginning of the period. This was, 
undoubtedly, one of the most important accomplishments of the counterinsurgent 
campaign of these years (see Figure 4.5). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Conflict-related kidnappings in the Middle Magdalena Valley, 1996-2004 
 
Source: Based on Fondelibertad database. 
 
As noted in Ch. 2, one of the crucial advantages of the Fondelibertad database is that 
it records whether the motivation was economic or political based on first-hand 
information collected by the authorities about each individual case. Although the 
motives were unknown in more than a third of the cases, the figures show that nearly 
half of the victims were captured to demand a payment but this proportion was 
slightly higher in the case of insurgents. In most cases, the motives of paramilitary 
kidnappings were unknown (see Table 4.4). A more detailed discussion of the use of 
kidnappings by guerrillas and paramilitaries is presented later in this chapter. 
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Table 4.4 Civilians kidnapped by insurgents and paramilitaries in the Middle Magdalena 
Valley, 1996-2004 
Motive Guerrillas (%) Paramilitaries (%) Total (%) 
Ransom 506 52.4 19 17.3 525 48.8 
Political 156 16.2 10 9.1 166 15.4 
Unknown 303 31.4 81 73.6 384 35.7 
Total 965 100.0 110 100.0 1075 100.0 
Source: Based on Fondelibertad dataset. 
 
 
4.2.3 Forced displacement 
 
According to official figures, 112,606 people fled their homes during this period 
and, in particular, between 2000 and 2001 (see Figure 4.6).66 Overall, 26,880 
migrated within the same municipio, usually from the rural area towards the town; 
likewise, 58,550 people migrated within the region. Of those who left the region, 
most went to cities such as Bucaramanga, Bogota and Cartagena. The impact on the 
population growth was evident: census data and projections show that from 1996 to 
2005 the population remained almost stationary, growing merely by 0.13 per cent 
per year. Several municipios lost up to a third of their population and in disputed 
areas, such as south Bolivar, e.g. San Pablo and Morales, there was massive 
migration (relative to their population) from rural areas and villages to the towns.67  
 
One of the most revealing aspects of the data shown above are the significant 
differences in the way armed organisations engaged in armed conflict and violence: 
government forces seemed to be particularly good at fighting insurgents, while the 
latter managed to inflict significant damage to paramilitaries; insurgents were also 
‘good’ at kidnapping civilians, as were paramilitaries at killing them. The specialised 
patterns of aggression towards civilians revealed by the data call for a more detailed 
analysis in which the specific goals of each organisation are examined separately. 
This is precisely the purpose of the next part of the chapter. 
 
 
 
                                                
66 However, it is likely that the first peak, in 2000, may actually include households displaced in 
previous years. These households had not been registered before either because the information 
system (i.e. forms, procedures) was not fully operational until 2001 or the assistance offered by virtue 
of being registered was available only from that year on. 
67 Figures based on author’s calculations. 
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Figure 4.6 Internally displaced people per quarter, 1996-2004 
 
Source: Official registry of displaced people (SUR). 
Note: This figure shows the number of persons who reported to have fled their homes at 
some point during the corresponding quarter because of imminent or actual violence. 
 
 
 
4.3 Producers of violence against civilians  
 
This section looks at how irregular armed organisations and the state produced and 
used different forms of violence against civilians. Although special attention is paid 
to killings and kidnappings, other forms of violence and coercion such as raids, 
checkpoints, looting and destruction of assets and infrastructure are also discussed. 
Forced displacement is not considered because the existing data (available to the 
public) does not report perpetrators.68 
 
 
4.3.1 Insurgents  
 
Although kidnappings and killings are the most notorious and best documented 
forms of violence used by insurgents against civilians, road blockades, raids and 
attacks against oil pipelines were among the most visible manifestations of the 
                                                
68 Information on perpetrators of displacement (and many more details) has been gathered by the 
authorities as part of the official displacement registry but it is not available to the public.  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1
9
9
6
-3
1
9
9
6
-4
1
9
9
7
-1
1
9
9
7
-2
1
9
9
7
-3
1
9
9
7
-4
1
9
9
8
-1
1
9
9
8
-2
1
9
9
8
-3
1
9
9
8
-4
1
9
9
9
-1
1
9
9
9
-2
1
9
9
9
-3
1
9
9
9
-4
2
0
0
0
-1
2
0
0
0
-2
2
0
0
0
-3
2
0
0
0
-4
2
0
0
1
-1
2
0
0
1
-2
2
0
0
1
-3
2
0
0
1
-4
2
0
0
2
-1
2
0
0
2
-2
2
0
0
2
-3
2
0
0
2
-4
2
0
0
3
-1
2
0
0
3
-2
2
0
0
3
-3
2
0
0
3
-4
2
0
0
4
-1
2
0
0
4
-2
2
0
0
4
-3
2
0
0
4
-4
D
is
p
la
c
e
d
 p
e
o
p
le
 (
th
o
u
s
a
n
d
s
)
  
 131 
insurgents’ strength in the 1990s and were equally important in grasping their 
relation with civilians. Road blockades and flash checkpoints in main rural roads 
enabled guerrillas to kidnap civilians, steal vehicles, destroy buses and trucks, or 
simply to make their presence and capabilities evident to travellers and to the public 
in general, as these evens were widely reported by the media.  
 
For instance, in September 1996, insurgents set fire to three trucks and three buses in 
separate events in Aguachica, Rionegro, Pelaya and Sabana de Torres (N&N 1: 76); 
according to a local newspaper, all buses belonged to the same company and, 
although the motive was not reported, it is likely that the attacks were aimed at 
exacting a protection fee (El Tiempo 16 September 1996). Other attacks seemed to 
be less well-targeted: for instance, during a typical blockade, occurred in July 1998, 
insurgents forced all vehicles to stop, painted the group’s acronym on some of them, 
stole a pick-up and a 4-by-4, kidnapped three people and killed other two after they 
dismissed a signal to stop their car (El Heraldo 19 July 1998). Other blockades 
seemed to have merely a publicity purpose, such as the one occurred near the town 
of Cimitarra, where guerrillas blocked the traffic by parking two trucks in the middle 
of a highway. It took nine hours to the police to get to the place, and remove the 
vehicles, which had no explosives as the guerrillas had told everyone (El Tiempo 10 
April 1997). These examples illustrate how guerrillas, by taking the initiative and by 
using civilians as a shield, can enjoy tactical advantages on the field. In all, the 
dataset records 120 insurgent road blockades or checkpoints and the destruction of 
89 vehicles.  
 
Raids were less frequent but still significant in political terms, as a challenge to the 
state. In Simiti, for instance, the ELN attacked the police station in several occasions, 
forcing the police to leave the town; in one of these raids, they also attacked and 
looted the state-owned agrarian bank and destroyed files in the district attorney’s 
office (more on this case in Ch. 7). Finally, the dataset records fifteen insurgent 
attacks on oil pipelines and ten against electrical towers. These attacks were 
allegedly made by the insurgents to express their concerns regarding the 
government’s energy policy—in particular the participation of foreign investors in 
the sector. However, there is evidence that they were actually aimed at extorting the 
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contractors that had to be hired to repair the damage (Peñate 1999: 93).69 At any rate, 
these attacks were useful in terms of getting media coverage and displaying their 
disruptive power even in areas they did not control, as attacks against electrical 
towers on the national grid could lead to power cuts in several municipios. 
 
 
Insurgent killings 
 
Judging by the number of victims, the elimination of civilians played a marginal role 
in the insurgent strategy. Although guerrillas were present in most of the municipios 
of the region, their killings were concentrated in a few places—almost half of them 
occurred in Barrancabermeja and nearly a third died in a single, accidental event in 
the village of Machuca, near Segovia.70 The ELN was the most violent insurgent 
group, accounting for nearly two thirds of the total number of civilians killed by 
insurgents.  
 
While the Machuca blaze was exceptional, unintended violence against civilians was 
not. Insurgent attacks against police stations and military facilities located in densely 
inhabited areas often caused damage to civilian homes and shops and killed passers-
by. In Barrancabermeja, for instance, the rudimentary rockets launched by insurgents 
against the Nueva Granada anti-aerial battalion facilities, often landed in homes 
located nearby. Similarly, peasants often stepped on landmines planted the in rural 
areas of south Bolivar as a last resource to stop the paramilitaries; the dataset records 
seven lethal victims of landmines—as many as the combatants killed by this device. 
 
 
Insurgent kidnappings 
 
If guerrillas had a marginal participation in the killing of civilians, they were by far 
the most important perpetrators of kidnappings in the region, capturing nine out of 
                                                
69 According to Peñate, these extortions could involve direct payments to the ELN but also demands 
to hire locals in the reconstruction works, increasing the insurgents’ appeal in those areas (1999: 93). 
70 In October 1998, a cloud of gas, released by a pipeline blown up by ELN guerrillas, was led by the 
wind towards the small village of Machuca where it caught fire, killing more than sixty civilians. 
Although the initial reaction of the ELN was to blame the army for the fire, they later acknowledged 
their full responsibility (El Espectador 30 October 1998, El Tiempo 12 November 1998). 
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ten victims of conflict-related kidnappings (and two of three hostages when all 
kidnappings are considered). The top kidnapper was the ELN, with 733 civilians, 
that is, 68 per cent of all the victims of conflict-related kidnappings, followed by 
FARC and EPL guerrillas with 15.6 and 6 per cent, respectively. 
 
Three aspects of insurgent kidnappings deserve attention. First, approximately one in 
two was done for ransom; only one in six had political motives.71 In absolute terms, 
the ELN was the top perpetrator of both political and ransom kidnappings; however, 
in relative terms the EPL and FARC were more likely to kidnap civilians for ransom 
(75 and 62 per cent respectively) than the ELN (48 per cent). 
 
While these figures highlight the importance of kidnappings as a source of funding, 
their use as a mechanism of political coercion should not be underestimated. In 
1997, for instance, the insurgency sabotaged the local elections and captured several 
candidates and elected officials in an attempt (successful, in most cases) to force 
them to resign. In other cases, the insurgents coerced officials in more subtle ways, 
for instance, by convening meetings in rural areas, where they were held, sometimes 
for several days, to deal with issues related to the local government. While violence 
was not actually used in these instances, defiance could have serious consequences.  
 
Insurgents also used kidnappings to punish collaborators. For instance, in 1997, 
FARC guerrillas kidnapped eight top employees of three palm oil companies and 
demanded to stop production in reprisal for their alleged support to paramilitary 
groups. The hostages were released in stages and, according to press reports, the 
companies were forced to pay an economic sanction and to increase ‘social 
investment’ in the region (El Colombiano 2 January 1998, Vanguardia 31 May 
1998). 
 
The evolution of political and ransom kidnappings reflected the declining 
capabilities of the insurgency and a change in their priorities (see Figure 4.7). As the 
counterinsurgent offensive progressed, they were less able to reach the towns and 
                                                
71 In the remaining cases the motives were unknown but their distribution (across municipios) was 
strongly correlated with that of ransom kidnappings, so they are likely to have involved economic 
demands. 
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main roads where they usually caught their victims. While the marked decline in 
political kidnappings could be interpreted as a sign of criminalisation, i.e. a shift 
towards economic rewards, this view is too simplistic. In fact, as it will be argued 
later (in Ch. 6), insurgents tried (and failed) to increase their control and political 
legitimacy in the region using a variety of means, not only kidnappings, such as their 
participation in episodes of social mobilisation or through negotiations with the 
national government to demilitarise the zone. 
 
 
Figure 4.7. Insurgent kidnappings in the Middle Magdalena Valley, 1996-2004 
 
 
 
Second, data on the hostages’ occupations (available in 77 per cent of the cases) 
indicates that most were far from the top echelons of the socioeconomic ladder. In 
fact, the largest group consisted of unskilled workers (29 per cent), including those 
employed through formal contracts and own-account and informal workers (e.g. 
merchants, shopkeepers and public transport drivers, who often drive their own 
vehicles). They were followed by local politicians and officials, both elected and 
appointed (18 per cent), and by skilled workers, including employees and own-
account workers (13 per cent). Less than four per cent of the victims were cattle-
ranchers; although some of them may have been large landholders, the database does 
not provide hints about their assets. Thus, for the most, the victims were members of 
middle-to-low income groups; this is consistent with the findings reported by Rubio 
(2003: 25) for the national level, based on the same source.  
 
In line with the above, the ransoms demanded were, in many cases, relatively low; 
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assuming a proportional relation between them and the actual assets of the hostages’ 
families, it is evident that most of them did not belong to the wealthiest layers of 
society: out of 184 cases for which data on the ransoms was available (that is 35 per 
cent of the total number of insurgent ransom kidnappings), in 53 (nearly 29 per cent) 
the amount was equal or inferior to Col$10 million (approx. $5,000).  
 
Third, in most cases the victims were held captive for a short period. Approximately 
86 per cent of the victims captured by insurgents during the period of study had been 
released by December 2004 and, of those free, 23 per cent had been released or 
rescued on the same day they had been captured; 60 had been set free within a week, 
84 per cent within a month, and 92 per cent within three months. However, nearly 
twelve per cent of all victims were still captive (by the same date) and the remaining 
two per cent were dead. 
 
These short periods of detention reflect the tactics employed by guerrillas in taking 
hostages: they often captured groups of civilians at random, screening them and 
releasing those who offered poorer prospects of exchangeability. This practice, 
known as ‘miraculous fishing’ (‘pesca milagrosa’) was extensively used by the 
insurgency throughout the country in the late 1990s. In other cases, the kidnapping 
itself was a form of political coercion on local officials, politicians, journalists and 
judges, who were captured and forced to resign to a post, abandon a political 
campaign, disseminate communiqués, render accounts about the use of public funds, 
leave a town, to mention some examples. In these cases, the victims were often 
released in a matter of hours or days, as the negotiation did not involve third parties. 
For instance, some of the politicians kidnapped by the ELN in south Bolivar in 1997, 
before the local elections, were released after three days. 
 
 
4.3.2 Paramilitaries 
 
If guerrillas were unbeatable kidnappers, paramilitaries were the champions of 
massacres and executions; but, like them, they also terrorised the population with 
checkpoints and raids. However, paramilitary checkpoints had a different nature; 
they were usually set in isolated locations, halfway between the towns and the most 
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secluded rural areas, where guerrillas were known to hide; their main purpose was 
controlling the access of people and goods, like medicines, food and other supplies 
useful to rural dwellers but also to the insurgents. As a peasant leader from south 
Bolivar recalled: ‘From late in 1999 through 2000 and 2001, the paramilitaries 
imposed a blockade on the region. If they caught you carrying batteries, or aspirins 
or even a black training suit they would kill you. More than one died like that. If you 
carried medicines, canned food or torches you were targeted’ (I-6).  
 
Paramilitary raids usually targeted villages in areas believed to be under insurgent 
control. They could last from a few hours to several days and involve verbal threats, 
the destruction of goods and homes and the execution or disappearance of civilians. 
While sometimes they targeted specific individuals named on a list or accused by 
informants, in other occasions the threats were general. For instance, in March 2000, 
paramilitaries visited San Luis Beltran, in the Cimitarra River valley, and gave the 
villagers 72 hours to leave the area, forcing them to escape towards the town of 
Yondo (N&N 15: 163). In Cerro Burgos, a village over the Magdalena River, 
paramilitaries entered the village in June 1998, killed three civilians, including one 
who had received threats in the past and whose home was burnt to ashes; other 
homes and two offices were looted too (N&N 7: 142). The village was raided again a 
few weeks later and became a beachhead for the paramilitary campaign in south 
Bolivar.  
 
Raids often led to massive forced displacement. Although the available official data 
does not record the group or groups that forced the victims to flee their homes, the 
VNN dataset records 94 instances of collective or massive forced displacement not 
prompted by hostile events but induced by the coercion of armed groups. Most of 
them, 72 to be precise, were caused by the direct action of paramilitary groups; of 
them, 44 targeted rural dwellers and 21 urban residents. 
 
 
Paramilitary killings 
 
Although paramilitaries clashed with guerrillas in several occasions, their 
participation in proper clashes with insurgents was marginal; they took part in less 
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than sixteen per cent of the hostile events registered in the region during the period 
of study. Furthermore, their performance was poor—they lost nearly three men for 
each guerrilla killed. As a force, they specialised in killing civilians: more than eight 
for every insurgent killed. In most cases, and especially in rural areas, the description 
of events as reported by N&N was not detailed enough to establish whether the 
victims were selectively targeted or not. However, there are signs that paramilitary 
violence became increasingly selective: up until 2000, nearly 40 per cent of their 
victims died in events where five or more people were killed simultaneously; from 
2001, that proportion fell to fifteen per cent. Likewise the proportion of victims 
killed in attacks aimed at a single person went from 18 per cent before 2001, to 50 
per cent from 2001 onwards. This is likely to be the combined effect of two factors: 
first, the availability of reliable information on collaborators, which probably grew 
as paramilitaries tightened control over the region but also by the fact that individual 
crimes attracted less criticism and public attention from the media and, therefore, 
could help them in improving their image to the eyes of the public, as discussed in 
the previous chapter. 
 
 
Paramilitary kidnappings 
 
Only ten per cent of the conflict-related kidnappings reported by Fondelibertad in 
the region were perpetrated by paramilitaries. While half of the victims were 
released within three days after their capture, one in five had not returned to liberty 
by the end of the period of study. Thirty per cent of the victims were kidnapped for 
ransom and thirteen per cent for political reasons; the motives were unknown in the 
remaining cases. It is worth noting that, compared to the Fondelibertad database, the 
VNN dataset reports twice the number of civilians kidnapped, abducted or 
temporarily retained by paramilitaries in the Middle Magdalena Valley. This is 
probably a result of different criteria used in the collection and classification of data; 
as noted in Ch. 2 2, the N&N reports offer less details about these events and the fate 
of their victims.  
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4.3.3 Government forces 
 
Compared with irregular groups, the participation of government forces in attacks 
against civilians was marginal. They accounted for less than two per cent of the 
civilian death toll and their ratio of civilians to combatants killed was approximately 
of 6 to 100—far from ideal but well below the paramilitaries’ ratio. According to the 
VNN dataset, government forces killed 28 civilians (in incidents different to 
hostilities). In most cases, the victims were reported by the army as insurgents killed 
in action but their families or human rights organisations dismissed the allegations; 
so did the N&N fieldworkers and, consequently, they were classified as civilians. For 
instance, in September 1997, the army reported the rescue of the mayor of 
Barrancabermeja’s brother, who had been kidnapped nine days ago; according to the 
media, four guerrillas were killed in the operation (Vanguardia 9 September 1997). 
However, according to N&N, the guerrillas, aware of the presence of the army, 
abandoned the hostage and escaped and the deceased were actually peasants who 
lived nearby and were executed by the army (N&N 5: 47). Likewise, in September 
2002, the army reported a clash with FARC guerrillas, in which two of them were 
killed in action; however, their families rejected the army’s story and denounced the 
event as a violation of their human rights (El Tiempo 29 September 2002; N&N 25: 
117).72 
 
Other forms of state violence against civilians were relatively marginal too. Victims 
of forced disappearances, a trademark of state violence in Latin America, were 
merely than a handful. Looting was uncommon and most cases of destruction of 
civilians’ goods and assets occurred when aerially sprayed herbicides, used to 
eradicate coca, actually fell on peasants’ staple crops and animals.  
 
There is, however, evidence about the reluctance of government forces to tackle 
paramilitary groups in their actions against civilians. Indeed, in several instances 
they seemed to act in coordination. Perhaps the most conspicuous cases were 
                                                
72 It is hard to tell if this was a common practice in the Middle Magdalena Valley during these years. 
However, by the mid 2000s, apparently it became widespread. A political scandal about the so-called 
‘false positives’, i.e. civilians executed by the army but officially reported as guerrillas killed in 
action, erupted in 2008 and it is still matter of judicial investigation (Semana 27 September 2008 and 
27 January 2009). 
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reported in Barrancabermeja where, despite the heavy presence of the police, the 
army, the navy and the state’s intelligence agency, paramilitary groups were able to 
attack civilians without restrain (more on this in Ch. 5). Other cases come from San 
Pablo, where the police locked themselves inside the station during a paramilitary 
raid in which fourteen civilians were killed (El Tiempo 12 January 1999). A few 
years later, in the same town, the police failed to react to the killing of a local 
merchant near the police station; in response, an angry mob of locals attacked the 
station during his funeral, setting on fire three vehicles (Bayona 2005). Likewise, 
during the paramilitary siege of Montecristo, government forces sent to protect 
civilians from an imminent confrontation targeted only insurgent-controlled areas 
(El Tiempo 31 August, 5 and 9 September 1998). To conclude, while episodes of 
open collaboration or cooperation between paramilitaries and government forces 
were rare or unclear, instances of coordination were more frequent.  
 
 
4.3.4 Unidentified or unknown perpetrators  
 
As explained above, this category refers to events in which the perpetrator is not 
known but the event was nonetheless deemed by N&N as conflict-related and thus 
included in the reports. The decision to include these cases in the N&N reports was 
based on the nature of events, the identity of the victim and the modus operandi of 
the perpetrators, which are usually different to those reported in quarrels and 
offences by petty criminals. Indeed, the events on which these unidentified agents 
took part consisted, in most cases, of deadly attacks against civilians and did not 
involve any other behaviour such as looting or kidnappings. Thus, it seems unlikely 
that the perpetrators were petty criminals.73 But in many cases they could not be 
identified because they deliberately concealed their identities, for instance by not 
wearing badges or insignias.  
 
There are two signs that many of these crimes were actually committed by 
                                                
73 If N&N had over-reported the number of conflict-related deaths, including purely ‘criminal’ 
homicides (e.g., resulting from quarrels, disputes among gangs, etc.) within the count, the increase in 
murders committed by unidentified groups from 1999 would have been offset by a decrease in the 
number of ‘criminal’ deaths as, in this scenario, the latter would had been mislabelled and counted 
within the former category. But, in fact, the number of criminal deaths rose in 1999 and remained 
relatively stable until 2002 (see Figure 4.3).  
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paramilitaries who did not want, or could not, be identified as such. The first is that 
nearly half of these deaths took place in the urban area of two municipios: 
Barrancabermeja and Aguachica and, of them, the large majority occurred in 2000 
and 2001, when paramilitaries changed their tactics, turning to individual, 
anonymous executions instead of the scandalous massacres seen in previous years 
(more on this in Ch. 5). The second is their spatial (municipal) distribution: whereas 
the correlation between the civilian killings included in this group and the 
paramilitaries’ is 0.536 and statistically significant, the correlation with those 
committed by guerrillas was not (n = 33 and 20, respectively).74 But these clues are 
far from conclusive and, since there is no way to determine the precise proportion of 
killings committed by paramilitaries, these killings are reported in a separate 
category or omitted in the analyses that follow. 
 
Overall, the evidence presented in this part does not back the claim made by some 
Colombian scholars that violence against civilians during the late 1990s escalated 
and ‘degradated ad nauseam’ because armed organisations ‘mimicked’ and, at the 
same time, tried to outperform each other (Gonzalez et al. 2003: 73; UNDP 2003: 
91). While both paramilitaries and insurgents did their part, the scale and forms of 
violence and coercion they used were different. These differences reflected the 
asymmetric conditions they faced in terms of resources and social support, as the 
next chapter will show.  
 
The findings of this part give us some clues about the purposes of some forms of 
violence, in particular kidnappings, but not in relation to killings and forced 
displacement. The next part of the chapter uses econometric techniques to unveil 
these motives. 
 
 
4.4 Explaining the aims of violence through its spatial correlates 
 
Armed organisations often justify their use of violence against civilians as a means 
                                                
74 Partial correlations calculated on the log of variables, as originally they were not normally 
distributed, controlling for population to exclude scale effects, i.e. large municipios have more victims 
irrespective of who committed the crimes. 
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to pave the way towards political change or to defend the existing institutional order, 
e.g. by punishing collaborators and ‘traitors’ or by executing guerrillas or state 
agents ‘in disguise’. But, as seen in Ch. 1, some scholars have argued that these 
statements may hide less transcendental ambitions—notoriously short-term 
enrichment. The true motivations of violence are not directly visible to researchers 
and even judicial authorities in charge of questioning perpetrators who have 
submitted to justice find great difficulties in unveiling the truth. 
 
This part of the chapter provides some clues about those motivations by examining 
the spatial distribution of violence. Using econometric techniques, it assesses 
whether the municipal patterns of violence and coercion against civilians seen in the 
Middle Magdalena Valley fit better into those of irregular warfare (as described in 
section 1.2) in which civilians are killed mainly to achieve or increase territorial 
control, or into the narrative of pseudo-wars (discussed in section 1.3) in which 
violence is aimed at other ends, or becomes an end in itself, leading to 
expropriations, extortion, and other forms of economic exploitation. 
 
Overall, the findings suggest that civilians were killed mainly as a means to achieve 
territorial control—not as a way to extract rents or capture civilian assets. The test 
from which these findings are derived follows a very simple finding from the 
literature on contemporary internal wars: armed conflict is not a sufficient 
condition—and not even a necessary condition—for violence. Indeed, widespread 
violence against civilians may occur against a backdrop of little or virtually null 
armed conflict, as in ‘new wars’ (Kaldor 1999) and ‘co-operative conflicts’ (Keen 
2005: 107).  
 
At first sight, these notions do not seem to capture the reality of the Middle 
Magdalena Valley, where combatants did fight against each other and the civilians-
to-combatant death toll ratio was not even close to the levels expected for ‘new 
wars’, as shown above. But on closer inspection, in some municipios the civilian 
death toll was disproportionately high in relation to the combatants killed in action—
in Barrancabermeja, for instance, approximately ten civilians died for every 
combatant killed in action—raising the question of whether, hidden behind the 
regional aggregates, there may have been localised processes of production of 
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violence similar to those seen in pseudo-wars. 
 
Moreover, as seen above, in the Middle Magdalena Valley the organisations most 
actively engaged in armed conflict were not the same that produced most of the 
violence against civilians. While the military and the insurgents were the most active 
organisations in armed conflict as such (i.e. attacking and exchanging fire with each 
other), paramilitaries and unidentified organisations did most of the killing. 
Therefore, the assumption that armed conflict and violence naturally converge in the 
same zones is misplaced. 
 
The analysis covers only civilian deaths and not kidnappings or forced displacement. 
In the case of kidnappings, the analysis was to some extent unnecessary because the 
Fondelibertad dataset already provided details about the motives behind most 
kidnappings based on first-hand information on each individual case. In the case of 
forced displacement, the analysis posed a particular complication: while forcing 
particular individuals, households or communities to flee was a common form of 
violence against civilians, not all those who fled due to violence did it under such 
direct, imminent pressure. 75 Since the official statistics do not make such distinction, 
it is impossible to discriminate between those whose forced displacement was 
directly prompted by armed organisations and those who did it for preventive 
reasons, to escape from the eventual damages and losses that armed conflict and 
violence could cause. In other words, the available figures capture an outcome that 
resulted from the combined decisions of armed organisations and households and 
cannot be used to make inferences about the rationales of the former only. 
 
 
4.4.1 Identification  
The purpose of the analysis that follows is to establish whether violence against 
civilians was aimed towards resource-rich areas or reflected the factions’ struggle to 
achieve territorial control. If, on the one hand, the spatial patterns of violence during 
the period resembled the geographic distribution of certain assets and resources then 
                                                
75 Ibanez and Velez (2008) defined preventive displacement as one caused by fear rather than by an 
imminent threat.  
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it is likely that violence had been aimed to capture them or to make possible the 
extraction of the rents derived from the corresponding economic activities via 
extortion, protection fees or plunder. On the other hand, if those patterns resembled 
the variable intensity of armed conflict (e.g. hostilities) across different areas 
(municipios), then it is likely that they had both been aimed at the same end, that is, 
increasing territorial control. The reasoning behind this inference is simple: 
hostilities entail a willingness from the factions to commit resources (e.g. manpower, 
ammunition, supplies) to control or protect a given geographical position; they are 
the most visible manifestation of the factions’ appetite for territorial control and 
reveal the strategic value that different areas have for them. In other words, the more 
the factions valued a particular piece of territory, the most likely is that they would 
have fought over it and used violence against civilians living there.  
 
The analysis is based on the following model (equation 1): 
 
cit = Wit + Eit-1 + Vcit + pit-1  (1) 
 
Where: 
 
cit  is the civilian death toll in the municipio i during the period of study; it 
excludes civilian deaths occurred in the course of hostilities (i.e. ‘caught in 
crossfire’), which are often unintended and, therefore, comprises only 
deliberate killings. Following the rationale outlined above, its level is 
believed to depend on one or more independent variables, grouped in two 
vectors and two control variables, as outlined below. 
 
Wit  is a vector that captures the intensity of armed conflict in the municipio i 
during the period of study t, which, as explained above, is a proxy for the 
strategic value of municipio i in the context of the armed confrontation during 
period t. It comprises two variables that capture the intensity of armed 
conflict in different ways:  
 
(i) The total number of hostile events (clashes and uncontested attacks) 
occurred in municipio i in period t. If violence was aimed to achieve 
territorial control, then this coefficient must be statistically significant 
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and positive. 
(ii) The total number of combatants killed in action in municipio i during 
period t. Since a low hostility count may hide a high death toll, this 
variable needs to be considered when gauging the intensity of 
conflict. Again, if violence was aimed to achieve territorial control, 
this coefficient must be positive and statistically significant.  
 
If one or both coefficients turned out to be negative (and statistically 
significant), that would mean that civilian killings focused in areas with low 
hostilities or low combatant casualties or, in other words, that armed conflict 
and violence against civilians did not converge in the same places. This 
would be a strong sign that civilian violence, despite being produced by 
organisations involved in armed conflict, was used to other ends different to 
increasing territorial control. Among those other ends, asset-stripping and 
violent rent-seeking are paramount. 
 
Eit-1 is a vector that captures the magnitude of key rents and resources that could 
have prompted aggressions against civilians, either to strip them of their 
assets or to extract rents from economic activity. Since the magnitude of such 
rents and resources may have changed during the period as a result of 
violence itself (i.e. endogeneity), they enter the equation at the levels they 
had just before the beginning of the period of study—hence the t-1 subscript. 
The vector includes five variables: 
 
(i) The municipal area of cattle pastures. Cattle ranching is by far the 
activity with the largest share of the productive land in the Middle 
Magdalena Valley and, consequently, pastures and cattle are, perhaps, 
the most important private assets for agents in the regional 
economy.76 Traditionally, cattle ranching has been a relatively safe 
                                                
76 It is estimated that, by 1990, 60 per cent of the productive rural area in the region was used as cattle 
pastures (cited by Machado and Briceno 1995: 39). Whereas aggregate crop areas never surpassed 
50,000 hectares (for each crop) during the period of study, cattle pastures areas oscillated around 1,8 
million hectares. Information on municipal areas was obtained from the agricultural assessments 
(‘evaluaciones agropecuarias’) held by the departmental offices of agriculture in Cartagena, 
Medellin, Valledupar and Bucaramanga. These, in turn, were based on municipal data gathered by 
local officials on the field. 
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form of investment77 and in the 1980s it was a favourite among drug 
traffickers (Thoumi 2003: 186, 193; Kalmanovitz and Enciso 2006: 
334).78 While cattle ranching is not incompatible with subsistence 
farming, in some municipios, particularly in the southern part of the 
valley, it often takes place in large ranches (Machado and Briceno 
1995: 41) and, as such, has been associated with different forms of 
violence against civilians: on the one hand, with insurgent 
kidnappings and extortion against cattle ranchers (not necessarily the 
wealthiest) and, on the other hand, with the creation of private militias 
and paramilitary groups by the latter, including drug lords with lands 
in the region (see Ch. 3). 
(ii) The municipal area of oil palm plantations. Compared to cattle 
pastures, oil palm crops occupy a marginal share of the regional 
productive lands. However, since the 1980s, oil palm became the 
most dynamic (legal) agricultural activity in the region and crops 
grew more than twofold between 1996 and 2004; by the end of the 
period, oil palm plantations had the largest share of the agricultural 
land in the region.79 Growing oil palm poses high entry costs for 
farmers: the trees take up to three years to start producing and the 
fruit requires mills and adequate facilities to be processed. For this 
reason, its production has been dominated by farmers and companies 
with some financial muscle.80 As such, it has attracted violence in a 
similar way to cattle ranching: owners and skilled staff have been 
targeted by extorted and kidnapped by insurgents and, allegedly, palm 
oil companies have paid for private protection from militias and 
                                                
77 As Van Ausdal (2009) pointed out, compared to other agricultural activities in Colombia cattle 
ranching offered substantial advantages such as stable prices and the possibility of managing the 
ranches from a distance. ‘In a country with limited, conservative productive outlets for capital, he 
observed, cattle stood out as one of the most promising options’ (2009: 716). And just as other 
agricultural activities, traditionally it has enjoyed low tax rates (Kalmanovitz and Enciso 2006: 345-
55). 
78 Suarez (1996) reported how in the first half of the 1990s, illegal capitals were used to buy cattle and 
pastures in the Middle Magdalena Valley, increasing the regional cattle stock and causing a tenfold 
rise in the price of land in the most safe areas. 
79 This is according to the municipal ‘agricultural assessments’ cited above.  
80 However, in some municipios, mill owners have organised small producers in co-operatives 
allowing them to develop their own plantations (Machado and Briceno 1995: 63). 
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paramilitary groups.81 
(iii) The municipal area of coca crops. The involvement of armed 
organisations in the cocaine industry is, according to some scholars 
(see section 1.4), a clear sign of the criminalisation of armed conflict 
and, as such, a possible factor in explaining violence against civilians. 
Moreover, as coca and cocaine are illegal, the state cannot regulate 
and police their trade, these functions often have been assumed by 
armed organisations, which are likely to resort to outright violence as 
a way to enforce their policies. 82  
(iv) The municipal volume of gold production. The extraction of valuable 
minerals has been linked to widespread abuses against civilians in 
contemporary armed conflicts. Although gold is rarely mentioned as a 
significant factor of violence in the Middle Magdalena Valley, in 
some municipios the mines are located in isolated rural areas 
controlled by the insurgency and miners must pay protection fees, 
opening a window for penalties against those who fail to pay. 
Moreover, paramilitaries have attacked members of miners’ labour 
unions and miners’ associations, apparently as a punishment for their 
alleged support to the insurgency. 83  
(v) Gross local public expenditure. The decentralisation process in 
Colombia has entailed a substantial transfer of financial resources to 
local governments; moreover, some municipalities are paid royalties 
by virtue of the extraction and transportation of gold and oil. 
Although these funds are often earmarked, local governments have 
some leeway in deciding their destination so they are vulnerable to 
misuse and theft. Consequently, local coffers became an attractive 
                                                
81 In the Pacific coast, for instance, ‘palm plantations have been the scene of combat, persecution and 
armed violence by all parties. Guerrillas have murdered and kidnapped the palm companies’ owners 
and employees and have dynamited extraction plants. The armed forces and paramilitary groups have 
become private security corps for palm producers, and have committed many of the extrajudicial 
executions reported in the palm production areas. Civil society members who have attempted to 
challenge the expansion of biofuels [...] have also been harassed and threatened [...]’ (Houldey 2008: 
6). 
82 Data on coca crops areas by municipio were obtained from UNODC’s SIMCI Project; they are 
based on satellite imagery and produced with technical assistance from the United Nations. However, 
these data are available only from 1999 onwards; official data from previous years are incomplete, 
inaccurate and, in general, less reliable. 
83 Data on municipal production of gold obtained from the Colombian government agencies in charge 
of mining, Ingeominas and Minercol.  
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target for armed organisations, leading to several forms of violence 
aimed to coerce and control the civil servants and elected officials 
who controlled such funds. 84  
 
As noted above, in the analyses that will follow the values of these variables 
are those recorded in the period immediately before the period of study. 
Following the rationale of the model, if any of the coefficients of these 
variables is positive and statistically significant, this would mean that 
violence against civilians was aimed towards resource-rich areas. It would be 
a strong sign that civilian violence, despite being produced by organisations 
involved in armed conflict, was used to other ends different to increasing 
territorial control. 
 
V This is a binary contiguity matrix with elements vij, where vij assumes a value 
of one if i and j are contiguous municipios and zero otherwise; hence Vcit is 
simply the sum of the civilian death tolls of each municipio’s neighbours. 
This variable is aimed to control for spatial correlation, that is, possibility that 
the civilian death toll in municipio i may not be independent from the civilian 
death tolls registered in i’s neighbours. 
 
pit-1 This is the population in municipio i in the period t-1; this is control variable 
that accounts for a possible correlation between population size and the 
number of victims. 
 
Eck and Hultman (2007) used a similar specification to analyse panel data on 
civilian casualties from a sample of countries around the world; more specifically, 
they wanted to examine whether lethal, deliberate violence against civilians was a 
function of political regime type or could be explained by the intensity of armed 
conflict. Likewise, Sanchez and Palau (2006) also used a similar specification to 
explain the incidence of insurgent and paramilitary actions in Colombian municipios. 
However, the specification used here reflects the particular research interests of this 
                                                
84 Data on public expenditure was obtained from the DNP’s (Departamento Nacional de Planeacion) 
municipal ‘ejecuciones presupuestales’, which contain information about the actual (as opposed to 
the budgeted) income and expenditure of the local governments. All the data were adjusted for 
changes in the consumer price index.  
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work as well as the specific resources, rents and assets that may have been played a 
role in fuelling violence in this region. Furthermore, while other studies on violence 
and conflict have included other potentially relevant control variables (e.g. political 
regime, ethnic fractionalisation), the specification employed here includes only two 
for two reasons: first, because the relatively small number of observations available 
(43 municipios or less) limits the number of variables that can be included in the 
analyses and second, because the units of observation are located within the same 
country and region and, therefore, many potentially relevant independent variable 
(such as those mentioned before) are in fact constant and, as such, they are already 
controlled for. 
 
Unfortunately, the option of a panel analysis (with yearly observations) had to be 
abandoned because of missing data for several variables, years and municipios, as it 
was impossible to obtain data on some economic variables (vector Eit-1) for every 
year and every municipio.85 For instance, data on coca crops previous to 1999 is 
incomplete and unreliable. Likewise, data on gold before 1999 was available only 
for some years and data series on most crops and cattle ranching had several 
scattered missing observations for different years and departments. Thus, although 
data on civilian deaths and conflict-related variables (vector Wit) were available for 
the whole period of study, panel regressions were unbalanced and nearly half of the 
observations (mostly but not exclusively from the first years of the period of study) 
had to be dropped because of missing data, making the results unreliable. In essence, 
the problem posed by the data can be described as a trade-off between observations 
and variables: the more variables were included in the analysis, the fewer the number 
of observations that could be actually included in computing the results, and vice 
versa. 
 
To overcome these limitations, the analysis that follows consists of successive cross-
section analyses (instead of a panel), covering different periods depending on the 
availability of data for economic variables. Regressions including the full battery of 
independent variables only cover the period 2000-2004 (so the dependent variable is 
                                                
85 As seen above, sources of municipal economic data are scattered across the four ‘gobernaciones’ 
(in four different cities) and in some national agencies, not always under the best conditions of 
storage and safety.  
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the aggregate death toll from 2000 to 2004) because data on coca crops is available 
only since 1999. When coca crops and gold production are dropped from the 
regression, it is possible to cover a larger period in the analysis, from 1997 to 2004. 
Thus, by successively dropping variables such as coca crops, gold production and 
local expenditure, it is possible to include a larger set of observations and a larger 
period and consequently a larger proportion of the death toll. This trade-off between 
observations and variables will be evident in the regression results shown below and 
it certainly calls for a dose of scepticism and caution in their interpretation. 
 
Unless otherwise stated, all models are run using the negative binomial regression, 
appropriate for over-dispersed count data. Count data consist of non-negative 
integers and is often analysed using the Poisson regression. However, the Poisson 
regression is inadequate in cases of over-dispersion (i.e. the variance is significantly 
larger than the mean), where the negative binomial regression must be employed 
instead (Winkelmann 2008). Poisson and negative binomial regressions are 
extensively used in research on crime and homicides, including the articles by 
Sanchez and Palau (2006) and Eck and Hultman (2007) mentioned above. 
 
 
4.4.2 Results 
 
Table 4.5 shows four regressions covering two different periods. Regression A 
includes all the independent variables mentioned above but covers only a limited 
period (2000-2004) and only 32 municipios because of missing data; following this 
outcome, regression B covers the same period but drops local public expenditure to 
increase observations (as there are a few municipios with missing observations on 
these variable) to 39 with similar results. The results show that the hostilities, oil 
palm crops, gold, the control variables and the constant are statistically significant 
and all show the expected sign. Regression C covers a larger period (1997-2004) but 
omits two independent variables: the production of gold and coca crops. Regression 
D covers the same period but drops local public expenditure to increase observations 
from 28 to 41. Overall, three variables turn out to be significant and show the 
expected sign: hostilities, oil palm plantations and the production of gold, although 
the latter was only included in the first pair of regressions.  
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Table 4.5. Cross-sectional regression analysis of the municipal civilian death tolls 
 
Notes: All regressions are negative binomial. Independent variables were all standardised.86 
Standard errors in parenthesis. Probability: p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***. 
 
 
These results are ambivalent. On the one hand they suggest that violence was 
certainly used along hostile actions to increase territorial control. But they also 
indicate that at least two economic activities—the palm oil agro-industry and the 
extraction of gold—played a significant role in prompting violence against civilians. 
To explore these outcomes in detail and, in particular, the possibility that different 
armed organisations may have used violence with different purposes, the following 
two sections present a separate of analysis of paramilitary and insurgent killings. 
 
 
                                                
86 The lines at the bottom of the table show the number of observations included in each regression as 
well as results for three tests: ‘alpha’ is used to measure overdispersion and whether the negative 
binomial regression (as opposed to the Poisson regression) is appropriate—in this case it is. ‘LR-chi 
square’ measures whether the model, overall, is statistically significant—again, in this case it is. The 
pseudo R-square measures the model’s goodness-of-fit, which in this case is modest. 
A B C D
Hostilities 0.991 0.931 1.525 1.489
(0.230) *** (0.211) *** (0.524) *** (0.392) ***
Combatants KIA -0.226 -0.133 -0.319 -0.313
(0.213) (0.189) (0.323) (0.256)
Cattle pastures (t-1) 0.192 0.123 0.064
(0.151) (0.137) (0.154)
Oil palm crops (t-1) 0.283 0.230 0.198 0.273
(0.155) * (0.139) * (0.195) (0.158) *
Coca crops (t-1) -0.032 -0.113
(0.160) (0.145)
Gold (t-1) 0.273 0.243
(0.126) ** (0.120) **
Local public expenditure (t-1) -0.044 -0.303
(0.338) (0.519)
Population (t-1) 0.380 0.364 -0.143 -0.318
(0.346) (0.142) ** (0.500) (0.314)
Neighbours' dep var 0.249 0.241 0.231 0.118
(0.130) * (0.122) ** (0.195) (0.149)
Constant 2.106 2.186 0.260 2.851
(0.143) *** (0.121) *** (0.166) *** (0.138) ***
Period of analysis (t) 2000-2004 2000-2004 1997-2004 1997-2004
Observations 32 39 28 41
Alpha 0.418 *** 0.396 *** 0.592 *** 0.669 ***
LR chi-square 49.49 *** 60.88 *** 40.71 *** 48.43 ***
Pseudo R-square 0.190 0.196 0.167 0.131
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4.4.3 Paramilitary killings 
 
Although the paramilitaries’ alleged motivation was defeating the insurgency 
(Aranguren 2001), it has been claimed that their real intention was capturing assets, 
in particular land, and legal and illegal rents, e.g., intergovernmental transfers to 
local authorities and those associated with the production and trade of coca paste and 
cocaine. In order to check whether the evidence backed these claims, a cross-
sectional regression analysis of the municipal figures of paramilitary killings during 
the entire period of study is carried out below. The analysis follows the rationale of 
the model used before (equation 1) and the battery of independent variables is 
similar except for two changes, aimed to capture some specific aspects behind 
paramilitary violence. First, instead of including all combatants killed in action, the 
vector Wit includes only counterinsurgent losses in the battlefield. Although the 
rationale of including this variable is essentially the same as above, i.e. gauging 
whether the distribution of civilian victimisation reflects the pattern of territorial 
dispute, it also aims to assess whether killings may have followed a retaliatory 
rationale, that is, a tendency to punish civilians in areas with heavy casualties (in 
which case the coefficient would be positive and statistically significant).   
 
Second, it includes a new variable: the level of insurgent activity in the recent past. 
The aim of including this variable is gauging whether paramilitary violence was 
aimed at increasing territorial control by undermining civilian support towards the 
insurgency or by punishing communities in municipios with a recent track of high 
insurgent activity. A positive (and statistically significant) coefficient would suggest 
that paramilitaries were trying to ‘kill the fish by draining the pond’ (Paget 1967: 
168), or to ‘neutralise’ the people who helped the insurgents, as Castaño described 
their strategy (Castro 1996: 155). Like other variables in the vector Wit this one 
reflects the use of violence for territorial control but unlike the others this one is 
lagged—it measures past insurgent activity; hence, its notation is different and for 
this reason only it is not included in vector Wit. 
 
The analysis is based on the following model (equation 2): 
 
cait = Wit +git-1 + Eit-1 + Vcait + pit-1  (2) 
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Where:  
 
cait  is the civilian death toll in the municipio i during the period of study caused 
by paramilitaries; 
 
Wit  is a vector that captures the intensity of armed conflict in municipio i during 
the period of study t. This vector consists of two variables: the number of 
hostilities and the number of counterinsurgent combatants (e.g. soldiers, 
policemen, paramilitaries) killed in action (in municipio i during the period of 
study t). A positive correlation between counterinsurgent losses in the 
battlefield and the killing of civilians would suggest a retaliatory rationale. 
 
git-1 is the level of insurgent activity in municipio i in the previous period (t-1), as 
measured by the recorded number of recent events of any sort (hostile or not) 
in which insurgents were involved. Here recent means during the three-year 
period immediately before the period of analysis (t).87 If violence was aimed 
to achieve territorial control, the coefficient is expected to be positive and 
statistically significant.  
 
Vcait is the sum of civilians killed by paramilitaries during the same period (t) in 
each municipio’s neighbours. 
 
The remaining terms of the equation remain unchanged. The results are shown in 
Table 4.6. 
  
                                                
87 The length of this period is to some extent arbitrary but it was seen as a way to the strike a balance 
between a period too short, in which case many observations would be nil, or a period too long, in 
which case the observations mix recent and not-so-recent data, undermining the rationale of including 
the variable. For regressions where this three-year period included events occurred prior to July 1996, 
I used data from the Justicia y Paz dataset, mentioned in the last section of Ch. 3. 
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Table 4.6. Cross-sectional regression analysis of paramilitary killings 
 
Notes: All regressions are negative binomial. Independent variables were all standardised. 
Standard errors in parenthesis. Probability: p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***. 
 
 
Table 4.6 shows two pairs of regressions; each pair covers a different period. 
Regression A includes all the independent variables mentioned above but covers 
only a limited period (2000-2004) and only 32 municipios because of missing data; 
regression B covers the same period but drops local budget (statistically insignificant 
in regression A) increasing the number of observations to 39. The results show that 
hostilities, previous levels of insurgent activity (measured from 1997 to 1999) and 
the production of gold are all statistically significant and show the expected sign. 
Regression C covers the period 1997-2004 but omits two independent variables: the 
production of gold and coca crops. Regression D drops local public expenditure to 
increase observations from 28 to 41. Hostilities, the previous levels of insurgent 
activity (measured from 1994 to 1996) and one of the control variables are 
statistically significant and show the right sign. 
 
Again, the results suggest the importance of territorial control as a determinant of 
A B C D
Hostilities 0.743 0.953 0.446 1.165
(0.215) *** (0.241) *** (0.713) (0.398) ***
Counterinsurgents KIA -0.283 -0.283 0.326 -0.049
(0.199) (0.218) (0.338) (0.208)
Insurgent activity 1.291 1.019 0.879 0.604
(0.453) *** (0.349) *** (0.641) (0.340) **
Cattle pastures (t-1) 0.350 0.280 0.011 0.015
(0.157) ** (0.177) (0.212) (0.179)
Oil palm crops (t-1) 0.154 0.242 0.101 0.194
(0.157) (0.171) (0.268) (0.179)
Coca crops (t-1) 0.044 0.000
(0.170) (0.197)
Gold (t-1) 0.391 0.379
(0.128) *** (0.146) ***
Local public expenditure (t-1) -0.624 0.358
(0.459) (0.603)
Population (t-1) -0.235 -0.589 -0.823 -0.805
(0.327) (0.346) * (0.619) (0.341) **
Neighbours' dep var 0.247 0.106 0.223 0.078
(0.182) (0.187) (0.288) (0.185)
Constant 0.739 0.846 1.707 1.853
(0.194) *** (0.176) *** (0.214) *** (0.163) ***
Period of analysis (t) 2000-2004 2000-2004 1997-2004 1997-2004
Observations 32 39 28 41
Alpha 0.293 *** 0.514 *** 0.894 *** 0.809 ***
LR chi-square 50.44 *** 51.67 *** 29.60 *** 41.34 ***
Pseudo R-square 0.263 0.235 0.151 0.142
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violence against civilians. Not only are hostilities significant in several specifications 
but, in addition, the previous levels of insurgent activity, also turn out to be 
significant and show the expected sign. In other words, paramilitary violence 
converged in the same place with hostile events and, furthermore, was also aimed to 
municipios with a history of high insurgent activity. The results also suggest show 
that municipios with high levels of production of gold in the recent past experienced 
later higher levels of paramilitary violence. This second finding is more puzzling and 
its significance will be discussed later, just before the conclusions.  
 
 
4.4.4 Insurgent killings 
 
This section replicates the analysis presented above focusing on the subset of civilian 
killed by insurgents. The model follows the same logic as the one used above for 
paramilitary killings (equation 2) with only a few changes to reflect the specific 
factors that could be at play in shaping the insurgents’ rationale (see equation 3). For 
instance, vector Wit includes the insurgents killed in action to check whether 
insurgents may have retaliated the population in response to heavy casualties on the 
battlefield and the level of past paramilitary activity to assess whether they wanted to 
punish civilians for supporting the paramilitaries—as we noted before, Mao did not 
rule out the use of violence against civilians to suppress the ‘counter-revolution’ 
(Mao 1954: 27). 
 
The analysis is based on the following model (equation 3): 
 
 
cgit = Wit +ait-1 + Eit-1 + Vcgit + pit-1  (3) 
 
Where:  
 
cgit  is the civilian death toll in the municipio i during the period of study caused 
by insurgents; and  
 
Wit  is a vector that captures the intensity of armed conflict in municipio i during 
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the period of study t. This vector consists of two variables: the number of 
hostilities and the number of insurgents killed in action (in municipio i during 
the period of study t). The second variable reflects how intense were the 
hostilities but also aims to check whether violence against the population was 
used to retaliate for insurgent losses on the battlefield. 
 
ait-1 is the level of paramilitary activity in municipio i in the previous period (t-1), 
as measured by the recorded number of recent (the same three-year period as 
above) events of any sort (hostile or not)  in which paramilitaries were 
involved. If insurgent violence (in period t) was aimed to punish people in 
communities with high levels of paramilitary activity in the recent past (t-1), 
the coefficient is expected to be positive and statistically significant. 
 
Vcgit is the sum of civilians killed by insurgents during the same period (t) in each 
municipio’s neighbours. 
 
The remaining terms of the equation remain unchanged.  
 
Table 4.7 shows two pairs of regressions; each pair covers a different period. 
Regression A includes all the independent variables mentioned above but covers 
only a limited period (2000-2004) and only 32 municipios because of missing data; 
regression B covers the same period but drops local budget (statistically insignificant 
in regression A) increasing the number of observations to 39. The results show that 
the hostilities, the production of gold and the control variable are statistically 
significant and show the expected sign. The extension of cattle pasture areas is also 
significant but the coefficient has the ‘wrong’ sign. Regression C covers the period 
1997-2004 but omits two independent variables: the production of gold and coca 
crops. Regression D drops local public expenditure to increase observations from 28 
to 41. Paramilitary activity (in the period 1994-1996) and cattle pastures are 
statistically significant but while the first coefficient has the expected positive sign, 
the second has negative sign, just as in specification B. 
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Table 4.7. Cross-sectional regression analysis of insurgent killings 
 
Notes: Regressions A and B are Poisson because there was no evidence of over-dispersion; 
regressions C and D are negative binomial. Standard errors in parenthesis. Probability: p < 0.1 *,  
p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***. 
 
 
Again, the results are ambivalent. On the one hand they indicate that insurgent 
violence occurred either in zones with a record of previous paramilitary activity in 
the recent past or along with hostile events and, therefore, suggest that it was aimed 
to increase territorial control. On the other hand, insurgent violence was positively 
correlated with high levels of production of gold and, unexpectedly, negatively 
correlated with areas dedicated to cattle ranching. The following section weighs 
these results and their implications in detail. 
 
 
A B C D
Hostilities 1.160 0.588 0.629 -0.078
(0.541) ** (0.329) * (1.274) (0.531)
Guerrillas KIA -0.352 0.357 -0.248 0.345
(0.451) (0.319) (0.922) (0.398)
Paramilitary activity 0.025 -0.043 0.522 1.015
(0.275) -0.302 (0.314) * (0.197) ***
Cattle pastures (t-1) -0.174 -0.554 -0.307 -1.348
(0.339) (0.302) * 0.473 (0.368) ***
Oil palm crops (t-1) -0.147 -0.093 0.053 -0.103
(0.209) (0.181) (0.170) (0.172)
Coca crops (t-1) -0.202 -0.290
(0.173) (0.187)
Gold (t-1) 0.436 0.292
(0.172) ** (0.150) *
Local public expenditure (t-1) -0.301 -1.615
(0.389) (1.931)
Population (t-1) 0.539 0.534 1.155 0.669
(0.498) (0.179) *** (0.758) (0.382) *
Neighbours' dep var 0.569 0.429 0.313 0.251
(0.237) ** (0.180) ** (0.222) (0.201)
Constant -0.549 -0.476 0.083 0.548
(0.296) * (0.250) * (0.461) (0.206) ***
Period of analysis (t) 2000-2004 2000-2004 1997-2004 1997-2004
Observations 32 39 28 41
Alpha na na 0.335 * 0.595 ***
LR chi-square 124.23 *** 131.75 *** 16.63 ** 37.14 ***
Pseudo R-square 0.639 0.599 0.169 0.187
  
 157 
4.4.5 Discussion 
 
The results of the econometric analyses presented above suggest that the spatial 
distribution of violence followed a similar pattern to that of armed conflict: other 
things equal, more civilians were killed in municipios where armed conflict was 
more intense. Barrancabermeja, San Pablo, Yondo and Remedios, the municipios 
with most hostilities, were also among the top six with the highest death tolls (and 
the highest conflict-related homicide rates). Conversely, the lower half of the 
distribution, where approximately ten per cent of the hostilities took place, accounted 
for less than thirteen per cent of the civilian death toll. Moreover, when the spatial 
patterns of use of violence by each armed organisation are considered separately, 
they show how they used violence against civilians more intensely in municipios 
where their enemies had been more active in the recent past. In other words, the 
patterns of civilian victimisation closely matched either the contemporaneous 
intensity of armed conflict (as measured by the number of hostilities) or the previous 
levels of ‘enemy’ activity or both. These patterns are consistent with the declared 
goals, expressed by the paramilitaries, of crushing the insurgency in the region and 
targeting collaborators and ‘guerrillas in disguise’ (Aranguren 2001). Indeed, 75 per 
cent of the paramilitary killings occurred in the top ten municipios with most 
insurgent activity (where nearly two thirds of all events involving guerrillas took 
place). At the other end of the spectrum, the twenty municipios with fewer insurgent 
events accounted only for eight per cent of the paramilitary killings. A similar case 
can be made in the case of the insurgency. 
 
Together, these results suggest that armed organisations used violence to increase 
territorial control, either by attacking civilians in the same areas where they fought 
their enemies or in areas where the latter had been particularly active in the past. In 
line with this finding, the availability of local fiscal resources and the scale of key 
economic activities such as cattle ranching and the production of coca and coca paste 
(traditionally associated with armed conflict in Colombia) did not show significant 
correlation with the spatial distribution of violence. For instance, while some of the 
municipios with the largest areas dedicated to cattle ranching experienced high levels 
of violence, e.g. Yondo and Remedios, this pattern is not consistent across the region 
and others such as Cimitarra, La Gloria and Puerto Berrio suffered relatively low 
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civilian death tolls (and low conflict-related homicide rates).88 By contrast, 
municipios such as Maceo and Tiquisio, with relatively small areas dedicated to 
cattle ranching, suffered comparatively high death tolls. The negative correlation 
between the size of these areas and insurgent violence (see Table 4.7), may reflect 
the fact that, with some exceptions, the latter was more intense in rural, mountainous 
areas controlled by the insurgency (particularly in south Bolivar), not suitable for 
large-scale cattle ranching. In other words, this variable may be acting as (an 
inverse) proxy for insurgent control. The link between control and violence will be 
explored in detail in Ch. 7. 
 
One of the must surprising results of the analysis is that coca crops were not 
statistically associated with lethal violence. The illegal trade in narcotics is plagued 
by bloody disputes and reprisals among dealers and ‘cartels’ and, since armed 
organisations in the region were involved in one way or another in this industry, a 
concomitant rise in the levels of violence would not have come as a surprise. Indeed, 
the scale of the coca crops in the Middle Magdalena Valley peaked around the same 
years with civilian deaths and forced displacement (2000-2001). However, when the 
municipal data are inspected in closer detail, it is evident that coca did not always led 
to violence: of the five municipios with the largest coca grown areas, two 
experienced relatively high rates of killings and displacement, but in other two those 
rates were below the regional average. In San Pablo and Santa Rosa, for instance, 
coca-cultivated areas were larger than anywhere else in the region, but while the 
former was exceptionally violent, in the latter civilian deaths and forced 
displacement were well below the regional averages. The role of the coca economy 
and in the production of violence in the region will be further explored in Ch. 6, 
which discusses in detail the dynamics of armed conflict, violence and collaboration 
in south Bolivar, the sub-region with the largest areas of coca crops. 
 
So far, these findings suggest that the patterns of spatial violence are consistent with 
a ‘classical’ irregular war, with armed organisations killing civilians as a means to 
increase territorial control. But, other results cast doubts over this conclusion. First, 
the production of palm oil was positively correlated with civilian deaths in general 
(see Table 4.5). However, the correlation is weak and, indeed, it did not show up 
                                                
88 By conflict-related homicide rates I mean the civilian death toll per 100,000 inhabitants. 
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when the killings of guerrillas and paramilitaries were considered separately (Tables 
4.6 and 4.7). In fact, only seven municipios in the region had palm oil crops at the 
beginning of the period (t-1) and most of them reported modest civilian death tolls 
both in absolute terms and in relation to their population. The outliers were Puerto 
Wilches and San Alberto, two adjacent municipios with the largest plantations of oil 
palm, and with relatively low levels of hostilities but moderately high civilian death 
tolls (above the average but not among the top). In sum, the effect that the 
production of palm oil apparently had on violence was circumscribed to a very 
limited number of cases.89  
 
The case of gold is similar: the coefficients are consistently significant across all 
three sets of regressions (Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7), showing a positive correlation 
between the volumes extracted in 1999 and the civilian deaths occurred in the years 
that followed. However, only a dozen of municipios in the region produce gold, most 
of them in south Bolivar and northeast Antioquia. A few of them reported high 
civilian death tolls and comparatively high levels of hostilities, the exception being 
Maceo, which only reported three clashes between armed factions during more than 
eight years. Again, whatever the impact this economic activity may have had on 
violence, it apparently was confined to a very specific geographical area.90  
 
Overall, the results indicate that the effect of economic activity on the production of 
violence was marginal and manifested itself only in a few municipios. They suggest 
that the key determinant was the military struggle for territorial control between the 
insurgency, on the one hand, and the state and paramilitaries, on the other. 
Paramilitaries and guerrillas, in particular, used violence against civilians in areas 
with a recent track of enemy activity and along with hostile action to increase 
territorial control. Therefore, the distribution of civilian deaths in the region during 
the period of study fits better into the standard model of irregular warfare (discussed 
in section 1.2) than into the pseudo-war narrative of contemporary warfare discussed 
in section 1.3.  
                                                
89 Indeed, when San Alberto is excluded from the regressions shown above (A, B and D in Table 4.5), 
the oil palm municipal areas are no longer statistically significant in the results, while hostilities still 
are. 
90 The production of gold is no longer statistically significant in the regression results (Tables 4.5, 4.6 
and 4.7) if Maceo is excluded from the analysis. The hostilities still are but paramilitary activity is no 
longer significant in the case of insurgent killings. 
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However, econometric results are probabilistic rather than deterministic. They are 
helpful in identifying patterns of correlation and in suggesting possible causal links 
but they cannot be used to infer sets of conditions that would positively lead to a 
given outcome. As seen above, while the results consistently point towards territorial 
control as the key determinant of violence, they also suggest that certain economic 
activities may have, somehow, created conditions for violence even in municipios 
with relatively low levels of armed conflict, e.g. Maceo and San Alberto. Likewise, 
municipios that apparently met the conditions for a ‘perfect storm’, such as Santa 
Rosa (intense armed conflict, vast coca-grown areas, second largest producer of gold 
in the region) displayed modest levels of violence.  
 
This caveat and the limitations in the availability of data mentioned at the beginning 
of this part suggest that any conclusions to be drawn from the econometric results 
should be taken with a pinch of salt, triangulated with other sources and 
complemented using research methods that may shed light on the specific causal 
mechanisms behind the correlations revealed by the regressions. This is precisely 
what the following chapters of this dissertation do. 
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided a broad but precise overview of the scale of armed conflict in 
the Middle Magdalena Valley and the magnitude and forms of violence employed by 
armed organisations and the state against civilians. The chapter has shown how the 
territorial ambitions of the insurgency were thwarted by an aggressive 
counterinsurgent campaign that weakened the rebels, pushing them back to rural 
areas and curbing down kidnappings. While the government forces were very 
effective in killing insurgents in action, the paramilitaries were less successful and, 
in fact, suffered themselves heavy losses. 
 
The counterinsurgent campaign produced a peak in the levels of violence against 
civilians: although kidnappings were already high since the beginning of the period 
civilian deaths and forced displacement escalated in 1999 and did not ease down 
  
 161 
until 2002. Only a fraction of violence was an unintended effect of warfare itself, i.e. 
collateral damage. Most civilian deaths and, of course, all kidnappings were 
deliberate even though their victims were often picked at random.  
 
The spatial (municipal) distribution of lethal violence and hostilities were closely 
and positively correlated, i.e. other things equal, the most hostilities were recorded in 
a municipio, the higher the civilian death toll. As argued in the previous section, the 
close spatial match between hostilities and violence is a strong indicator that they 
were both aimed at the same end. Moreover, the results also indicate that both 
insurgents and paramilitaries targeted more intensely areas with a previous record of 
enemy activity. They thus suggest that to achieve territorial control the factions 
fought against each other but also used violence against those individuals and 
communities who, in their view, were instrumental to the enemy.  
 
The chapter also shows that resource-rich areas did not necessarily attract more 
violence against civilians. For instance, municipios with comparatively meagre 
resource endowments (e.g. coca, gold, fiscal resources) such as Montecristo and 
Tiquisio, suffered forced displacement rates well above the regional average. 
Although some economic activities (the production of gold and the cultivation of oil 
palm) appeared to have a statistically significant, positive influence on violence, 
their effect was apparently confined to narrow geographical areas or even to specific 
cases where violence was intense but armed conflict was not. 
 
Whereas the capture of economic rents and assets did not seem to be the main 
purpose of most civilian killings, it was the goal of the majority of kidnappings. 
Insurgents were behind most ransom kidnappings and they targeted a wide range of 
civilians—not only cattle ranchers and large landowners but also shopkeepers and 
even unskilled workers, making the region unsafe for almost everyone who dared to 
travel along its roads. Although insurgent and paramilitaries may have resorted to 
extortion, protection fees and other forms of economic exploitation of civilians, the 
lack of information prevents an informed analysis of these phenomena.  
 
Although the evidence is mixed, by and large it is consistent with a scenario of 
classical irregular war rather than with the narrative of and pseudo-wars. Violence 
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against civilians occurred in the context of a fairly intense armed conflict and the 
ratio of civilians to combatants killed was not as disproportionate as in ‘new wars’. 
And despite the presence of armed organisations specialised in killing civilians, their 
actions seemed to be genuinely aimed to weaken the insurgency rather than to 
exterminate the population on the basis of their identity or grab their assets. In this 
sense, their harsh tactics resembled those employed by counterinsurgents in other 
irregular wars in recent decades rather than those of private armies and militias 
described in the literature on pseudo-wars.  
 
This chapter gives us strong hints in favour of the hypothesis that violence against 
civilians was aimed to increase or defend territorial control, but it leaves several 
puzzles and questions unresolved. The next chapter focuses, precisely, on a case that 
is at odds with this conclusion: Barrancabermeja. This town suffered 
disproportionate levels of violence against civilians—for each combatant fallen in 
action, more than fifteen civilians were deliberately killed by armed organisations—
and accounted for thirty per cent of the regional civilian death toll. Just as important, 
the sources of information on violence and armed conflict and violence in this town 
are richer than in other towns or rural areas and this make possible a more detailed 
exploration of the mechanisms through which violence is produced. To this effect, it 
relies on a theoretical model developed by Kalyvas (2006) to explain the spatial 
distribution of violence in irregular wars. The model gives crucial explanatory power 
to the levels of territorial control achieved by the factions and while the results are 
not entirely consistent with this premise, they provide further insights into the 
relation between armed conflict and violence, highlighting the importance of civilian 
collaboration and suggesting that violence was used by armed organisations to 
expand and consolidate territorial control but also to achieve political control. 91 
 
 
  
                                                
91 In theory, Kalyvas’s model (2006) could have been applied to the entire region but it requires 
detailed information about the circumstances and specific location of every killing and hostile event. 
Barrancabermeja was one of the few towns where this information was more complete and detailed. 
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5. TERRITORIAL CONTROL AND BEYOND: 
COUNTERINSURGENCY AND VIOLENCE IN 
BARRANCABERMEJA 
 
 
Among the recent contributions to the literature on violence in civil wars, Kalyvas’s 
(2006) stands out in terms of formulating an explicit, consistent set of assumptions 
and testable hypotheses about the use of violence against civilians. Its central tenet is 
that the state and armed organisations use violence as part of their efforts to expand 
and strengthen territorial control. To prove the point, the author developed a model 
that explains the variable intensity of violence across time and space while taking 
into consideration crucial traits of irregular warfare such as the absence of well-
defined front lines and the involvement of civilians as collaborators.  
 
This chapter tests the model and methods put forward by Kalyvas. Because of 
informational demands, the test covers only the town of Barrancabermeja and not the 
entire region.92 There are good reasons to focus the analysis in this town: it accounts 
for 30 per cent of the civilian death toll and, what is more interesting, it displays a 
conspicuously high ratio of civilian to combatant deaths—a trademark of new wars 
and a hint that civilians may have been killed for reasons other than achieving 
territorial control. Thus, when considered individually, Barrancabermeja does not 
seem to conform to the conclusion reached in the previous chapter and, in this sense, 
provides an opportunity to test its robustness. 
 
The chapter provides further insights into the relation between conflict, collaboration 
and violence. It suggests that violence was used by armed organisations to expand 
and consolidate territorial control but also to achieve political control; it also 
questions the notion that alliances between civilians and armed organisations are as 
                                                
92 It requires detailed knowledge about whether each killing was selective or not, and about how the 
development of armed conflict changed the configuration of the different zones of territorial control 
(e.g. contested areas, controlled areas). 
  
 164 
individualistic and opportunistic as the model suggested. Furthermore, the chapter 
highlights the relevance of socioeconomic factors and spatial segregation in 
predicting the distribution of violence. In the process, it sheds light on the use of 
violence in Barrancabermeja, the largest town in the Middle Magdalena Valley 
(population 2005: 170,000), where a bloody counterinsurgent campaign developed 
by paramilitary groups and government forces managed to drive out the guerrillas, 
even from the poorest neighbourhoods, which they had controlled for years if not 
decades. 
 
The first part of the chapter summarises the relevant aspects of Kalyvas’s model and 
methods. The second presents the case as such and consists of three sections: a brief 
historical background of the city; a narrative timeline of the evolution of armed 
conflict and violence from 1996 to 2004 and its impact on civilians; and a 
descriptive, statistical account of these phenomena. The third part describes the 
procedure followed to test the model in the case of Barrancabermeja, as well as the 
key findings of this exercise. The results and their theoretical implications are 
discussed in the fourth part and the conclusions. A shorter version of this chapter 
was published in Terrorism and Political Violence (Vargas 2009); comments and 
suggestions from two anonymous examiners from the journal were incorporated in 
this chapter. 
 
 
5.1 The ‘Logic of Violence in Civil War’ 
 
Kalyvas’s book (2006) represents a substantial contribution to the understanding of 
violence against civilians in civil wars.93 This chapter focuses on two aspects in 
particular: the notion of ‘alliance’ and the ‘control–collaboration–violence’ model, 
which are briefly summarised in this section. According to the first, violence in civil 
war results from a ‘convergence of interests’ between warring factions and civilians. 
This convergence manifests itself in alliances, that is, transactions ‘between 
supralocal and local actors, whereby the former supply the latter with external 
                                                
93 In 2007, the book was a co-recipient of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award, conferred by the 
American Political Science Foundation to the best book on government, politics or international 
affairs published during the previous year. 
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muscle, thus allowing them to win a decisive advantage over local rivals; in 
exchange, supralocal actors are able to tap into local networks and generate 
mobilisation’ (2006: 383).  
 
The notion of alliance is further developed by the author in a model that predicts the 
evolution and spatial distribution of indiscriminate and selective violence, referred to 
in the rest of the chapter as the ‘control–collaboration–violence’ model. Briefly 
stated, the model assumes that ‘political actors’ (i.e. insurgents and incumbents) 
want to maximise control and use violence against civilians to do so. Compared with 
indiscriminate violence, selective violence is more effective but also more 
demanding in terms of information on who is collaborating with the enemy.94 
Civilians are the main providers of this information, but they only do so when the 
risk is low; this, in turn, depends on the degree of control the factions have over a 
given territory. Crucially, civilians are opportunistic and, thus, prone to ‘malicious 
denunciation’ for their own benefit. Hence, civil wars enable civilians ‘to use 
‘political actors’ to settle their own private conflicts’, thus leading to a ‘privatisation’ 
of political violence (Kalyvas 2006: 14). 
 
Based on the above, the model asserts that violence in civil wars is a function of 
territorial control. This distribution is modelled by defining five zones of control: 
while the extremes, z1 and z5, are fully controlled by ‘incumbents’ or ‘insurgents’, 
respectively, the middle zone (z3) is contested; the two intermediate areas, although 
disputed, are nearly dominated by one of the factions—incumbents in z2 and 
insurgents in z4. The model posits the following hypotheses (Kalyvas 2006: 169, 
204): 
 
H1: ‘Political actors are likely to gradually move from indiscriminate 
to selective violence.’ 
H2: ‘The higher the level of an actor’s control, the less likely it is that 
this actor will resort to violence. Therefore, no incumbent 
violence is likely in zone 1 and no insurgent violence is likely in 
zone 5.’ 
H3: ‘The lower the level of an actor’s control, the less likely that this 
actor will resort to selective violence and the more likely that its 
violence, if any, will be indiscriminate. Therefore, insurgent 
                                                
94 However, indiscriminate violence can still be of use when a political actor is close to obtaining full 
control over a territory (Kalyvas 2006: 167). 
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violence in zones 1 and 2, if any, is likely be indiscriminate and 
incumbent violence in zones 4 and 5, if any, is likely be 
indiscriminate (sic).’ 
H4: ‘Under fragmented control, violence will be exercised primarily 
by the political actor enjoying an advantage in terms of control: 
incumbents in zone 2 and insurgents in zone 4.’ 
H5: ‘Parity of control between the actors (zone 3) is likely to produce 
no selective violence by any of the actors.’ 
 
To support this theory, Kalyvas provided numerous examples drawn from civil wars 
which occurred across the world during the last two centuries. However, the most 
systematic test was a study of violence in sixty-one villages in the Argolid region 
during the Greek Civil War (1943–1949). The results were fairly satisfactory—as he 
put it, ‘optimal evidence does not exist for problems such as those explored in this 
book’ (Kalyvas 2006: 13).  
 
Kalyvas’s model focuses on lethal violence only and in some aspects of civil wars, 
such as control and collaboration, leaving aside others, potentially relevant in 
explaining violence.95 As any theoretical model, Kalyvas’s merely aspires to provide 
a ‘sensible simplification, a theoretical baseline’ against which empirical variations 
must be compared to improve our understanding of civil wars (2006: 208). The rest 
of this chapter looks, precisely, at how well this model ‘travels’ into a different 
context, using it as a heuristic device in understanding violence against civilians in 
an urban setting.  
 
 
5.2 Armed conflict and violence against civilians in Barrancabermeja 
 
This section provides a brief background to the case study, describes the main events 
that shaped the evolution of armed conflict and violence in Barrancabermeja during 
the period of study and concludes with some descriptive statistics about the 
magnitude and trends of these phenomena. 
 
 
5.2.1 Barrancabermeja—at the edge of the Colombian State 
                                                
95 For instance, Weinstein (2007) focused on organisational aspects such as funding, incentives and 
the way they affect the behaviour of combatants towards civilians.  
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Barrancabermeja is located on the flat east bank of the Magdalena River, in the 
department of Santander. Since its foundation in the early 1900s, its economic and 
demographic dynamics have been driven by the oil industry, now run by the state-
owned company Ecopetrol and a variety of domestic and multinational firms. The 
local economy has revolved around the provision of low-tech services to these 
companies and never developed as an industrial cluster centred on the refinery. It did 
attract, though, thousands of men aspiring to acquire a job and earn the legendary 
wages and perks paid to oil workers.  
 
The oil workers’ union, Union Sindical Obrera (the Workers’ Labour Union), born 
in the 1930s, is still one of the most important labour unions in Colombia; it has 
been an active promoter of popular political mobilisation in the city. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, Barrancabermeja developed an active squatter movement as well as a 
vibrant network of local organisations, vocal in their demands for basic 
infrastructure, housing and access to social services, all in short supply due to 
immigration. 
 
Although not an administrative or political centre, Barrancabermeja is one of the 
main points of access to a geographic region where the Colombian state always had 
a precarious presence. Its importance was only paralleled by Puerto Boyaca, in the 
south of the region; a town that used to boast the title of ‘Colombian anti-insurgent 
capital’ after being the cradle of right-wing paramilitary groups (see 3.2.2). 
 
However, for many years, Barrancabermeja did not experience open armed conflict 
as such. Brawls between the police and urban insurgent militias erupted occasionally 
during popular demonstrations and militias were keen to enforce civic strikes, 
punishing civilians who dared to open their shops or go to work when their fellow 
citizens were engaged in protest. But proper clashes between the army and 
insurgency only occurred in rural areas. Besides, the strategic importance of the local 
refinery, the largest in the country, led to a heavy presence of security forces, 
consisting of three military bases (anti-aerial, riverine and infantry) and a branch of 
the home intelligence services. 
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From the early 1990s, insurgent organisations strengthened their urban militias. The 
new recruits were given guns but little military training or indoctrination; rather than 
political agitation, their priority was to collect funds, badly needed to support the 
struggle in rural areas such as south Bolivar. This strategy had pernicious effects: 
militiamen often abused the population, targeting owners of corner shops or stealing 
raw meat from small dealers to ‘redistribute’ it to the poor. The competition among 
different organisations and ‘fronts’ often meant that victims were targeted and asked 
to pay twice, by different organisations. Although they rarely engaged in combat 
with the police or the army, by the mid-1990s they had managed to establish 
protection rackets over large, poor neighbourhoods, where the police rarely ventured. 
Not surprisingly, they became increasingly unpopular, even among those who used 
to sympathise with the revolutionary struggle, but especially among shopkeepers, oil 
contractors and local investors. Unable to fight them through regular methods, the 
navy launched an undercover operation aimed at the elimination of insurgent 
collaborators but it was eventually exposed and aborted (El Espectador, 20 April 
1998; Human Rights Watch 1996: 30). 
 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, paramilitary organisations steadily advanced over 
the region, raiding villages and killing alleged insurgent collaborators. By the mid-
1990s, two groups often roamed the city’s hinterland: the Autodefensas de Santander 
y Sur del Cesar, AUSAC, in the north, and the Autodefensas del Magdalena Medio, 
in the south. These groups, together with the Bloque Central Bolivar (BCB), started a 
series of attacks on city residents from 1998, causing a wave of violence against 
civilians that only ebbed in 2002, when insurgent activity in Barrancabermeja had 
been curbed. 
 
 
5.2.2 Crushing the insurgency 
 
This section describes the main trends and events in the armed conflict in 
Barrancabermeja from 1996 to 2004. It covers the preamble to the paramilitary 
campaign, the peak of violence and its aftermath, thus allowing us to explore the 
relation between the changing patterns of control and violence. The choice of period 
is also concerned with the availability of data, as the records used to quantify the 
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number of conflict-related civilian deaths start in July 1996. This section is based on 
national and regional Colombian newspapers (e.g. El Tiempo, Vanguardia); it is 
organised in six sub-periods, defined by events that significantly shaped the 
evolution of control in the city. 
 
 
 1) Insurgents galore (1 July 1996 to 15 May 1998) 
 
In broad lines, this period can be characterised by an increasing presence and action 
of insurgents in the city. Hostilities between guerrillas and government forces 
averaged twelve per year; approximately half of these events took place in the urban 
area. A particularly hot spot was barrio Primero de Mayo, where thirty ELN 
militiamen attacked with gunshots and grenades the police station in March 1997, 
causing its partial destruction and killing a civilian in the process, who fell victim to 
a stray bullet (El Tiempo 18 March 1997). Three months later, the ELN attacked the 
same police station, firing from a bus and detonating later a truck with dynamite; 
several policemen and civilians who lived in the neighbourhood were injured (El 
Tiempo 20 June 1997). A few days later, in the same barrio, they detonated an 
explosive device when a military vehicle passed by, injuring twelve soldiers and 
killing a seven years old girl (El Tiempo 10 July 1997). The Nueva Granada 
Battalion, located close to the centre of the city, between the refinery and residential 
and commercial areas, was also attacked by the ELN using mortars, but the 
projectiles missed the target destroying two homes in an adjacent neighbourhood, 
injuring six civilians (El Mundo 25 July 1997). The press reported the finding of a 
mined camp close to a slum in the southeast of the city but its purpose was unclear 
(Vanguardia 6 August 1997). 
 
While attacks against the Police and Army forces often hit civilians by mistake, 
other guerrilla activities such as bombings and ‘armed strikes’ deliberately targeted 
civilians. Buildings affected by explosive devices include the offices of the local 
association of farmers and cattle ranchers, Fedagro, in the commercial zone of the 
city (El Tiempo 18 March 1997); the office of the mayor (El Espectador 24 April 
1997); the local offices of the Liberal mayor and presidential candidates 
(Vanguardia 10 October 1997) and the local offices of the General Attorney bombed 
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by FARC (El Tiempo 19 April 1998). Several explosives detonated in December 
1997 in a market and other places, apparently were aimed to hit policemen (El 
Tiempo 5 and 9 December 1997). 
 
Since the mid-1990s insurgents often declared ‘armed strikes’ to mark certain dates, 
voice their disapproval over particular events or decisions and, perhaps most 
importantly, to show their capacity to bring to a halt the activities in a city or 
region—and the government forces’ inability to prevent such strikes. One of such 
armed strikes occurred in September 1996, when the city was paralysed for more 
than a week (El Tiempo 26 September 1996). Bus and taxi drivers who failed to 
comply with these restrictions often found their vehicles burnt to ashes. 
 
In December 1997, the EPL celebrated their thirtieth anniversary burning two buses 
owned by two private transport companies and other two owned by Ecopetrol and 
Ferticol, a local fertiliser factory; they also stole twelve oxen and set up explosives 
in a cab and a community building which both failed to explode (El Tiempo 18 
December 1997). Similarly, three Ecopetrol buses were burnt by the ELN to 
commemorate the death of revolutionary priest Camilo Torres (El Tiempo 16 
February 1998); a few weeks later other three buses were burnt in barrio Primero de 
Mayo (El Tiempo 7 March 1998). 
 
In 1997, EPL guerrillas kidnapped the mayor’s brother in what the authorities 
described as an attempt to reassert their weak presence in the city, but the army 
managed to rescue him alive after a week in captivity (Vanguardia 9 September 
1997). At this stage, guerrillas were not very active in kidnapping people in the city; 
however, the number of kidnappings picked up since March 1998.  
 
Up to this point, the paramilitary presence in the city was often rumoured but rarely 
confirmed. The existence of two ‘security co-operatives’—a legally sanctioned form 
of vigilantism, often linked to paramilitary groups—was mentioned but not 
confirmed in 1997 (Vanguardia, 9 April 1997). Later, in January 1998, the media 
reported that men wearing balaclavas had been patrolling the streets of some 
neighbourhoods in three 4-by-4 vehicles; FURY militiamen warned the residents of 
barrios Primero de Mayo and others and asked them to ‘go to bed early, as 
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something may happen’ (Vanguardia 5 January 1998). 
 
 
 2) The paramilitary massacres (16 May 1998 to 15 November 1999) 
 
During this period, the paramilitaries launched terrorising attacks against the 
population and insurgent activity remained stable. While the Autodefensas del 
Magdalena Medio approached the city from the south, the Autodefensas de 
Santander y Sur del Cesar, AUSAC, did it from the north. The AUSAC eventually 
launched a series of raids and massacres in the city, the first of which occurred on 16 
May 1998, when a fifty-strong commando raided several barrios during a local fair 
killing eleven people and capturing other twenty-five who were later murdered (El 
Tiempo 18 May 1998). Although the AUSAC initially refused any responsibility, 
they later acknowledged the massacre and argued that the operation was aimed to 
capture the top ELN leader, who was supposed to meet the oil workers’ union 
president that night (El Tiempo, 17 June 1998). However, the AUSAC commander, 
Camilo Morantes, declared later that all the victims were guerrilla collaborators who 
had been previously identified as such by deserters and other civilians (Semana 21 
August 1998). 
 
The massacre was certainly a blow for the insurgents, as they failed to protect the 
population who they were supposed to defend; even worst, an interviewee reported 
that several militiamen present at the popular fair in barrio Maria Eugenia, one of 
the scenes of the massacre, remained silent while innocent civilians were being 
killed or kidnapped (I-15). The massacre had a deep, lasting impact in the city, 
especially because news about the killing of the twenty-five captives were revealed 
only three weeks later. Two successive ‘civic strikes’ were held in the city and 
militias attacked police and military facilities in several barrios in June (El 
Espectador 5 June 1998; Vanguardia 7 June 1998) 
 
A few days later, the paramilitary groups announced an alliance between AUSAC 
and the umbrella organisation Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC, based on 
their ‘political and ideological identity’, aimed towards ‘solidarity and strategic 
cooperation’ and the protection of ‘the right to protect life, liberty and property, 
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threatened and attacked by FARC, ELN and EPL’ (El Tiempo, 17 June 1998). In the 
same statement, they named a number of guerrilla collaborators, including the 
presidents of the human rights NGO Credhos and USO, who were publicly declared 
as their targets; they both left the country (El Espectador 1 July 1998). One year 
later, they also accused the local administration of collaboration with guerrillas 
(Vanguardia 16 June 1999). 
 
A wave of collective killings followed. In August 1998, ten people were killed in 
different places of the city (El Espectador 4 August 1998). In November, gunmen 
killed four people in barrio Primero de Mayo. (El Espectador 10 November 1998). 
In February 1999, AUSAC men toured the city in two trucks killing eight people (El 
Tiempo 1 March 1999); the victims were not chosen at random: a former FARC 
guerrilla, known as ‘the Baker’, who had become a top member of the paramilitary 
group AUSAC, picked the targets (El Espectador 2 March 1999). The last massacre 
of this period occurred in September 1999, an unidentified commando killed seven 
people in barrio Minas del Paraiso (Noche y Niebla 13:143). 
 
In most cases, these attacks were launched from the rural area: one or several 
vehicles entered the city, toured the eastern barrios and then left again. Indeed, by 
this time, the city was surrounded by paramilitaries. In an interview, the AUSAC 
commander confirmed their presence in several municipalities in Cesar and 
Santander, north of Barrancabermeja, where they had up to 400 men, and their 
taking over the city, where ‘the programme follows’ (El Pais, 18 August 1998). To 
the south, the Autodefensas del Magdalena Medio had entered the rural village of 
Cienaga del Opon and warned the dwellers about the consequences of collaborating 
with guerrillas (Vanguardia 1 October 1998). Other rural villages, such as San 
Rafael de Chucuri, in the east, were taken about the same time (I-10). 
 
In response to the increasing paramilitary strikes in the city, guerrillas announced an 
increase in the number of guerrillas assigned to the city, as well as the upgrading of 
FURY, from an ‘independent militia’ to a proper ‘front’ (Vanguardia 4 July 1998). 
However, insurgent activity in this period followed a similar pattern to the one 
observed before: attacks on military units, ‘armed strikes’, bombs and arson 
continued, often in reaction to paramilitary actions. 
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FURY militiamen ambushed a military convoy as it patrolled barrio Chico, 
detonating a bomb, then firing on the occupants; a soldier was wounded. Guerrillas 
had imposed a night curfew in barrio Maria Eugenia (Vanguardia 23 July 1998). 
One month later, they attacked a military garrison located next to a water supply 
station in the northeast during three hours; a grenade fell on a home in the neighbour 
barrio Los Alpes, but no victims were reported (Vanguardia 21 August 1998). Three 
days later, a military patrol was attacked in barrio Boston; an EPL militiamen and a 
civilian, a girl aged fifteen, died in the exchange of fire (El Tiempo 26 August 1998). 
 
A 48-hours ‘armed strike’, declared after a massacre, led to the destruction of two 
taxis, whose owners did not attend the order (El Espectador 4 August 1998). 
Vehicles were burnt and explosive devices detonated in other occasions (Vanguardia 
21 and 27 June 1998). Militiamen detonated an explosive device inside a factory 
injuring four workers (El Espectador 10 November 1998). ELN gunmen killed the 
chief executive of Ferticol, allegedly in reprisal for the harsh policies against the 
company’s labour union (El Tiempo 13 June 1998). 
 
In June 1999, men in two trucks killed twelve people in barrios La Esperanza, 
Granjas and Provivienda. Although AUSAC paramilitaries were initially blamed for 
the killings, it later emerged that FARC guerrillas had carried out the action as a 
‘cleansing’ operation against EPL militiamen, whose behaviour was judged as anti-
revolutionary. This prompted other EPL members, like ‘Setenta’, ‘Prisco’, ‘Harold’ 
and ‘Gabi’, to switch to the paramilitary ranks (El Espectador 3 June 1999, I-5, I-9, 
I-10, I-11, I-19). 
 
Besides these actions, a wave of selective killings was carried out by gunmen in the 
city (El Espectador, 29 June 1998). Other attacks, apparently random, also occurred: 
for instance, a small restaurant and a bar were attacked with hand grenades, killing a 
woman and injuring six people (El Espectador 30 September 1998; Vanguardia 11 
October 1998).  
 
Understandably, these events created a climate of fear, especially among the 
residents in the eastern side of the city, beyond the railway, which was seen as 
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controlled by guerrillas and became the main target of both paramilitaries and 
government forces (El Tiempo, 7 June 1998; Semana, 8 February 1999). The police 
still was able to patrol these areas, as they often did, if only in armoured vehicles. 
Forensic officials were not allowed to enter the area and the usual procedures 
following a death could not be performed in situ precluding the possibility of any 
serious investigation; instead, two private funeral agencies collected the bodies and 
brought them to their facilities, to the west of the railway, where forensic staff 
identified the victims and pronounced them dead. This situation continued at least 
for the next two years (Vanguardia 20 July 1998; El Tiempo 22 August 2000). The 
wave of killings and violence led the ICRC to open a local office to promote the 
‘humanisation of conflict’ (Vanguardia 15 July 1998). 
 
As mentioned before, insurgents increased the number of kidnappings, capturing 
thirty-five people in this period, the majority of which were later released. Among 
the victims were a member of the local cabinet, kidnapped by ELN guerrillas but 
released after two weeks; two months before, a paramilitary group had captured him 
for four hours (El Pais 23 September 1998). Some of the victims were murdered, 
including a former army officer and a former policeman kidnapped by EPL 
guerrillas and murdered a few weeks later, apparently in retaliation for the killing of 
four people in barrio Primero de Mayo; the bodies were found in a truck in the 
outskirts of the city (El Espectador 14 November 1998). Kidnappings by purely 
criminal or unidentified individuals or organisations picked up simultaneously with 
guerrilla kidnappings, suggesting a link between them; although there is a chance 
that guerrillas had chosen to keep their identity hidden in some cases, it is also likely 
that some of them were carrying out ‘free-lance’ kidnappings, for personal profit. 
 
The reaction of local elites and NGOs to the intensification of violence was twofold. 
On the one hand, the Church called for a stronger military effort aimed to protect the 
population (El Colombiano 18 November 1999). The massacres prompted a row 
between the security forces and human rights activists, as the latter repeatedly 
claimed that the Police and the Army had turned a blind eye on the paramilitaries; 
their commandos, they alleged, often passed unnoticed through military checkpoints 
as they entered and left the city (El Espectador 18 April 1999). Military officers 
denied these accusations and said that the government forces were unable to protect 
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the civilians in northeast Barrancabermeja because the district was a ‘hostile 
battlefield’ and soldiers were ‘shot from the windows’ (Vanguardia 17 June 1999).  
 
On the other hand, calls for a ‘regional peace dialogue’ made by the mayor were 
backed by the local business sector, echoing the attitude of major business groups in 
the country, which supported the peace talks held by the ELN and the government in 
Germany (Vanguardia 20 July 1998). However, the Coordinadora Popular and 
other leftists organisations rejected any possibility of talks with paramilitaries 
(Vanguardia 24 July 1998). 
 
Amid this escalation of conflict, a massive peasant demonstration, originated in 
south Bolivar, took place during the last quarter of 1998. Branded the ‘exodus’ by 
the organisers, this mobilisation gathered an estimate of 10,000 peasants who 
marched towards Barrancabermeja and camped in parks and schools for several 
weeks, demanding the provision of infrastructure and social services to rural 
communities, but most importantly, protection against the increasing presence of 
paramilitary groups. While it is often said that guerrillas were involved in the 
mobilisation, the demonstrations in Barrancabermeja were peaceful and only some 
schools were affected by the occupation. 
 
The closing event of this second stage was the killing of Camilo Morantes, the 
AUSAC commander, in early November 1999 (El Colombiano 18 November 1999). 
His execution, ordered by the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, was justified as a 
disciplinary action for their excesses; according to Julian Bolivar, his successor, 
Morantes’s approach was too indiscriminate (Aranguren 2001: 310). However, his 
death probably signalled the ‘hostile takeover’ of the AUSAC by the AUC, or at 
least by some of its top associates, with a view to the creation of what would become 
the strongest paramilitary division, the ‘Bloque Central Bolivar’, BCB, in the years 
to come. The killing of Morantes led to a significant change in the paramilitary 
strategy in the city, effectively curbing the insurgent activity but unleashing a 
massive bloodshed. 
 
 
3) From massacres to selective killings (16 November 1999 to 23 December 
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2000) 
 
During this stage, both insurgent and paramilitary activity changed their nature: on 
the one hand, guerrillas were more active than ever, but held less hostilities with 
government forces than in the previous period; on the other hand, paramilitaries 
changed their modus operandi, from terrifying raids to silent, individual crimes. In 
April 2000, Julian Bolivar, explained to the media that the paramilitaries did not plan 
to carry out new massacres and were only to target guerrilla leaders ‘and their 
bodyguards, if they are around’, but not collaborators. However, asked about the 
sharp increase in the number of killings in the city he replied: ‘Barrancabermeja is 
going to change; in fact, it is already changing. After Easter we will carry on the 
cleansing operations’ (Vanguardia 16 April 2000). He also explained that they 
executed only two or three people every week as a way to prevent a climate of fear 
(Aranguren 2001: 312). The new approach was further explained by another 
paramilitary commander who confirmed that massacres belonged to the past: now 
they were being very ‘careful and selective’ in their operations, based on information 
provided by former guerrillas who had joined their ranks (Vanguardia 23 July 2000). 
 
The regional Police commander attributed the increased number of homicides to the 
confrontation between guerrillas and paramilitaries and announced that victims were 
being pointed out by former guerrillas who had joined the paramilitary groups. He 
also declared that the magnitude of conflict was superior to his forces, but his 
attitude was seen by some sectors merely as an open declaration of unwillingness to 
put a halt to the paramilitary campaign (El Tiempo 30 June and 10 July 2000; 
Vanguardia 12 July 2000). However, in an exceptional operation, the Police chased 
and reportedly managed to kill one and capture other two members of a paramilitary 
squad just after they killed seven people, including at least three ELN guerrillas, in 
barrio El Campestre (Vanguardia 5 November 2000). 96 
 
As both the AUC and the Police commanders confirmed, several guerrillas and 
militiamen had deserted the ranks of the organisation and joined the paramilitaries. 
                                                
96 This version has been disputed, as other sources claim that there was no chase or fight involving the 
Police (Loingsigh 2000: 14). N&N reported the killing of seven civilians but did not mention any 
combat or the killing of any paramilitary men in action; for this reason this death is not shown in the 
statistics based on the VNN dataset. 
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This was not an uncommon phenomenon—Camilo Morantes, for instance, a FARC 
middle-rank guerrilla, joined a squad that would later become the AUSAC in 1994 
(I-9, I-11). Although it is difficult to establish the proportion of insurgents that 
switched sides, it seemed to have been a widespread phenomenon, which gave the 
paramilitaries a significant advantage, as every deserter meant not only a loss for the 
insurgents, but also a gain for the paramilitaries, both in terms of experienced 
manpower and, more importantly, as a source of information. According to some 
sources, entire cells within the ELN ranks crossed the floor, including, critically, 
‘extortion collectors’, who kept records of individual and corporate payers (I-9, I-
10). 
 
Lack of indoctrination, threats, pragmatism and money, altogether, seem to explain 
the quick mutation of guerrillas into paramilitaries. Some interviewees emphasised 
the dramatic choice they faced—‘join us, die or leave the town’—while others 
pointed out that their new employers offered them a rise in their ‘wages’ and timely 
payment. Those who gave the step first were asked to go and ask their comrades to 
do the same (I-5, I-7, I-9, I-10, I-11, I-13). 
 
Nonetheless, guerrillas continued their attacks against military facilities and police 
stations but, as in the past, they often hit the wrong targets killing civilians and 
destroying their homes (Vanguardia 4 March and 21 September 2000). They also set 
up several explosive devices against banks and the local branch of DIAN, the 
national revenue service, killing passers-by and damaging neighbouring shops 
(Vanguardia 5 September 2000 and 4 February 2001). The customary ‘armed 
strikes’ declined, but still occurred, as the one declared after paramilitaries killed one 
of the top members of the FARC militia in the city (El Tiempo 6 October 2000). 
 
Furthermore, kidnappings continued, although at a slightly lower rate than before. 
Twenty people were kidnapped in thirteen months; approximately half of them were 
released and the other half rescued by government forces. The cattle ranchers’ 
association launched a proposal to authorise the Police and other security agencies to 
attempt military operations to release victims of kidnapping; some business 
associations backed the proposal but the Church and several NGOs highlighted the 
risks that such operations posed for the victims and suggested that their release 
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should be discussed in the context of negotiations held with their captors (El Tiempo 
17 November 2000). 
 
 
4) The paramilitaries move in—for good (24 December 2000 to 20 March 
2001) 
 
On Christmas Eve 2000, paramilitaries launched a definitive operation. In previous 
years they had launched attacks from the outskirts of the city, entering and leaving 
the city during the night, or sending gunmen, who usually disappeared as quickly as 
they got to the crime scene. However, they now moved into the city, setting up 
headquarters in several neighbourhoods; according to two unnamed journalists, cited 
in a special report prepared by CINEP and Credhos, that night two paramilitary 
checkpoints were set up in barrio Primero de Mayo and in the bridge that leads to 
the northeast (CINEP-CREDHOS 2004: 129-131). By the end of January, they were 
regularly present at barrios such as Villarelis, Altos del Campestre, La Paz, San 
Silvestre, Simon Bolivar and Miraflores (Noche y Niebla 19: 61-63). Their presence 
in the two latter was so conspicuous that FARC guerrillas asked residents in these 
barrios to leave their homes as they intended to storm the paramilitaries out; ten 
days later, nine people were killed in barrio Miraflores (Vanguardia 9 January 2001, 
Noche y Niebla 19: 35, 59). 
 
During the first quarter of 2001, N&N recorded more paramilitary death threats than 
they had during the four previous years altogether. Human rights activists, leaders of 
grassroots organisations and labour unions, NGOs, families and entire 
neighbourhoods were the object of imminent threats; some were given merely a few 
hours to leave their homes. Sixteen families from barrio Pablo Acuna flee their 
homes and took refuge at the OFP’s Casa de la Mujer. According to official records 
on internal displacement, more than 450 households—2,236 people—fled their 
homes during the first quarter of 2001; of them, approximately one in six moved to 
other neighbourhoods but nearly a half went to larger cities such as Bogota and 
Bucaramanga. 
 
As homes were abandoned, paramilitaries moved in or gave them to families of their 
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choice (Vanguardia 8 May 2001). Several homes were appropriated in this way in a 
number of barrios in the eastern side of the city—e.g. La Esperanza, El Progreso, 
Provivienda, Boston, Granjas, Esperanza, Campin, Maria Eugenia, Puerta del Sol, 
Kennedy, San Pedro Claver, Altos del Rosario, Nueve de Abril, and Danubio (I-14, 
I-18). Some of these homes were offered in return to the original owners in 2006, but 
not all of them took them back, as they were still scared to return (I-14).  
 
Nonetheless, guerrillas were still active in the city. On 6 January, for instance, they 
detonated an explosive device as a Police vehicle passed by, in a sector known as 
Pozo Siete; three policemen were injured while two civilians died and other thirteen 
were injured as they travelled in a local bus that crossed the scene at the same time 
(Noche y Niebla 19: 36). The next day they burnt a bus and two taxis in barrio 
Primero de Mayo and blocked a road in the northeast of the city. Later, in March 
2001, FARC guerrillas stole three buses in barrios Antonio Narino, Danubio and 
Boston. On 19 March, guerrillas and paramilitaries skirmished in a place known as 
El Bambu, leaving no casualties (Noche y Niebla 19: 181). These were the last 
actions involving guerrillas in urban Barrancabermeja. 
 
 
5) The paramilitary consolidation (21 March 2001 to 13 March 2004) 
 
This period, the longest of the five, was characterised by the absence of any 
perceptible presence of guerrillas in the city, 97 an increasingly confident, noticeable 
presence of paramilitaries and a substantial reduction in the level of conflict-related 
violence and coercion, which nonetheless was not negligible, especially when 
compared to the levels registered during the first period.  
 
N&N reported two combats between guerrillas and paramilitaries, and guerrillas and 
government forces in March 2003 and April 2004, in Los Neques, approximately 
twelve kilometres to the south of the urban area. Similarly, guerrillas kidnapped only 
three people from 2001 to 2004, two in May 2001 and another in January 2002, all 
                                                
97 In 2003, a car bomb allegedly set up by FARC guerrillas, was found and deactivated in the city but 
the local media reacted with scepticism and it was rumoured that the car had been actually set up by 
paramilitaries to justify their presence in the city (Vanguardia 22 and 25 May 2003). 
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of them in rural areas. No armed strikes or burnt vehicles were reported in this 
period. Meanwhile, paramilitaries increased their grip over the city by co-opting and 
expanding the reach of small private security companies operating under the law; 
households in barrios such as Los Pinos, Cincuentenario, Limonar, 
Autoconstruccion, Recreo, Inscredial and Palmira, were asked to pay a fee 
(approximately one dollar per month) for this service (Vanguardia 11 May 2001, 20 
March 2003). 
 
Official records on forced displacement suggest that it still was very high during the 
second quarter of 2001 but receded afterwards. Conflict-related killings also dropped 
substantially but threats against human rights activists and labour unions’ members 
continued. In an interview, ‘Alex’, one of the BCB commanders, criticised human 
rights activists for circulating the notion that Barrancabermeja was a violent city and 
claimed that the death threats they allegedly received were a fabrication, made up by 
NGOs to get funds and trips to Europe. He made a similar criticism about local 
newspapers and finished the interview warning that if they kept doing so, they would 
have the ‘painful duty of executing somebody’ (Vanguardia 8 July 2002). One of 
them, ‘El vocero’, had to close one month later, after their owners received imminent 
death threats. Similar cases were reported in 2003: a Vanguardia journalist had to 
quit the job for this reason, and a well-known, polemical radio commentator was 
murdered (CINEP-CREDHOS 2004: 129, 133; Vanguardia 7 April 2003). 
 
This concern with the image of the city seemed to be shared by many, including 
some army officials who also contacted journalists and editors to express 
disapproval about the coverage given to ‘bad’ news and the way they were reported 
(CINEP-CREDHOS 2004: 129). Even grassroots organisations seemed to be 
unhappy: during a visit by the Colombian vice-president, dwellers of eastern barrios 
demonstrated against the ‘stigmatisation’ and ‘bad name’ of the city, which led to 
low private investment and lack of opportunities, and asked NGOs to ‘speak well’ 
about Barrancabermeja (Vanguardia 15 September 2003). 
 
‘Alex’’s interview also reflected the self-confident, unashamed attitude of 
paramilitaries and its increasing presence in the public domain. He announced that 
talks were being held with members of USO and that they aimed to ‘change people’s 
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mentality’ and broaden their influence over ‘the masses’. After defeating the 
insurgents, he declared, they now ‘struggled to fight corruption’ in public 
administration and confirmed their participation in ‘social cleansing’ operations 
aimed at petty criminals, drug dealers and addicts and paedophiles. He welcomed 
people to come forward to denounce their troops’ abuses but asked them to keep 
their private quarrels to themselves and not to bring them to be settled by the 
paramilitaries, who only could play a conciliatory role (Vanguardia 8 July 2002). 
 
This confident attitude was matched by the firm support from local merchants. 
Interviewed by a Colombian researcher, Dario Echeverry, executive director of the 
local Chamber of Commerce compared guerrillas and paramilitaries, advocating the 
pro-business attitude of the latter (quoted by Ruiz 2003: 194-5): 
 
Both guerrillas and paramilitaries are illegitimate: they kill, they plunder, they kidnap, 
but there is a difference: whereas guerrillas destroy the productive infrastructure […] 
paramilitaries build on the economic growth of the city. […] One cannot develop the 
private sector with the poor, and they made Barranca poorer. Those who had the money 
are gone. [Guerrillas’] economic model is: the more poverty, the better for them. 
Paramilitaries are the opposite, they say: ‘Come and work my friend! Come and invest! 
I will give you security, I will protect you, but you are going to have to pay for it, of 
course’. […] They are bad, yes; they kill, yes; the businessman has to pay them, yes, 
but he also had to pay to the guerrillas anyway.  
 
 
His views reflected the thriving, optimistic economic climate that followed the 
counterinsurgent campaign. According to Gonzalez and Jimenez (2008), more 
businesses were established in the city from 2001 to 2003, than during the entire 
previous decade (2008: 113).  
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6) ‘Peace’ (14 March to December 2004) 
 
On March 2004, the BCB commanders announced the withdrawal of their troops, 
172 men, from Barrancabermeja, prompting a demonstration attended by one 
hundred people who opposed the measure arguing that they had successfully 
imposed order on the city. The protesters also expressed fear about retaliations from 
guerrillas, who might eventually return, in reprisal for their connivance with 
paramilitaries, who had been ‘accepted by communities and associations, especially 
the merchants’ (El Tiempo 12 March 2004, Vanguardia Liberal 13 and 14 March 
2004). The protesters’ arguments echoed the words of Echeverry during the 
interview cited above: ‘If the AUC leaves the city, guerrillas will be here at the next 
minute. The Colombian government is not able to provide security and stability to 
the Middle Magdalena Valley and Barranca. That is clear, we understand that’ (Ruiz 
2003: 195).  
 
The Church welcomed the news but some sectors were sceptic about the BCB’s 
intention, especially after considering the small number of troops to be withdrawn 
(El Tiempo 8 March 2004). The withdrawal apparently took place on 14 March but 
was not verified by any independent observer. Although the BCB may have actually 
withdrawn some men, its presence in the city still was evident after that date. For 
instance, only until 2006 they offered to return some of the homes they had occupied 
since 2001 (I-14). However, conflict-related killings dropped substantially and so did 
the homicide rate, which nonetheless was still high compared to other cities. In any 
case, there were no reports of guerrilla activity during this period. Indeed, the city 
has remained ‘in peace’ since then and its economic prospects continued to be 
positive. For instance, in 2007, the president of the association of juntas de accion 
communal (the local federation of grassroots organisations) gave the following 
assessment (I-5): 
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The situation in the city has improved notably. Merchants are coming to the city […] 
Exito [a nationwide retail store] will open a store here. Trade is growing and jobs are 
being created. I had the chance of talking to people outside the city and they think that 
Barrancabermeja is now a safe place—and that is very positive. We would not like to go 
through those dark moments we had with guerrillas and autodefensas again. Some 
people think that the autodefensas cured a problem, but that was just an episode of the 
armed conflict. Now they are demobilised and that is positive. Now we, the 
barranquenos, have the duty of maintaining the city safe and peaceful. 
 
 
 
5.2.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
This section presents a quantitative overview of the magnitude of armed conflict and 
violence in the period just described. A first indicator of their scale is the notorious 
increase in the homicide rate from 1999 onwards (see Figure 5.1); although this 
figure includes deaths caused by quarrels and petty crime, there is evidence that a 
high proportion of them were conflict-related, that is, they were directly linked to the 
armed confrontation between insurgents, paramilitaries and government forces. 
Based on death certificates issued by the Colombian Instituto de Medicina Legal (the 
official forensics department), the Vice-President’s Human Rights Office estimated 
that eighty-nine per cent of all homicides occurring in Barrancabermeja from 
January 2000 to September 2001 were conflict-related (PPDHDIH 2001: 8).  
 
 
Figure 5.1. Homicide rate in Barrancabermeja, 1996-2004 
 
Sources: Homicides, Policia Nacional; population, DANE and author’s estimates. 
 
 
 
 
  
 184 
Compared with that, the dataset used for this research (described below) is relatively 
conservative, as it suggests that only 55.5 per cent of homicides occurring between 
2000 and 2001 were conflict-related. However, it confirms a marked peak in 
conflict-related violence around the same period, matched by a notorious increase in 
forced displacement (see Figure 5.2). Approximately 13,000 people fled their homes 
in Barrancabermeja from 1997 to 2004—that is, about 7 per cent of the total 
population reported in the 1993 official census.  
 
Figure 5.2. Conflict-related civilian deaths and internal  
displacement from Barrancabermeja, 1997-2004 
 
Sources: Deaths, VNN dataset, described below; displacement, Sistema Unico de Registro. 
 
 
Table 5.1 provides an overview of the total number of conflict-related deaths, based 
on the VNN dataset described in Ch. 2. Forty combatants died during the whole 
period of study and fifteen of them were killed in internecine disputes within 
guerrilla or paramilitary groups. Only twelve civilians died as a direct result of the 
hostilities (i.e. ‘collateral damage’); the remaining deaths resulted from deliberate 
attacks on civilians. Although the ratio of civilian-to-combatants deaths is close to 
thirteen, this ratio varies between warring parties: while guerrillas were equally 
prone to kill combatants and civilians, government forces and paramilitaries had 
specialised roles depending on the target. Paramilitaries in particular were highly 
specialised in violence against civilians. 
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Table 5.1. Civilian and combatant deaths in urban Barrancabermeja, 1996-2004 
Warring forces Government forces Guerrillas Paramilitaries Civilians 
Civilians / 
combatants 
Government forces 0 11 0 1 0.09 
Guerrillas 14 *12 0 25 0.96 
Paramilitaries 0 0 *3 161 53.67 
Unknown group/s 0 0 0 299 ∞ 
Others/mixed 0 0 0 10 - 
‘Collateral damage’ - - - 12 - 
Total 14 23 3 508 12.70 
 
Notes: Figures in columns represent deaths inflicted to a group or population; figures in rows 
represent deaths inflicted by a group. The last column is the result of dividing the fourth column by 
the sum of the first three columns. ‘Collateral damage’ refers to civilian killed in the course of 
hostilities. Deaths marked with asterisk (*) occurred out of combat. Strictly speaking, the victims 
were not combatants, as defined by the International Humanitarian Law, but were active members of 
armed organisations. 
Source: VNN dataset. 
 
 
Table 5.2 provides a longitudinal summary of the evolution of armed conflict during 
the six phases outlined above as measured by the number of hostilities, i.e. clashes 
and uncontested attacks between the warring factions, and combatants killed in 
action. The total number of hostilities amounted to forty-three, of which forty 
involved government forces and guerrillas; no hostilities between government forces 
and paramilitaries were reported by N&N.  
 
 
Table 5.2. Hostilities and combatants’ deaths by phase 
 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 Total 
Hostilities 12 19 10 2 0 0 43 
Combatants’ deaths 9 23 5 0 3 0 40 
 Based on: VNN dataset. 
 
Table 5.3 shows conflict-related civilian deaths, excluding those caused by collateral 
damage. Each cell contains three figures: the absolute number of deaths, the share of 
civilian deaths by faction and a yearly average of deaths per phase (to account for the 
different duration of phases). The third and fourth phases, t3 and t4, were the most 
violent; on average, one civilian was killed every day during the first quarter of 
2001. The distribution of violence against civilians in general was unevenly 
distributed between the parties: 32.5 per cent of victims were killed by paramilitaries 
while guerrillas killed only 5 per cent; the government forces had a marginal role 
with 0.2 per cent of the killings (1 victim) and the remaining deaths could not be 
assigned to any party. Whereas the guerrillas had a marginal and decreasing 
importance in the perpetration of such crimes, the paramilitaries were responsible for 
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the largest share of the death toll, especially in the second, fifth and sixth phases.  
 
 
Table 5.3. Conflict-related civilian deaths by organisation and phase 
Perpetrators t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 Total 
 
Guerrillas 
5 
23.8 
2.7 
 
4 
6.7 
2.7 
14 
8.8 
12.6 
2 
2.2 
8.4 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
25 
5.0 
2.9 
 
Paramilitaries 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
43 
71.7 
28.6 
 
9 
5.6 
8.1 
17 
18.3 
71.3 
86 
55.5 
28.8 
6 
85.7 
7.5 
161 
32.5 
18.9 
 
Government forces 
1 
4.8 
0.5 
 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
1 
0.2 
0.1 
 
Unidentified/Mixed 
15 
71.4 
8.0 
13 
21.7 
8.7 
137 
85.6 
123.8 
74 
79.6 
310.5 
69 
44.5 
23.1 
1 
14.3 
1.3 
309 
62.3 
36.3 
 
Total 
21 
100.0 
11.2 
60 
100.0 
40.0 
160 
100.0 
144.6 
93 
100.0 
390.2 
155 
100.0 
51.9 
7 
100.0 
8.8 
496 
100.0 
58.3 
Based on: VNN dataset.  
 
Also worth noting in Table 5.3 is the occurrence of paramilitary violence in the fifth 
phase: although no guerrilla activity was reported in the city, the number of killings 
was as high as in the second phase—28.6 and 28.8 killings per year, respectively. 
Finally, Table 3 shows a high proportion of killings in which the perpetrator is 
unknown; they were reported by the source as conflict-related, based on the victims’ 
identities and the nature of the events. Most of them occurred in t3, that is, just after 
the death of Camilo Morantes, when the paramilitaries changed their tactics, 
favouring discreet operations usually involving one or two gunmen rather than 
commandos. However, since these killings cannot be rigorously imputed to any of 
the warring parties, they cannot be fully included in the analysis that follows, as it 
demands unequivocal information about the perpetrator of each crime—an important 
empirical limitation of this analysis. 
 
 
Table 5.4. Conflict-related kidnappings in Barrancabermeja 
 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 Total 
Guerrillas 13 34 21 0 3 0 71 
Paramilitaries  0 2 12 2 11 1 28 
 Source: Fondelibertad. 
 
While insurgents made a marginal contribution to the killing of civilians, they were 
the main perpetrators of kidnappings: sixty-eight victims during the first three 
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phases. More than sixty per cent were made for ransom; less than sixteen per cent 
were politically motivated (see Table 5.4). 
 
 
5.3 Testing the ‘Logic of Violence’ in Barrancabermeja 
 
The first part of this section describes the methods used to replicate the test 
developed by Kalyvas to the case of Barrancabermeja; the second part presents the 
main results and highlights key aspects on whether the theory and evidence are 
consistent or fail to match. 
 
 
5.3.1 Methods 
 
To start with, the test involves two tasks: first, the territory must be divided and 
coded in zones of control, according to the five-zone categorisation described above; 
as these zones are likely to be unstable, the codification should capture these changes 
following the timeline of events. Second, deaths should be coded in two categories, 
depending on whether the victims died in indiscriminate or selective attacks and then 
allocated to the respective zone of control; this involves detailed knowledge about 
the date, place and nature of the attack.  
 
Regarding the first task, the conflict in the city involved three factions: insurgents, 
government forces and paramilitaries. Allegations of a coalition between 
government forces and paramilitaries are hard to substantiate. However, the figures 
on hostilities show that there were no clashes between government forces and 
paramilitaries; furthermore, the role of government forces in killing civilians was 
negligible.98 Thus, although it might be an oversimplification, it is reasonable to 
proceed as if the conflict had been two-sided, with paramilitaries and government 
forces fighting the insurgency. 
 
For operational purposes territorial control is defined here as the ability of an armed 
                                                
98 In statistical terms. 
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organisation or the state to prevent or, failing that, to successfully respond to military 
challenges (i.e. hostilities) posed by other forces within a given territory. Zones of 
control were demarcated following the territorial division of the city in comunas (see 
Figure 5.3) and coded using quantitative criteria. The number of hostile events, i.e. 
clashes and uncontested attacks involving insurgents, were used to gauge whether a 
comuna was being contested or not.99 Other insurgent events, not aimed to attack 
military targets or kill civilians, e.g. the destruction of vehicles, were used to gauge 
insurgent activity within a given comuna.100  
 
The coding of comunas was performed independently for each phase, to reflect 
changes in control, as follows. First, comunas where the number of hostilities 
exceeded the average plus one standard deviation were classified as highly contested 
comunas and thus assigned to zone z3.101 Second, comunas where no insurgent 
activity was recorded during a given phase were assigned to zone z1. Third, comunas 
where guerrillas were able to operate without challenging the incumbents’ control, 
i.e. with insurgent activity but without hostilities, were coded as z2. Finally, the 
remaining comunas, where guerrillas were not only active but also able to challenge 
the incumbents were assigned to zone z4. Although guerrilla organisations had a 
strong influence over civilians in the eastern comunas of Barrancabermeja, they 
never had full, uncontested control, even in barrios perceived as their strongholds 
(e.g. Primero de Mayo). For this reason, no comunas were coded as z5.102 These 
criteria are summarised in Table 5.5.  
  
                                                
99 Since the periods (t1, t2, …) are uneven in duration and comunas are different in size (i.e. 
population), these figures were indexed as events per year per 100,000 inhabitants so that they were 
actually comparable. 
100 Since these events do not involve selective civilian deaths, the former can be used to code zones of 
control and predict the latter without leading to a circular reasoning. 
101 Although statistically sensible, this threshold is arbitrary. The effects of setting it at different levels 
are briefly examined later. 
102 This is consistent with the principles and the actual practice and limitations of urban guerrilla 
warfare, e.g. the vulnerability to encircling and the inability to establish ‘liberated zones’ (on this, see 
Marighella (1975), Lacqueur (1986) and Joes (2007: 157-8)). 
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Table 5.5. Zones of control in Barrancabermeja and operational criteria 
Zone Definition Operational criteria 
z1 Fully controlled by incumbents. Insurgents absent. 
z2 Contested and nearly controlled by 
incumbents. 
Insurgent activity and no hostilities. 
z3 Highly contested. Insurgent activity and high levels of 
hostilities (average plus one standard 
deviation or more). 
z4 Contested and nearly controlled by 
insurgents. 
Insurgent activity and hostilities. 
z5 Fully controlled by insurgents. Incumbents absent but insurgents present 
(no comunas coded into this zone). 
Note: Incumbents are government forces and paramilitaries 
 
 
Although the coding seemed plausible, it overstated the insurgents’ strength in 
comuna No. 1 during the first three periods (t1 to t3) when, according to the criteria 
above, this comuna would have been coded into zone z4. However, the police, the 
army and the intelligence services all had their local headquarters in this comuna and 
regularly patrolled the streets; moreover, insurgent hostile attacks were sporadic and 
limited, e.g. hit-and-run mortar attacks on military facilities, and usually missed the 
target, reflecting the relative weakness of the insurgency in this comuna. Hence, their 
strength was not comparable to the government forces’ or to their own position on 
the east side of the city, where they comfortably challenged the state’s authority 
ambushing police stations and military convoys with temerity. To correct this 
problem, this comuna was coded as nearly controlled by the government forces 
rather than by the insurgents, i.e. in zone z2 rather than in zone z4. 
 
 
The resulting patterns of control are illustrated in Table 5.6: while in 1996 several 
comunas were nearly controlled by guerrillas (i.e., zone of control 4), by early 2001 
only two comunas were being disputed (i.e., zone of control 3). After March 2001, 
guerrillas had no evident presence in the city. Comunas 1 and 2 are the ones where 
the state was better able to prevent or successfully respond to military challenges 
from the insurgency (i.e. maintain territorial control) and, therefore, are coded as 
zones z1 or z2 throughout the period. By contrast, comunas 5 and 7 comprised barrios 
such as La Esperanza, Primero de Mayo, El Campin, El Campestre, Maria Eugenia 
and Villarelys, all of which were believed to be controlled by FARC or ELN 
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insurgents by the late 1990s and, as result, they are coded as zone z4 until December 
2000. Finally, since most hostilities happened during the second period, it is the one 
where most comunas were coded as highly contested (see Table 5.6).  
 
 
 
Map 5.1. Urban area of Barrancabermeja in 2006 
 
Note: The city is divided into seven comunas or districts, signalled with numbers in the map. 
The railway splits the city in two halves from north to south. Roughly speaking, the areas to 
the west of the railway have better access to infrastructure, public and social services, as well 
as a more noticeable presence of the police than other areas.  
Source: Drawn by the author based on GIS files generously provided by the Middle 
Magdalena Valley Peace and Development Programme. 
 
 
 
As for the second task, deaths were coded as selective when the victims had been 
threatened recently, or murdered inside or in front of their home or shop, or abducted 
and then killed (in which case they were assigned to the zone where the victim was 
captured), or identified using a list, or finger pointed by an informer or if they had a 
social/political notable position which made a random murder unlikely (e.g. 
councilman). Information on the circumstances of each crime was obtained from the 
N&N reports. In all, 200 selective deaths were identified; the remaining deaths were 
coded as indiscriminate. 
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Table 5.6. Comunas and zones of control in urban Barrancabermeja, 1996-2004 
Phase Period Comunas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
t1 Jul-1996 to May-1998 z2 z2 z4 z2 z4 z1 z4 
t2 May-1998 to Nov-1999 z2 z1 z3 z1 z4 z3 z3 
t3 Dec-1999 to Dec-2000 z2 z1 z4 z2 z4 z3 z4 
t4 Dec-2000 to Mar-2001 z1 z1 z3 z1 z2 z2 z3 
t5 Mar-2001 to Mar-2004 z1 z1 z1 z1 z1 z1 z1 
t6 Mar-2004 to Dec-2004 z1 z1 z1 z1 z1 z1 z1 
 
 
 
Since it was impossible to obtain data on forced displacement and kidnapping 
disaggregated at a level lower than the town itself (e.g. comunas or neighbourhoods) 
it was impossible to include these forms of violence in the analysis. While this does 
not prevent us from testing the model itself, as it was formulated to account precisely 
for civilian deaths and not for other forms of violence, it imposes limits on our 
ability to understand how armed organisations combined different forms of violence 
to reach their goals. These limits will be evident in the next section and in the 
discussion that follows. 
 
 
5.3.2 Results 
 
Each cell in Table 5.7 contains three figures: first, the absolute number of deaths; 
second, selective deaths as a percentage of total civilian deaths by organisation and 
phase (that is, how selective was each faction during each phase); and, third, the 
yearly average of selective deaths per phase (to account for the different durations of 
phases). Selective deaths amount to forty per cent of the total number of conflict-
related civilian deaths and the distribution of selective killings among factions shows 
a similar pattern to that of the total civilian deaths: forty-four per cent of deaths are 
attributed to paramilitaries and six per cent to guerrillas. Half of these deaths could 
not be attributed to any specific group or involved more than one faction (‘mixed’). 
In contrast with the common perception of paramilitaries as indiscriminate 
murderers, the data show that they were slightly more selective than guerrillas: 54.7 
versus 48 per cent, respectively. A third of the killings committed by ‘unidentified 
groups’ were selective too. 
 
Table 5.7. Selective civilian deaths by organisation and phase 
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Perpetrators t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 Total 
 
Guerrillas 
1 
20.0 
0.5 
 
4 
100.0 
2.7 
6 
42.9 
5.4 
1 
50.0 
4.2 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
12 
48.0 
1.4 
 
Paramilitaries 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
 
3 
7.4 
2.0 
7 
77.8 
6.3 
14 
82.4 
58.7 
61 
70.9 
20.4 
3 
50.0 
3.8 
88 
54.7 
10.3 
 
Unidentified/Mixed 
7 
46.7 
3.7 
5 
38.5 
3.3 
25 
18.2 
22.6 
32 
43.2 
134.3 
31 
44.9 
10.4 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
100 
32.4 
0.5 
Total 
8 
38.1 
4.3 
12 
20.0 
8.0 
38 
23.8 
34.3 
47 
50.5 
197.2 
92 
59.4 
30.8 
3 
42.9 
3.8 
200 
40.3 
23.5 
Based on: VNN.  
 
 
Table 5.7 provides evidence in support of Kalyvas’s first hypothesis that ‘as a 
conflict waxes on, we should observe a shift toward selective violence, especially 
among incumbents, the ones likely to initiate indiscriminate violence’ (Kalyvas 
2006: 168-9). In this case, the shift took place after the second phase. As a result, 
from December 1999 to March 2004 (t3 to t5), about eighty per cent of their victims 
were killed selectively, in contrast to eight per cent or less from July 1996 to 
November 1999 (t1 to t2).  
 
If the results shown above are allocated to the different zones of control, it is 
possible to determine the number of civilian deaths by zone and thus to examine 
whether the relation between military control and violence holds in the ways 
hypothesised by Kalyvas. Table 5.8 provides data on the number of selective deaths 
by zones of control. The first figure within each cell shows the absolute number; the 
second shows selective deaths as a percentage of civilian deaths (how selective each 
faction was in each zone of control). Overall, selective violence was not the 
predominant form of violence; it was relatively high in zone of control z1 and lower, 
but very similar, across zones z2, z3 and z4. Paramilitaries were relatively selective in 
the zones they controlled or nearly controlled, z1 and z2, but also surprisingly 
selective in zone z4, where according to the theory they would lack the information 
necessary to be selective. The pattern of guerrilla violence is even more surprising—
being more selective in zones where they had little control, z1 and z2, or where the 
theory predicted that selective violence was unlikely, z3. In all cases, violence in 
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zone z5 is null for reasons already explained.103  
 
 
Table 5.8. Selective civilian deaths by organisation and zone of control 
Perpetrators z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 Total 
 
Guerrillas 
1 
16.7 
0.1 
 
3 
75.0 
1.2 
3 
75.0 
2.4 
5 
45.5 
1.6 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
12 
48.0 
0.8 
 
Paramilitaries 
68 
70.1 
7.7 
 
7 
63.6 
2.7 
6 
15.8 
4.8 
7 
46.7 
2.3 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
88 
54.7 
5.6 
 
Unidentified/Mixed 
52 
40.9 
5.9 
17 
4.1 
6.5 
11 
3.5 
8.8 
20 
4.7 
6.4 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
100 
53.2 
6.3 
Total 
121 
48.8 
13.6 
27 
39.1 
10.4 
20 
30.8 
15.9 
32 
28.1 
10.3 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
200 
40.3 
12.6 
Based on: VNN 
 
 
The third figure within each cell shows the number of selective deaths after 
accounting for the different time spans involved in the aggregation of deaths by zone 
of control and the different population sizes of the zones of control.104 It shows the 
number of selective deaths that would have occurred in each zone during one year if 
they had a population of 100,000 each. Overall, the intensity of selective violence is 
relatively flat across zones of control, always in the region of ten to fifteen selective 
killings per year per 100,000 people. Compared with the expected, theoretical 
distribution, the observed pattern, shown in Figure 5.3, shows some puzzling results. 
 
On the one hand, the guerrillas’ selective violence is very low in absolute terms. 
Although the theory does not predict any particular level of violence for a given 
faction, nor symmetry in relation to paramilitary violence, according to its premises 
guerrillas should have resorted to selective violence in order to stop the paramilitary 
offensive. Having a significant and long-standing presence in large areas of the city, 
they probably had good access to information on paramilitary collaborators, so this 
defensive reaction was at their reach. The distribution of paramilitary violence, on 
the other hand, follows the expected pattern in a limited way, being unexpectedly 
high for zones z1, z3 and z4. In other words, paramilitaries seemed to be excessively 
                                                
103 It must be noted that if zone 5 existed, the results would not be very different; it would mean that 
the selective deaths now allocated to zone 4 would be redistributed between 4 and 5. 
104 Zone of control 1, for instance, is far larger in terms of population and time than zone 3.  
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violent in the zones they fully controlled (or the government forces) where, 
according to the theory, violence was unnecessary and surprisingly able to produce 
selective violence in areas where, so the theory runs, lack of information would 
preclude selectivity.105 
 
Figure 5.3. Conflict-related, selective homicides by organisation  
and zone of control (annual deaths per 100,000 pop) 
 
Note: Population estimates by neighbourhood were adjusted to reflect the 
results of the National Census of Population 2005. Census data available on 
http://www.dane.gov.co 
Sources: Deaths, VNN dataset; population, Alcaldia de Barrancabermeja, 2005. 
 
 
Thus, when compared with the expected distribution of violence (based on a rational, 
control-maximising model of behaviour, subject to information constraints), 
selective violence in Barrancabermeja seemed to be insufficient in some areas, 
unnecessary in others and even impossible in others. It also seemed to be ineffective 
as, up until December 2000, it only had a limited effect in curbing the guerrillas’ 
capability to attack civilian and military targets.  
                                                
105 These anomalous results would not change substantially if the boundaries of zone of control 3 
changed. This is what would happen: if the threshold were raised by one extra standard deviation (to 
µ + 2σ), the distribution would remain unchanged. If it were raised by two standard deviations (to µ 
+ 3σ), the guerrillas’ civilian deaths in zone of control 3 would be reallocated to zone 4 (see Figure 
4); this would improve the match between theory and evidence. If the threshold is raised by three 
standard deviations (to µ + 4σ), the paramilitaries’ civilian deaths could be reallocated to zones of 
control 2 or 4. Although this change would also improve the match between theory and evidence, it 
would lead to the disappearance of zone of control 3, which does not seem to be a sound analytical 
assumption. Thus, although changing these boundaries might lead to a marginal increase in the match 
between theory and evidence, the key puzzles emerging from the case (see below) would still be the 
same. 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5
Zones of control
S
e
le
c
ti
v
e
 h
o
m
ic
id
e
 r
a
te
 
(a
n
n
u
a
l 
p
e
r 
1
0
0
,0
0
0
 p
o
p
)
Guerrillas
Paramilitaries
  
 195 
5.4 Discussion 
 
This section evaluates three key ‘anomalies’ detected above, explores the 
relationship between violence and the socioeconomic background of the victims and 
discusses their theoretical implications. The term ‘anomalies’ refers to mismatches 
between the expected and observed results that offer an opportunity to refine and 
expand the theory, that is, to phenomena that still need to be explained in the context 
of a research programme (Lakatos 1983: 72). 
 
 
5.4.1 Guerrillas’ selective violence—was it insufficient?  
 
As mentioned earlier, the relatively low level of guerrillas’ selective violence in 
Barrancabermeja poses a question in the context of Kalyvas’s ‘logic of violence’: 
why did not they kill more people (selectively) in order to stem the paramilitary 
offensive? There are at least two possible, not mutually exclusive, answers to this 
question. The first is that by focusing on homicidal violence, the theory may 
overlook other forms of violence equally effective in punishing collaborators, e.g. 
kidnappings and destruction or theft of assets. During the first stages of the 
paramilitary campaign, t2 and t3, guerrillas kidnapped on average twenty-one people 
per year in Barrancabermeja. This also allowed them to capture resources that 
otherwise might have been directed to the paramilitaries. Although there is no 
evidence on whether these kidnappings were mainly aimed at punishing 
collaborators of paramilitaries, it is known that FARC guerrillas used kidnapping, as 
well as sabotage, to punish palm oil companies accused of funding paramilitary 
groups in Puerto Wilches, north of Barrancabermeja.   
 
A second explanation has to do with the asymmetric levels of civilian collaboration 
on which guerrillas and paramilitaries relied. Unlike the insurgents, paramilitaries 
did not depend critically on broad civilian collaboration to operate in the city. At 
least until December 2000, they deployed their operations from bases located in the 
rural hinterland, returning to them after the mission was completed. When those 
operations involved selective killings, the victims were pointed out mostly by former 
guerrillas, and not by civilians. Moreover, since the government forces did not 
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actively pursue them, they did not need any kind of civilian cover for their activities. 
Thus, although it is likely that significant sectors of the local society were in favour 
of radical counterinsurgent measures, the number of civilians who provided actual 
operational support to the paramilitaries was probably insignificant. Therefore, even 
though punishing paramilitary collaborators was for guerrillas the ‘rational’ thing to 
do (in theoretical terms), in reality there were not many of them. 
 
 
5.4.2 Paramilitaries’ selective violence—how was it possible in zones z3 and z4?   
 
Paramilitary selective violence in zones of control z3 and z4 was unexpectedly high 
for the theory’s standards, as it requires information about guerrilla collaborators, 
which is to be obtained mostly from civilians who, according to the theory, would 
not provide it because of fear of reprisal. A possible answer to this question is that 
Kalyvas’s theory may work better in a rural setting, with villages located in close 
proximity (e.g. as in the Argolid), than in an urban one. In a rural setting, 
information may be shared among villagers but compartmentalised across villages; 
therefore, controlling and securing a given village will help a faction to gather 
information about collaborators in that specific village but not about those in the 
village behind the hill. In a urban setting, by contrast, information may travel more 
easily as informants may travel across neighbourhoods, from unsafe to safe zones 
and back, and denounce their neighbours with lesser risk of retaliation. For instance, 
someone from comuna 5 can go downtown (comuna 1), discreetly denounce a 
neighbour as guerrilla collaborator and return home with little risk of being caught 
by the insurgents.106 
 
While such possibility is not farfetched, key informants indicated that in 
Barrancabermeja paramilitaries were able to identify guerrillas and their supporters 
even without civilian collaboration (I9, I-10, I-11). They relied on former guerrillas 
who were captured and forced to switch sides, beckoned with the promise of a good 
position within the paramilitary organisation, or simply bought with money. As 
shown before, this was a useful mechanism not only to punish collaborators but also 
                                                
106 The author is grateful to J. P. Faguet for this insightful observation. 
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to ensure that the resources regularly paid by merchants, contractors and companies 
to guerrillas kept flowing to the paramilitaries, as a ‘protection fee’. In fact, as shown 
in section 5.2, paramilitary cadres such as Camilo Morantes and ‘the Baker’ had 
been in the past members of the FARC. 
 
This finding makes evident that the primacy of civilians as a source of information 
cannot be taken for granted. By incorporating different (alternative or concurrent) 
sources of information (e.g. official intelligence, paid informants), the model could 
be able to accommodate a wider range of situations, thus increasing its explanatory 
power. Interestingly, this finding also draws attention to the asymmetric view of 
civilians and combatants in the model: while the former are seen as self-interested 
and opportunistic, the possibility that combatants can behave in a similar fashion, 
switching sides by force or convenience, is not built into the model.  
 
 
5.4.3 Paramilitaries’ selective violence—excessive in zone z1?   
 
What was the purpose of so many selective killings in areas fully controlled by the 
paramilitaries or the government forces, where guerrillas had lost all operational 
capabilities? Could not these deaths have been avoided considering that these zones 
had been cleared of guerrillas? Indeed, nearly half the selective deaths recorded 
during the entire period of the study occurred in zone of control z1 after March 2001, 
that is, when no significant guerrilla activity was reported in the city. 
 
Although paramilitaries claimed that insurgent clandestine activities continued in 
2002, there is evidence that after ‘securing’ the city, they continued using violence 
for a broader range of purposes. As paramilitary territorial control increased, the 
smuggling of stolen petrol and the protection racket that guerrillas themselves used 
to run were transferred to the paramilitaries, thus requiring the use of violence for 
purposes other than curbing collaboration with the enemy. Similarly, social 
cleansing operations and the enforcement of newly imposed codes of good conduct 
among civilians, youngsters in particular, also entailed the use of violence and 
coercion. Finally, social organisations such as the Organizacion Femenina Popular 
(People’s Women’s Organisation) and trade union leaders were harassed in an effort 
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to co-opt them or silence them. Indeed, the high incidence of attacks against 
members of NGOs and grassroots organisations suggests that violence was used to 
control or eliminate these organisations and reshape a local political arena in which 
these organisations used to play a prominent role. They had been traditionally 
involved in political mobilisation and, sometimes, in handling public and 
international funds that, although meagre, were decisive in gaining influence 
communities and the electorate within the patron-client regime that prevails in the 
poorest areas of country (e.g. juntas de accion communal). 
 
 
5.4.4 ‘Alliances’ and socioeconomic segregation 
 
As suggested above, the distribution of violence was linked to the socioeconomic 
segregation that has characterised the city since its foundation. Table 5.9 shows the 
distribution of violence across neighbourhoods according to the ‘socioeconomic 
stratum’ predominant in each of them; these strata are a proxy indicator of 
households’ incomes, based on the physical conditions of their homes—the lower 
the stratum, the poorer the household.107 As the table shows, violence was 
significantly higher in the lower strata. Paramilitary violence, in particular, was 
strongly associated with these strata, being more intense in poorer neighbourhoods, 
where insurgents had a stronger presence.  
  
                                                
107 The socioeconomic stratum of each home is assessed by the local authorities, following national 
guidelines, to calculate the subsidies and charges applicable to every household for services such as 
water and electricity. Stratification was devised as a mechanism for income redistribution. 
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Table 5.9. Conflict-related violence and socio-economic strata in urban Barrancabermeja: 
civilian deaths per 100,000 population (annual average, 1996-2004) 
  Socioeconomic strata 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Selective 7.0 4.6 5.4 2.4 0.0 0.0 
Paramilitaries Indiscriminate 11.7 2.6 2.6 1.5 0.0 0.0 
 Total 18.7 7.2 8.0 3.9 0.0 0.0 
        
 Selective 0.8 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.0 
Guerrillas Indiscriminate 0.0 1.3 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Total 0.8 2.4 0.8 0.7 0.0 0.0 
        
 Selective 10.0 6.1 5.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 
Unknown Indiscriminate 10.3 12.9 15.5 15.5 0.0 18.0 
 Total 20.3 19.1 20.5 16.4 0.0 18.0 
 Selective 17.8 11.8 10.7 4.0 0.0 0.0 
Total Indiscriminate 22.2 16.9 18.6 17.0 0.0 18.0 
 Total 40.0 28.7 29.3 21.0 0.0 18.0 
Notes: Population estimates by neighbourhood were adjusted to reflect the results of the National 
Census of Population 2005. Census data available on http://www.dane.gov.co  
Sources: Deaths, VNN dataset; population and strata, Alcaldia de Barrancabermeja (2005). 
 
 
Similarly, there is some evidence, admittedly sparse, that shows a relation between 
violence and the occupational status of victims (see Table 5.10). Two patterns are 
evident: first, paramilitaries were more likely to target and kill members of social 
organisations such as NGOs, grassroots organisations and labour unions than any 
other occupational groups; as mentioned above, this probably reflects their interest in 
increasing their control over the local political arena. Second, predictably, insurgents 
usually kidnapped people who, although far from being affluent, lived better off than 
most in the town: skilled workers (‘profesionales’), merchants, owners of small 
businesses, local politicians and civil servants. Nearly two thirds of the insurgent 
kidnappings in Barrancabermeja were for ransom. 
 
 
Table 5.10. Occupational categorisation of victims of  
conflict-related killings and kidnappings in Barrancabermeja, 1996-2004 
 Insurgents Paramilitaries 
 Killings Kidnapping Killings Kidnapping 
Peasants, miners and fishermen 0 1 10 8 
Cattle ranchers 1 3 1 0 
Unskilled workers, employed or own-account 2 5 7 1 
Skilled workers 0 21 4 1 
Merchants and owners of small businesses 0 13 14 3 
Politicians, elected officials, top local civil servants 0 13 0 0 
Members of NGOs and grassroots organisations 2 0 27 0 
Others 5 2 16 2 
Information unavailable 3 13 80 13 
Total 13 71 158 28 
Sources: Deaths, VNN dataset; kidnappings, Fondelibertad. 
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The association between selective violence and the social background of the victims 
can be interpreted in different ways. It can be argued that both violence and 
deprivation came along with the weak presence of the state; thus, violence followed 
a lack of policing just as water-related diseases would follow a lack of access to 
basic infrastructure and sanitation. However, this Hobbesian perspective is not 
consistent with the evidence: homicidal violence and displacement were used to 
crush the insurgency. Rather than an expression of disorder, violence was used, for 
the most, to impose (an) order. 
 
Or, maybe, violence was in fact the manifestation of a class struggle between the 
poor and the local petty bourgeoisie, with insurgents and paramilitaries acting as 
their respective agents. In Barrancabermeja, the paramilitaries actually managed to 
provide a safer environment for professionals, contractors, merchants and 
companies; although they had to pay a ‘protection fee’ for their services, apparently 
it was seen as ‘good value for money’. However, paramilitaries were never 
subordinate to the interests of the local elite: the BCB, in particular, was largely an 
autonomous organisation thanks to the resources they obtained from drug 
trafficking. Insurgents, on the other hand, hardly embodied the interests of the poor; 
indeed, after May 1988, their presence only increased their vulnerability.  
 
An alternative interpretation can be drawn from the notion of ‘alliance’—if not as 
developed in the ‘control–collaboration–violence’ model. As shown above, civilian 
support was unnecessary in detecting and punishing insurgents and their 
collaborators. However, civilians were not passive observers of the events. On the 
one hand, guerrillas preyed on the local elite as well as on companies and oil 
contractors operating in the city; in this way, they obtained resources to sustain the 
war in rural areas, where they faced increasing pressure from paramilitaries and 
government forces. To this effect, they operated from poor neighbourhoods, which 
they used as a sanctuary. This was possible because the insurgency emerged and 
grew organically in these neighbourhoods, in particular in those established by the 
squatter movement in the 1960s and 1970s and in others inhabited by former 
peasants who were forcefully displaced from rural areas controlled by guerrillas 
during the 1980s and early 1990s. Throughout the years, insurgent organisations 
recruited guerrillas from these neighbourhoods and thus were able to tap into their 
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social networks and territory to run their operations, even though the vast majority of 
their dwellers gained little from their presence. Although the term ‘alliance’ does not 
accurately describe this sort of relation, the neighbourhoods were definitely 
functional to the operation of insurgents. 
 
Paramilitaries, on the other hand, targeted those neighbourhoods precisely because 
they provided a platform for the insurgents. Merchants, contractors, skilled workers 
and some politicians courted and welcomed the paramilitary counterinsurgent 
campaign and helped them to gain legitimacy. This was evident in the interviews 
cited above and in the demonstration that followed the announcement of the BCB 
withdrawal, in March 2004. This support was, to some extent, a predictable effect of 
the improved conditions of security experienced by them, but also resulted from a 
public relations campaign launched by the AUC, aimed to portray themselves as a 
disciplined, quasi-professional army, able to carry out very selective, intelligence-
based operations against insurgent collaborators. This campaign included frequent 
interviews given by paramilitary commanders to the local media and was part of a 
broader, nationwide campaign led by Castaño. The relation between paramilitaries 
and the local elite in Barrancabermeja fits better with the notion of alliance, as there 
was a mutually beneficial exchange involving local and supra-local actors. While 
this alliance was not essential in operational terms, it was a key part of the 
paramilitary political strategy, aimed at gaining acceptance from, and integrating 
into, the local polity.108  
 
To conclude, the relation between violence and the victims’ socioeconomic 
background is the correlate of the ability of armed organisations to coalesce with 
specific social groups and networks, or to create alliances with them, thus making 
them functional to their operation and legitimisation. Thus, while alliances may 
enable civilians to ‘privatise political violence’ (Kalyvas 2006: 4, 332), they may 
also enable private armies to legitimise criminal violence. 
 
 
                                                
108 This was not a new strategy. As Lee noted in 1991: ‘The paramilitary movement offers cocaine 
traffickers a vehicle for acquiring a modicum of social legitimacy. By supporting such paramilitary 
activities, cocaine dealers have cemented their ties with establishment groups in Colombian society, 
especially with the land-owning classes and right-wing military factions’ (Lee 1991: 19). 
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5.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter used some of the ideas and methods put forward by Kalyvas in his 
Logic of Violence in Civil War to explore the use of violence against civilians in the 
context of an irregular conflict in a Colombian city. Kalyvas’s model is a leap 
forward in defining key variables and laying out the causal links that explain the 
production of violence in civil wars. In the case under scrutiny, the delimitation of 
periods and zones of control and the distinction between selective and indiscriminate 
forms of violence revealed some interesting patterns and anomalies in the motives 
and mechanisms involved in the production of violence. The evidence presented in 
this chapter confirms the central role of territorial control, that is, the factions’ ability 
have to prevent or respond effectively to military challenges, in explaining violence 
against civilians.  
 
However, there are several aspects on which the facts are at odds with the expected 
outcomes. First, besides territorial control, armed organisations may be interested in 
achieving other forms of control, depending on their own political and economic 
agenda but also on the interests of the local social groups. This may lead to new 
manifestations of violence not necessarily aimed at punishing defectors. In the 
particular case of Barrancabermeja, political control was an important goal 
manifested in the killing of members of social organisations that had played a 
significant role in the local political arena.  
 
Second, some of the anomalies in the performance of the model can be linked to 
breaches in its assumptions: for instance, civilians are not necessarily the main 
source of information on defectors and, as other sources become involved, the 
patterns of violence across zones of control may change. In particular, the hypothesis 
that violence against civilians would be relatively low or null in contested areas 
where neither the state nor armed organisations are dominant (because civilians 
would be too scared to denounce), does not hold. 
 
Likewise, civilian collaboration can be asymmetric: while irregular warfare involves 
the participation of civilians in the waging of war, the degree to which the warring 
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parties rely on them may be uneven, thus making the punishment of defectors more 
likely on one side than on the other. Consequently, any attempt to predict or explain 
violence, should empirically assess the degree to which armed organisations rely on 
their collaboration and the particular forms that it takes. While these anomalies do 
not amount to a ‘falsification’ of the model, they pose challenges in terms of 
expanding it to make it better able to account for the unexpected results; in 
particular, some conditions that were assumed as given in the model, such as the 
sources of information on collaborators and the level of collaboration itself, may 
need to be incorporated as variables, and therefore measured, rather than as 
constants, which are merely assumed.  
 
Lastly, an issue that merits further exploration and discussion is that of collaboration 
and, in particular, the notion of alliance. As noted in Ch. 1, civilian support is a 
critical, often decisive input for government forces and armed organisations involved 
in irregular warfare; this is precisely one of the reasons why they use violence 
against those who support their enemies. One of the standard assumptions about 
civilian collaboration has been that it is shaped, by and large, by the major fault lines 
that defined an armed conflict. In other words, the same motives and causes that 
prompt a confrontation at a national scale, e.g. toppling an oppressive dictatorship or 
redistributing land and other assets, would shape the allegiance of individuals, 
groups, political parties, social organisations and local elites in the local sphere 
towards the warring parties. Either through indoctrination, propaganda and coercion 
or by effect of polarisation, the local interests and conflicts would eventually be 
blurred or subsumed within the major conflict.  
 
By introducing the notion of alliance, Kalyvas made perhaps his most significant 
contribution to the literature on civil wars. Rather than assuming increasing identity 
between the interests of armed organisations and civilians, he suggested that they 
could remain distinct and yet be the basis for collaboration (Kalyvas 2003a). In the 
control-collaboration-violence model he went a step further, giving civilians a 
crucial role in identifying the targets of violence and even allowing them to take 
control over violence itself by the back door, without even having to wield a 
machete, via malicious denunciation. Thus, although the notion of alliance allows for 
a variety of agreements between local and supra-local actors, the control–
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collaboration–violence model underscores a very specific form of alliance in which 
civilians take part in an individualistic, opportunistic way. In doing so, he 
refashioned collaboration in line with the rational, self-interested conception of 
human behaviour that has increasingly permeated the study of conflict and violence 
during the last decade and which, until recently had focused on the motives and 
incentives of combatants. 
 
Barrancabermeja, however, did not offer evidence to back this view. First, because 
the identification of targets relied less on denunciation and more on information 
given by former guerrillas who joined the paramilitaries. And second, because 
informants (for this research) were particularly wary about revealing details about 
their links or even their sympathy or opposition towards armed organisations. Their 
prudence was understandable as, by the time the interviews were done, paramilitaries 
were still in control of the city and investigations about embarrassing links between 
them and local politicians were launched across the country.109 From the evidence 
above it seems reasonable to conclude that whereas paramilitaries did not require 
substantial civilian collaboration, insurgents relied extensively on it and had deep 
roots at least on certain neighbourhoods; indeed, as the figures show, the 
counterinsurgent campaign succeeded precisely after paramilitaries scaled up their 
campaign of killings and caused the forced displacement of civilians from several 
neighbourhoods. But, beyond these findings, Barrancabermeja shed little light 
regarding the nature and extent of alliances. 
 
To explore this issue in further detail, the next chapter focuses on south Bolivar, a 
sub-region of the Middle Magdalena Valley where alliances between armed 
organisations, local elites and social organisations acquired particular salience and 
manifested themselves in episodes of massive social and political mobilisation. As 
anywhere else, in south Bolivar links between armed organisations and civilians 
have been surrounded by an atmosphere of rumour and secrecy but, since these 
episodes were widely reported by the press, there is a decent, if not abundant, 
                                                
109 Links with guerrillas could have deadly consequences. Links with paramilitaries could cause 
political embarrassment to politicians and local leaders. It is worth noting that while the investigation 
on links between the mayor and paramilitaries was dropped because of lack of evidence, when his 
political party announced their own investigation, he resigned his membership effectively aborting the 
inquiry. 
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amount of evidence to rely on. Furthermore, south Bolivar was the most contested 
area in the region: only a handful of municipios accounted for half the hostilities and 
nearly a third of the combatants killed in action across the region.  
 
The chapter will show how events in the national and local political arenas get 
intertwined creating opportunities for alliances between supra-local armed 
organisations and local social organisations and local elites. In doing so, it will 
question the individualistic version of alliances and show how they can go well 
beyond the individual, private sphere to which they were confined in the control-
collaboration-violence. It will also show that, even in wartime, local politics matters 
and, indeed, has the potential to influence military outcomes, thus tackling an aspect 
that Kalyvas overlooked, namely, the relevance that contentious politics in general—
not only violent—may have in explaining violence (Tarrow 2007: 592). What is 
more, the next chapter will provide evidence that shows how, despite the 
involvement of armed organisations in criminal activities, notoriously the 
coca/cocaine industry, they were able to engage in political negotiation and promote 
political mobilisation.  
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6. MORE THAN VICTIMS? CIVILIAN COLLABORATION, LOCAL 
POLITICS AND ALLIANCES IN SOUTH BOLIVAR 
 
 
 
The scale and forms of violence against civilians provide significant clues about the 
roles they play in irregular wars, as previous chapters show. Explaining violence 
demands a better understanding of those roles and, in general, of the relationship 
between civilians and armed organisation. This chapter examines the specific forms 
this relationship assumed in south Bolivar during the late 1990s and early 2000s. The 
chapter supports the notion that civilians are not just victims or passive observers of 
violence as they engage in talks, negotiations and alliances with armed organisations 
to protect their rights or advance their interests. However, it challenges claims that 
such deals are primarily individualistic or opportunistic; indeed, it shows that 
political parties and social organisations still continue aggregating and representing 
local interests, even amid conflict, and act as a bridge between the population, armed 
organisations and the state. In doing so, the chapter also questions the dichotomy 
between organised crime and politics and shows how the involvement of criminals in 
armed organisations and of the latter in criminal activities (e.g. the production and 
trade of coca paste) does not preclude their participation in local politics or strip their 
activity of their intrinsic political nature. This finding is particularly significant 
considering that the largest coca-cultivated areas in the Middle Magdalena Valley 
were located precisely in south Bolivar. 
 
The first part outlines the debates addressed in the chapter and its intended 
contribution to those debates. The second part provides a brief regional background 
on south Bolivar, an isolated region of Colombia with limited presence of the state 
and increasing influence of the insurgency. The third part summarises the evolution 
of armed conflict in this region during the late 1990s and early 2000s and shows how 
violence against civilians reached unprecedented heights in 1999 and 2000 by effect 
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of a counterinsurgent campaign in which paramilitary groups and government forces 
managed to push back the leftist insurgency. The fourth part describes the links 
between civilian and armed organisations, their visible manifestations and their 
effects on the evolution of armed conflict.  
 
 
6.1. Crime and the demise of politics in contemporary armed conflicts  
 
One of the crucial aspects in the debate about the nature of contemporary wars is the 
relation between civilians, armed organisations and the state in a context of armed 
conflict. This debate has been permeated by the increasing influence of neoclassical 
economics on the way the behaviour of combatants and civilians is modelled, which 
underscores issues of financial feasibility and individual profit over the political 
projects and social roots of conflicts (Cramer 2002). Furthermore, many recent 
armed conflicts seem, in fact, increasingly driven by the personal appetites of 
politicians, warlords and combatants, attracted by the opportunities of power and 
enrichment that conflict and disorder create. 
 
This chapter focuses on two related aspects of this debate. The first aspect concerns 
the involvement of civilians in the production of violence. It is well known that 
civilians can be mobilised for the production of violence and, sometimes, can be 
formidably effective at it. However, their role is less obvious when violence is 
produced by members of armed organisations and, therefore, they are not involved 
first-hand in the process itself. Needless to say, civilians often carry the heaviest 
burden in recent conflicts: the civilian death toll has usually exceeds that of the 
combatants, and those lucky to survive are often displaced and stripped of their 
assets. But civilians often play their part in the production of violence—unarmed, 
they may seem powerless, but they provide key inputs, necessary for the military and 
political advancement of armed organisations, particularly in irregular conflicts, 
where armed conflict takes place amid the population.  
 
In his influential work on civil wars, Kalyvas suggested that civilians participate in 
the production of violence in irregular conflicts at both ends of the process: they are 
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victims but also partners in ‘alliances’ with armed organisations, thus winning ‘a 
decisive advantage over local rivals’ while allowing those organisations to ‘tap into 
local networks and generate mobilisation’ (2006: 383). These alliances, he 
suggested, may consist of individual transactions between civilians and armed 
organisations, whereby the latter use information provided by the former to eliminate 
enemy collaborators, thus creating opportunities for civilians to take advantage by 
accusing foes and competitors (‘malicious denunciation’). Ultimately, he concluded, 
political violence is privatised (Kalyvas 2006). While, the previous chapter tested his 
claims in relation with the spatial distribution of violence, this chapter focuses on 
whether the notion of alliance adequately captures the relation between civilians and 
armed organisations. 
 
A second aspect to examine is whether the involvement of armed organisations in 
criminal activities, such as the drug trade, has transformed the relation between 
civilians and armed organisations. As we noted in Ch. 1, the standard view on the 
nature of irregular wars assumed that insurgencies and other forms of collective 
political violence were aimed to seize power and transform society in accordance 
with a set of ideological principles. In line with this view, it was assumed that the 
state would compete for civilian allegiance mainly through rewards, propaganda and 
indoctrination—resorting only marginally to fear and violence. However, it has been 
argued, in pseudo-wars predatory behaviour towards civilians becomes 
widespread—either as a result of the generalised misconduct of combatants or as a 
planned strategy of economic exploitation, exclusion or elimination. In short, the 
convergence between armed conflict and crime would lead to a de-politicisation of 
their relationship and to increasing abuses and violence, manifested in massive 
forced displacement, asset stripping, slavery or subtler forms of economic 
exploitation. 
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Map 6.1. Middle Magdalena Valley and the towns of south Bolivar and Yondo 
 
Note: South Bolivar comprises the towns on the west side of the Magdalena River, 
which splits into several streams or ‘arms’ (visible in the map between San Pablo and 
Rioviejo) creating marshes, shallows and some small riverine islands that ‘emerge’ 
only during the dry seasons. Source: Map drawn by Cesar Moreno, used with his 
permission. 
 
 
This chapter challenges this claim by looking at the alliances between armed 
organisations and civilians in south Bolivar, a sub-region of the Middle Magdalena 
Valley where coca crops spread during the 1990s and became a substantial source of 
income for locals and armed organisations alike—insurgents and paramilitaries. 
Whilst it may not be representative of conditions across the country, it offers an 
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opportunity to assess claims sometimes heard in the literature, suggesting the 
Colombian case as proof of the causal links between criminalisation and violence 
against civilians. For instance, Bibes argued that ‘traditional revolutionary 
movements [in Colombia] have turned more violent as a result of the drug trade’ 
(Bibes 2001: 244). Likewise, Beardsley and McQuinn recently claimed that the 
FARC ‘originally provided numerous public goods such as education when it began 
operating, but as it became more focused on narcotic sales it became more of a 
menace to the local population’ (2009: 631). The findings presented in this chapter 
cast doubts about such simplistic connection and suggest that despite their 
participation in the drug trade, and their lack of credible, coherent political 
programmes, their relation with civilians was not reduced to just violence and 
coercion; they used their power to favour specific social groups and organisations, as 
well as political parties, and push their agendas in the local sphere and beyond. 
Moreover, it suggests that policing and controlling the regional coca paste market 
required a measure of coercion and sanctions rather than a massive use of violence. 
 
 
 
6.2. South Bolivar—beyond the edge of the state 
 
South Bolivar consists of ten municipios on the west side of the Middle Magdalena 
River Valley, in the department of Bolivar.110 Despite its central position in relation 
to the largest Colombian cities (Bogota, Medellin and Barranquilla) access to south 
Bolivar is still cumbersome and some rural areas can be reached only by foot or 
mule. 
 
The two most salient geographical features of this subregion are the Magdalena 
River, which traverses the region from south to north, and sierra San Lucas, a 
mountainous area with ‘two million hectares of tropical and subtropical forest’ 
believed to be ‘the last refuge of a considerable number of threatened species’ 
(Davalos 2001: 71-2). In between, there is a flat area, scattered with marshes, where 
                                                
110 More specifically, the area consists of nine municipios of Bolivar (Arenal, Cantagallo, 
Montecristo, Morales, Rioviejo, San Pablo, Santa Rosa del Sur, Simiti, and Tiquisio), but I also 
included one in Antioquia (Yondo), because it is part of the Cimitarra Valley, where key events 
described in this paper occurred. 
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most towns of the region are located. While some of them were founded in colonial 
times (e.g. Simiti), in rural areas colonisation took place well into the twentieth 
century and, in some cases, as late as in the 1980s.  
 
Colonisation has been fuelled by successive economic booms, e.g. oil, rice, gold, 
coca, and by migrations from regions such as Santander and Boyaca prompted by 
political violence—first during ‘la violencia’ and later by the spread of paramilitary 
groups in the 1980s. By 2000, the estimated population of the region was 200,000; 
approximately sixty per cent lived in rural areas. 
 
Although some towns remained firmly controlled by mainstream ‘traditional’ 
parties, radical social and political movements exerted significant influence over the 
population, particularly in rural areas. Given the precarious presence of the state, 
Catholic priests were very active in organising the provision of basic services and 
infrastructure and in mediating between these communities and the departmental 
authorities (I-4, see list of interviewees in Ch. 2). In the heyday of Liberation 
Theology, some priests encouraged the peasantry to participate in the squatter 
movement and disseminated revolutionary ideals in their parishes. Likewise, the oil 
workers’ union, USO, and the national peasant association, ANUC, encouraged the 
squatter movement, which was sometimes successful. In 1967, for instance, the 
government allocated 160,000 hectares in the rural areas of Yondo (El Tigre and San 
Luis Beltran) and Barrancabermeja in response to peasant mobilisation (Zamosc 
1986: 43). 
 
However, violence and conflict over access to land, characteristic of the colonisation 
process in several regions, including the Middle Magdalena Valley, had marginal 
importance in south Bolivar. San Pablo, for instance, ‘has not experienced the basic 
conflict over access to land’ as ‘no large landowners have attempted to expropriate 
the peasants’ (Restrepo 1994: 210). Three factors may account for this exceptional 
outcome: first, the geographical features of the region (mountains, marshes, location) 
are not attractive for intensive agriculture; San Pablo’s rice growers, for instance, 
could not mechanise their crops and could not compete with those from Tolima and 
Huila, who did (Restrepo 1994). Second, at least until the 1960s conflicts over 
access to land often involved property owned by foreign oil companies or the state-
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owned Ecopetrol, which was no longer as valuable for them as the productivity in 
the oil fields declined; therefore, while land titling still involved peasant protest it 
was not as politically contentious and volatile as in other zones, where the interest of 
large landowners were also at stake. Third, in some areas (e.g. the Cimitarra Valley) 
the presence of FARC guerrillas may have deterred large landowners from attempts 
to expropriate peasant lands, just as it did in the early years of this organisation (i.e. 
‘armed colonisation’).111 
 
Geography and the limited presence of the state made the region a fertile ground for 
guerrilla movements. Indeed, mountainous terrain, thick vegetation and marshes are 
textbook examples of the kind of terrain most suitable for guerrilla warfare (Harkavy 
and Neuman 2001:79). 112 The National Liberation Army (ELN), founded by young 
intellectuals inspired by the Cuban Revolution, operated in the rural areas of San 
Pablo and Yondo since the late 1960s. Despite important setbacks, they operated 
almost uninterruptedly in the region, establishing its headquarters in sierra San 
Lucas. The Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) did not have a 
significant presence in the region until the 1980s, when they were pushed out from 
the south by effect of the counterinsurgent campaign that had Puerto Boyaca as 
epicentre (Gutierrez and Baron 2005).113 As a result, south Bolivar was flagged by 
the central government as a ‘red zone’ and treated accordingly—sometimes with 
social programmes aimed to strengthen the presence of the state, e.g. the Plan 
Nacional de Rehabilitacion (PNR), but most often with repression especially in areas 
such as the Cimitarra and Santo Domingo valleys, where FARC and ELN insurgents, 
respectively, were known to roam (I-22, I-24). 
 
Political and fiscal decentralisation and the institutional reforms introduced with the 
constitutional reform of 1991 (expansion of civil rights and guarantees, increase in 
                                                
111 Exploring the relative significance of these factors goes beyond the scope of this work. 
112 Guerrilla commanders probably followed Guevara’s advice that the most favourable settings for 
guerrilla warfare were ‘zones difficult to reach, either because of dense forests, steep mountains [and] 
impassable deserts or marshes’ (1985: 65). Indeed, insurgent strongholds are often located in rural, 
isolated areas as they offer several advantages for this kind of warfare (Kalyvas 2006: 132-6) and 
there is some evidence that mountainous countries are more conflict prone (Collier et al. 2009). 
113 Both sierra San Lucas and the Cimitarra Valley met four of five ideal conditions required to be 
‘good tactical bases’ as defined by Mao: difficult terrain, remote from modern transportation; 
cultivable land; a friendly local population; and hospitable climate (cited by Harkavy and Neuman 
2001: 194).   
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social expenditure, participatory democracy) had a limited success in strengthening 
the presence and legitimacy of the state in the region. As in the rest of the country, 
increased fiscal transfers from the central government funded the expansion of 
education and health services. But these advances were capitalised by the 
insurgency, which managed to co-opt the local authorities and, although they did not 
lack sympathisers, coercion was often needed to enforce their will (Peñate 1999).  
 
In the 1990s, the coca boom reinvigorated the regional economy but reinforced the 
disconnection between the population and the Colombian state, pushing them into 
illegality and making them subject to the repressive measures implemented as part of 
the ‘war on drugs’. Although coca crops in South Bolivar never represented more 
than five per cent of the national estimates, they were a vital source of income for 
many in the region—not only cultivators but also for guerrillas and the local 
economy in general.114 Official estimates based on satellite imagery suggest that 
crops grew during the 1990s and reached approximately 6,000 hectares by 2001.  
 
Approximately forty per cent of that area was maintained by small cultivators in 
2,000 plots of less than three hectares. The cultivation of coca has low (technical and 
economic) barriers to entry and attracted both large and small landholders and even 
town dwellers, who rented small plots to grow it. The transformation of coca leaves 
into coca paste is not technically demanding; it is usually done in facilities close to 
cultivation areas. It enables growers to transport their produce in an easy and 
inexpensive way, as a ton of coca leaves can be reduced into a small, light package 
that can be carried in a handbag and taken to the town to be sold.  
 
At least until 1998, buyers of coca paste could freely access the local markets, 
competing with each other and paying the producers in cash and on the spot 
(Fonseca et al. 2005: 61, I-25). In towns like Santa Rosa, coca had a significant 
economic impact, visible in the housing market—a small three-storey building, with 
a shop in the ground floor, located near the central square, could cost as much as a 
flat in a middle-class neighbourhood in Bogota (I-33). Even merchants who were not 
directly involved in the coca economy amassed a capital over the years and become 
                                                
114 The five per cent estimate is based on data published by the UNODC Monitoring Project of Illicit 
Crops (SIMCI-II). Available on http://www.unodc.org/colombia/es/ simci_project.html 
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the ‘economic and political elite of south Bolivar’ (Fonseca et al. 2005: 69). 
Insurgents also benefited from the trade: while the ELN charged a fee of Col 
$50,000 per kilogram (approx. $25), the FARC raised a ten percent of the price paid 
by the buyer, that is, approximately Col$200,000 (approx. $100) (Fonseca et al. 
2005: 63). The rise of the coca economy went hand in hand with widespread 
illegality; according to a former member of the local cabinet, in the late 1990s more 
than half of the vehicles in Santa Rosa had been stolen in Venezuela and smuggled 
into the region (I-33).115 
 
 
6.3. The struggle for territorial and political control in south Bolivar  
 
This section describes the evolution of armed conflict in south Bolivar during the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. The first part shows how the insurgents challenged the 
state in the region and, simultaneously, grasped the political opportunities opened by 
the institutional reforms of the early 1990s to increase their political local power in 
south Bolivar. The second part shows how the paramilitary forces of Carlos Castaño 
tipped the military balance against the insurgency forcing it to retreat to the 
mountains. The third part provides a general idea of the magnitude and outcomes of 
armed conflict during these years, and its impact on the population. The first two 
parts are based on press reports obtained from newspapers, magazines and reports 
(e.g. El Tiempo, Vanguardia, Semana, Noche y Niebla) as well as on interviews with 
locals. The third part is based on the VNN dataset. 
 
 
6.3.1 The rise of the insurgency 
 
Kidnappings, extortion and fees on the cultivation and trade of coca, among other 
sources, enabled the insurgency to increase their manpower and challenge the state’s 
authority in several regions during the 1990s. Moreover, the decentralisation 
reforms, originally aimed at strengthening the capacity and legitimacy of the 
Colombian state, had a limited (and perhaps counterproductive) effect, as municipal 
                                                
115 Of course, legal crops and other economic activities (e.g. beans, cocoa, mining) persisted. 
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governments were influenced or co-opted by insurgents in the areas they controlled. 
 
In south Bolivar, the expansion of coca crops during the 1990s improved the 
insurgency’s finances and allowed them to establish themselves as regulators of the 
coca paste market, playing a role that, for obvious reasons, the Colombian state 
could not perform (Fonseca et al. 2005: 63-9). Although coca crops in South Bolivar 
never represented more than five per cent of the national estimates, they 
reinvigorated the regional economy and became a vital source of income for many in 
the region. Furthermore, the cultivation of coca reinforced the disconnection 
between the population and the Colombian state as thousands of peasants, coca 
pickers and cultivators were pushed into illegality and ostracised as part of the ‘war 
on drugs’.116  
 
As noted above, the decentralisation reforms were capitalised by the insurgency as 
they gained influence over the local authorities through persuasion, negotiation or 
coercion. In 1997, an intelligence report produced by the military and leaked to the 
media, tagged several mayors in the Middle Magdalena Valley as linked with 
guerrillas including the mayor of San Pablo (Semana 19 May 1997). Richani 
reported how in San Pablo, Cantagallo and Yondo, FARC guerrillas organised town 
meetings in which ‘candidates were freely chosen’ before the election. Their party 
affiliation was irrelevant and ‘yet, by accepting the rules of the game set by 
guerrillas, they qualif[ied] for election’ (2002: 89). Furthermore, there is evidence 
that guerrillas regulated and policed local matters in villages and rural areas. For 
instance, Davalos reported how local environmental groups, endorsed by the FARC, 
successfully banned hunting and logging near the villages of Santo Domingo, San 
Luis and Pozo Azul and how the ELN ‘created, imposed and enforced the most 
comprehensive scheme of forest conservation and environmental management 
measures in San Lucas’ (2001: 72).117 
                                                
116 The five per cent estimate is based on data published by the UNODC Illicit Crops Monitoring 
Project (SIMCI-II). The data are available on http://www.unodc.org/colombia/es/ simci_project.html. 
According to the same source, by 2001, more than 80 percent of the coca plots in the region (out of 
approximately 2,600 identified using satellite imagery) were less than three hectares in size. 
117 Controversially, the enforcement of this scheme involved what Davalos called ‘gunpoint 
conservation’, e.g. planting landmines, and was probably motivated by the strategic value of the forest 
for guerrillas (Davalos 2001: 74-6). The measures mentioned by Davalos were in place at the time of 
her visit to San Lucas, in 1998. 
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In 1997, the insurgents sabotaged the local elections, apparently in an attempt to 
maintain in power the existing officials, many of whom were under their influence, 
and also motivated by fears that some of the candidates, who sympathised with 
paramilitary groups, could win seats in the councils or even be elected as mayors 
(Gutierrez 2004b: 35). The sabotage also had a symbolic purpose as it showed the 
inability of the Colombian state to perform one of the fundamental operations in a 
democracy. The sabotage consisted of kidnappings and death threats against the 
candidates, destruction and theft of ballots and attacks against electoral staff and 
facilities. It was widely covered by national and regional newspapers and, indeed, 
very effective as the elections had to be postponed or repeated in several towns (El 
Espectador 27 August 1997; El Colombiano 12 September 1997; El Heraldo 3 
September 1997, El Nuevo Siglo 26 August and 17 September 1997, El Espectador 
24 June 1998, Vanguardia 17 May 1998).  
 
The sabotage faced mixed responses from the population in different towns. In 
Yondo, it provoked a rift among local politicians as an agreement reached among the 
contestants to boycott the election was breached and, as a result, the mayor was 
elected with only seven votes. The opposition formed an alternative government, a 
local junta, apparently backed by the FARC, and demanded new elections. The 
winners refused to resign their posts but were kidnapped by insurgents and forced to 
do so. They later denounced an alliance between the insurgency and ‘politicians 
from the Cimitarra River Valley’, an area with heavy presence of insurgents (El 
Colombiano 14 March 1998, El Espectador 7 May 1998, El Tiempo 6 July 1998).  
 
In Santa Rosa, the sabotage was less successful: although the rural polling stations 
could not open, in the town the elections went ahead as planned. When the 
insurgents demanded the resignation of the elected mayor and councilmen, the locals 
convened a meeting with guerrilla commanders and dismissed their threats, 
supported by a crowd of their followers. The mayor and councilmen took their posts 
in January, as planned, and no reprisals followed (I-3). As the cases of Yondo and 
Santa Rosa show, the relation between local elites and the insurgency was marked by 
dialogue, compromises and veiled partnerships between them; but the use of threats 
and intimidation during the electoral sabotage of 1997 left a sour taste among 
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politicians and, arguably, helped the paramilitaries to cultivate local support 
(Gutierrez 2004b). 
 
Besides the electoral sabotage, guerrillas escalated their attacks against police and 
military facilities and, in general, against the state’s institutions. The town of Simiti, 
for instance, was the target of sustained incursions by ELN guerrillas who, 
eventually, forced the police to leave the town and raised their own black-and-red 
flag on top of the abandoned police station (El Heraldo 19 August 1997). The 
insurgents also destroyed and looted the local branch of Caja Agraria, a state-owned 
bank specialised in services to farmers and cattle-ranchers (El Tiempo 2 July and 17 
August 1997). In a sign of their intent on replacing the state, they pledged to protect 
the town from petty criminals and, reportedly, offered loans to peasants (Aranguren 
2001: 334). 
 
The rise of the insurgency during the second half of the 1990s also had consequences 
beyond the region as they escalated attacks against vehicles travelling along the 
Troncal de la Paz, one of the main roads that connect the Colombian capital with the 
Atlantic Coast. Buses and trucks were often set on fire to punish companies that 
failed to pay protection fees. Travellers were randomly stopped in improvised 
checkpoints and kidnapped for ransom. 
 
6.3.2 The counterinsurgent campaign 
 
Paramilitary organisations mushroomed across the country during the 1980s and 
1990s as local collective responses to the insurgency or simply as the private armies 
of drug-traffickers, cattle ranchers and local patrons. But south Bolivar did not 
develop their own groups, possibly because it lacked large landholders, 
agriculturalists or merchants who could finance such force—or who were so badly 
affected by the insurgency in the first place. Up until 1997, only paramilitary groups 
based on neighbouring regions occasionally forayed into this region. However, in 
1998, things changed radically as Carlos Castaño and the Peasant Self-Defences of 
Cordoba and Uraba (ACCU) entered the region having the defeat of the ELN as the 
main purpose—but also well aware of the rents that could be derived from the coca 
economy and the support that could be obtained from politicians, merchants and 
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companies targeted by the insurgency.118 
 
Roughly speaking, the ACCU’s counterinsurgent campaign progressed in two 
stages: the first aimed to secure the villages and towns in the valley and cordon the 
sierra; the second, to reduce the rural areas under their control. The first stage started 
in June 1998 and consisted of raids against town and villages such as Montecristo, 
Tiquisio, Cerro Burgos, Moralitos, Buenavista and Micoahumado (El Tiempo 31 
August, 7 March 1998, 5 and 9 September 1998; El Espectador 1 September 1998; 
Vanguardia 6 March, 20 September and 22 November 1998; El Pais 19 September 
1998). The paramilitaries quickly moved into the region and established checkpoints 
in crossroads and other points of access to the region. They also distributed leaflets, 
reminding guerrillas of the harsh conditions they had to endure and enticing them to 
join their ranks. As the insurgency reacted to the paramilitary incursions, the media 
reported clashes between paramilitaries and combined forces of FARC and ELN in 
July and September near Monterrey, a village halfway between San Pablo and Simiti 
(Vanguardia 11 and 17 July 1998, El Tiempo 25 September 1998).  
 
During the second stage, after securing the towns and setting up bases in the valley, 
the paramilitaries launched new attacks on rural villages, along tributaries of the 
Magdalena river such as the Boque, Inanea, Santo Domingo and Cimitarra rivers, 
until then controlled by the insurgency. In the north, the fighting took place in rural 
areas such as Regencia and Villa Uribe, near Montecristo, and Colorado, near 
Tiquisio (Noche y Niebla 11: 191; 12: 119; 14: 82). In the south, the action focused 
in Yondo and the Cimitarra river valley. Paramilitary raids on rural villages along 
the Cimitarra River were followed by insurgent attacks on paramilitary camps; these, 
in turn, prompted the reaction of the military, leading to counterinsurgent operations, 
sometimes supported by riverine units and aerial fire (Noche y Niebla 16: 94, 105, 
166; 19: 52, 94, 106). During 2002, the fighting continued in the Cimitarra river 
valley; paramilitaries periodically attacked and plundered villages and occasionally 
clashed with FARC and ELN insurgents (Noche y Niebla 23: 77, 117; 24: 69, 86; 25: 
                                                
118 Unlike most paramilitary organisations, the ACCU launched several operations in geographic 
areas well beyond their original turf, including south Bolivar and Meta. This seemed to have the 
double purpose of increasing the rents obtained by the group and buttressing Castaño’s political 
career. Indeed, he promoted a national confederation of paramilitary organisations known as the 
United Self-Defences of Colombia or AUC, which he used as a vehicle to advocate negotiations with 
the national government and to promote himself, with great success, in the national political arena. 
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67, 72). 
 
In contrast with the swift progress made during the first stage, the second was more 
costly for the paramilitaries and, ultimately, had limited success. As they established 
permanent bases and outposts across the region, they became more vulnerable to 
ambushes and the insurgents managed to strike them on several occasions from 2000 
to 2003, causing a notable rise in paramilitary casualties (El Tiempo 28 December 
2002; Noche y Niebla 27: 194, 207, 208; Voz 14 January 2004). The insurgents also 
resorted to the use of land mines to resist the counterinsurgent campaign in areas 
such as Santo Domingo, Villaflor and Micoahumado, but they could not to reverse 
the progress made by paramilitaries and, by 2003 a stalemate had been reached, with 
the insurgency alive but confined to the most isolated, mountainous areas and the 
state and paramilitaries in control of towns and villages in the valley. 
 
Although the counterinsurgent campaign only led to a slight reduction in the level of 
insurgent activity across the region, it was successful in several aspects. It forced the 
guerrillas back into the sierra and, as result, the proportion of insurgent events taking 
place in the towns fell from twenty-six per cent in 1997-1998 to less than ten per 
cent between 2001 and 2003, and was null in 2004. 119 It also led an ostensible 
reduction in the number of kidnappings in the region (see Figure 6.1), improving the 
security conditions of local politicians and merchants and allowing oil palm 
companies to expand their plantations from 250 hectares in 2000 to 3,600 in 2004. 
Indeed, in San Pablo, oil palm became the most important crop in terms of planted 
area, even above coca.120  
 
Of course, the campaign imposed a heavy cost on the rural population, especially in 
insurgent-controlled areas. Beside the risks posed by armed conflict itself (e.g. raids, 
clashes, killings), peasants had to endure the embargo imposed by the paramilitaries, 
who rationed the amount of food and other goods that could be brought into the rural 
areas of south Bolivar. Moreover, the aerial spraying of coca crops often damaged 
                                                
119 The figures provided in this section came from three sources: the VNN dataset and the official 
databases on forced displacement and kidnapping, developed by Red de Solidaridad Social (later 
known as Accion Social) and Fondelibertad, two Colombian government agencies. The figures cover 
twelve municipios in south Bolivar and one in Antioquia (Yondo); the latter belongs to the Cimitarra 
Valley, one of the key theatres in the armed confrontation in this region. 
120 According to figures provided by the Secretary of Agriculture in Cartagena, Boliva. 
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staple and cash crops, eroding their livelihoods (Noche y Niebla 21: 111).  
 
Figure 6.1. Insurgent activity in south Bolivar and Yondo, 1996-2004 
 
Sources: Activity, VNN dataset; kidnappings, Fondelibertad.  
Note: Includes 32 passengers of flight kidnapped on April 1999. Excludes first half of 
1996. 
 
 
To make things worse, the paramilitaries reorganised the coca paste market: in the 
past, buyers from so-called ‘cartels’ were free to enter the region and producers 
could sell the paste to the buyer of their choice. Under the paramilitaries, only a 
handful of buyers were authorised to buy coca paste. The price was set at Col $2 
million (approximately US$1,000) per kilogram of coca paste and attempts to sell 
the coca paste to non-authorised buyers outside the region were severely punished. 
Furthermore, the authorised buyers often paid their purchases with undated IOU 
notes rather than cash (I-33; I-8; I-27; Gutierrez 2004b: 35). Although the 
interviewees could not confirm it, it is very likely that the authorised buyers were all 
at the service of the well-known drug lord Carlos Jimenez, (aka ‘Macaco’), who was 
also one of the three top commanders of the Bloque Central Bolivar, a new 
paramilitary organisations which, by 2002, had taken over the previously existing 
structures in south Bolivar and other Colombian regions (Semana 9 June 2007). In 
this respect, and despite the casualties, the paramilitary campaign was also a success. 
 
In 2002, paramilitary groups signed an agreement with the Uribe administration 
pledging to demobilise their troops as part of a ‘peace and justice’ process 
underpinned by an ad-hoc judicial framework that established sentences of up to 
eight years for their members, conditioned to the full confession of their crimes. 
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However, the demobilisation process as such in south Bolivar had to wait until 2006, 
when they formally withdrew their troops from south Bolivar (OAS-MAPP 2006).121 
 
 
6.3.3 Magnitude, trends and outcomes of armed conflict 
 
The intensification of armed conflict and its impact on civilians during these years is 
evident in the statistics. The number of insurgents killed in action rose steadily 
during the second half of the 1990s; as noted above paramilitaries suffer most of 
their casualties from 2000 onwards (see Figure 6.2).  
 
 
Figure 6.2. Combatants’ killed in action in south Bolivar and Yondo, 1996-2004 
 
Source: VNN dataset.122 
 
 
Table 6.1 summarises the death tolls produced in the course of the conflict from July 
1996 to December 2004. It shows that the bulk of the counterinsurgent campaign 
rested on the shoulders of the military: approximately two thirds of the guerrillas 
killed in action died in clashes with government forces. Out of 215 hostile events 
(clashes and uncontested attacks) registered in the region from 1996 to 2004, only a 
quarter involved guerrillas and paramilitaries. It also shows that government forces 
and paramilitaries never inflicted any losses to each other; thus, even though the 
                                                
121 However, paramilitaries continued threatening human rights workers and Catholic priests in south 
Bolivar (El Tiempo 15 April 2008). 
122 This part is mainly based on the N&N dataset, developed for this research, using as a source the 
Noche y Niebla reports.  
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conflict involved three sets of actors (government forces, insurgent groups and 
paramilitary groups), in practice it developed as a two-sided conflict.123 While 
paramilitaries played a modest role in fighting the insurgency, they were quite 
effective in killing civilians, accounting for approximately two thirds of the civilian 
death toll.  Most civilians were killed in deliberate attacks; less than twelve per cent 
died as a direct effect of warfare. However, the ratio of civilians to combatants killed 
was well below the levels seen in ‘new wars’ (Kaldor 1999: 8); in other words, 
despite intense violence against civilians, armed conflict as such (i.e. hostilities) still 
was the dominant aspect of the confrontation, as reflected in the number of lethal 
casualties it produced.124 
 
 
Table 6.1. Death tolls according to groups involved in hostilities, 1996-2004 
 Combatants Civilians Warring forces Government  Guerrillas Paramilitaries Total 
Government forces 0 176 0 176 8 
Guerrillas 56 0 202 258 61 
Paramilitaries 0 86 0 86 227 
Others/mixed 1 6 0 7 121 
Total 57 268 202 527 366 
Based on the VNN dataset. Notes: Figures in columns represent deaths inflicted to a group; 
figures in rows represent deaths inflicted by a group. Civilian deaths occurred as a direct 
result of hostilities are included in the last row (‘others/mixed’); the first three rows 
correspond to killings out of combat. Government forces include members of all forces—
not only the army. 
 
 
Expectably, forced displacement also increased dramatically: according to the 
official database, nearly 57,000 people fled their homes during this period, most of 
them in 2000 and 2001; that is approximately one quarter of the population of the 
region (see Figure 6.3). If the 2005 Census is anything to go by (some areas were 
inaccessible to census workers), the rural areas of municipios such as San Pablo, 
Santa Rosa, Morales, Simiti and Rio Viejo lost between 50-70 per cent of their 
population, in relation to the official population forecasts.  
                                                
123 Indeed, in occasions, the army and the paramilitaries acted collaboratively, to say the least. For 
instance, in January 1999, forty men massacred fourteen people in San Pablo, including a former 
mayor and a local politician; according to witnesses, the police locked themselves in the station and 
did not react to the incursion, prompting a row of criticism in the national media (El Espectador 10 
January 1999; El Tiempo 12 January 1999). Furthermore, there have been allegations about 
government troops wearing paramilitary insignias to commit abuses against civilians.    
124 Recent political violence, at least in this region, is then notably different in its character from the 
1950s’ violencia, when ‘relatively few deaths were the result of armed contacts between guerrillas or 
other unofficial forces’ and ‘deaths were caused less by acts of war, however unconventional, than by 
atrocities and vengeance’ (Palacios 2006: 137). Indeed, as Gutierrez has noted, the 1950s’ violencia 
fits better into the ‘new wars’ template than the recent armed conflict (2006: 142-3). 
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Figure 6.3. Displacement and civilian deaths in south Bolivar and Yondo, 1996-2004 
 
Sources: Civilian deaths, VNN; internal displacement, Red de Solidaridad Social.  
 
 
 
6.4. Armed conflict and social mobilisation: from allegiance to alliances 
 
Civilians were deliberately targeted by armed organisations as part of their strategies 
to preserve or expand their control over south Bolivar. However, they were not 
passive spectators or mere victims of the process. This section shows how social 
organisations engaged in collaborative arrangements with armed organisations that 
enabled them to make claims vis-à-vis the state regarding the protection of the rights 
and interests of specific social groups while reinforcing the legitimacy of insurgents 
and paramilitaries in the political arena. While these arrangements had different 
manifestations (such as the electoral deals mentioned above), two episodes of social 
and political mobilisation were particularly significant in terms of their magnitude 
and political consequences. This section narrates these episodes and describes the 
involvement of civilians and armed organisations in the process. 
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6.4.1 The peasant marches of 1996 and 1998 
 
In 1996, peasant demonstrations took place across the country, in reaction to the 
government’s new, tougher coca eradication policies. In south Bolivar, the protests 
took place in San Pablo and they also addressed old demands, made in previous 
demonstrations, on issues such as education, health, infrastructure and loans. 
Although the departmental government reached an agreement with most of the 
marchers in October 1996, delegates from the Cimitarra Valley adopted a radical 
stance and, despite the efforts of Navy’s riverine units, managed to gather 3,000 
peasants in Barrancabermeja, across the Magdalena River (I-8, El Tiempo 3 and 4 
October 1996, Vanguardia 11 October 1996). The demonstration finished after two 
weeks of negotiations, when the national authorities agreed to invest US$50 million 
to improve the living conditions in the rural areas of south Bolivar and pledged to 
protect the population from paramilitary groups (El Tiempo, 28 October 1996; 
ACVC 1996).  
 
However, as seen in the previous section, the situation in the region quickly 
deteriorated as the paramilitary offensive became imminent. In 1998, two peasant 
organisations launched a new massive demonstration, more comprehensive in scope 
and better coordinated in political and operational terms. The Cimitarra Valley 
Peasant Association, ACVC, was integrated by juntas de accion comunal, one for 
each vereda (i.e. rural community) and drew on the networks of a peasant 
cooperative created in the 1980s to reduce the costs of purchasing and distributing 
goods from outside the region. The South Bolivar Agricultural and Mining 
Association (Fedeagromisbol) was created in the 1990s by miners’ and peasants’ 
associations from sierra San Lucas who had actively participated in the march of 
1996; they were particularly concerned about recent attempts made by an absentee 
family to assert their alleged legal rights over their mines and evict them. According 
to one of their leaders they worked for over a year persuading the population about 
the march and preparing the logistics (I-12). 
 
As in 1996, the marchers chose Barrancabermeja as the place to stage the 
demonstration (or ‘exodus’ as they called it), where the local government, the 
Church, NGOs and the oil workers’ union were helpful in providing food, shelter 
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and sanitation to the marchers (I-12, I-9). After three months of negotiation, an 
agreement was reached in the first week of October, when the government agreed to 
fund a participatory process aimed to formulate a regional plan aimed to promote 
peace, development and security for the peasants. Helped by a team of technical 
advisors, the peasant organisations produced the ‘Plan for the Development and 
Integral Protection of the Human Rights in The Middle Magdalena Valley’ in 
February 1999. 
 
At first sight the document resembled a typical ‘development plan’: it included a 
diagnosis of the problems faced by the region in a variety of aspects (e.g. education, 
agriculture, mining, environment, health) and proposed a number of solutions and 
investments, in most cases vaguely stated.125 However, a good deal of the document 
was aimed to question the legitimacy of the Colombian state: the army was 
repeatedly accused of working hand in hand with paramilitaries to unleash a 
campaign of state-terrorism against the peasantry. Local authorities were deemed 
weak and corrupt so the document called for a ‘new, popular’ institutional 
arrangement, in which peasant organisations would have the leading role in 
implementing the development strategy (1999: 30).  
 
The plan’s estimated budget amounted to approximately one tenth of the entire 
national public investment budget for the same four-year period and, as one of the 
economists involved in the formulation of the plan put it, was more symbolic than 
practical as, in their view, it reflected the huge ‘debt’ of the Colombian state with the 
people of the region, after decades of absence and repression (I-17).126 Not 
surprisingly, the plan was not taken very seriously by the national government. 
Furthermore, members of the negotiating team received death threats (I-17) and two 
of them were killed by paramilitaries in 1999. Others were formally accused later of 
having links with the insurgency and, thus, prosecuted and imprisoned.127 
                                                
125 In Colombia, national, departmental and local executives are legally bound to prepare 
‘development plans’ shortly after they take power. 
126 The plan had an estimated cost of Col$6,7 trillion (approximately US$3,4 billion). The official 
national investment budget for the same period (1999-2000) was Col$65,6 trillion, as by Law No. 508 
of 1999. 
127 The army captured the leader of the miners’ association a few days after our interview, in April 
2007. He was accused of rebellion but the district attorney (‘fiscal’) found the evidence insufficient 
and he was later released (Human Rights First 2009: 24). Other members of these organisations have 
been killed, allegedly, in clashes with between insurgents and the army but their families have 
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The question of whether the marches and the plan itself were ‘genuine’ or were 
‘manipulated’ by the insurgents deserves some discussion. The demands made by 
the peasant organisations certainly reflected the concerns of the population regarding 
their security and living conditions. Furthermore, the second march occurred 
precisely at the time of first stage of the paramilitary campaign, so it is likely that 
many peasants, truly worried about their lives, had joined the march hoping to get 
the attention of the national authorities and humanitarian organisations. But some 
sources suggested that the march had been planned or at least backed by the 
insurgency. The magazine Semana, for instance, claimed that guerrillas were 
manipulating the peasants and using them as ‘pawns in a political chess’ (14 
September 1998). An interviewee also confirmed that guerrillas put some pressure 
on the peasants to participate in the march (I-9).128  
 
At any rate, both peasant and insurgent organisations found beneficial to promote 
massive participation in the marches. For the former, they were a chance to raise 
their profile in the local and national political arenas and present themselves as true 
representatives of the population. But even if they were successful in convincing the 
population about the advantages of taking part in the marches, they still had to 
overcome the risks of free-riding, that is, of people staying at home in the hopes that 
their neighbours did all the walking and the shouting by them—just as in any other 
instance of collective action. So a discreet but effective nod from the insurgency was 
not unwelcome and, arguably, may have helped them in achieving the massive and 
sustained mobilisation they needed to get Bogota’s attention. For the insurgency, in 
turn, the ‘development plan’ and the marches themselves were functional to their 
political and military interests as they questioned the legitimacy of the Colombian 
state and required a decisive military action against the paramilitaries. Moreover, by 
backing the march they made themselves stakeholders in their success so, even if a 
small fraction of the demands made in the development plan had been met by the 
government, it would have been a triumph for the insurgents.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
rejected such claims (Semana Online 28 July 2009). 
128 However, there are no indications that they had used coercion or violence with that purpose: 
according to the available data, only one civilian was deliberately killed by insurgents in 1998 in this 
region but his death occurred in September, when the march was about to end (N&N 9: 92).  
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To conclude, rather than manipulative, the relation between insurgent and social 
organisations could be better described as collaborative or, following Kalyvas’s 
(2003) terminology, as an ‘alliance’.129 
 
 
6.4.2 The local opposition to the demilitarised zone 
 
The election of Andres Pastrana as Colombian president in 1998 offered the 
insurgents an opportunity window to advance their agenda; peace talks with FARC 
rebels were his top priority. Quickly after taking power, his government created a 
demilitarised zone in the south of the country, comprising five large municipios, in 
an area traditionally controlled by insurgents but occasionally attacked by the 
government.130 Once the zone was put in place, in early 1999, a vague negotiation 
agenda was issued and the ‘civil society’ was invited to participate in audiences held 
in the zone and broadcasted on national public television. Even foreign diplomats 
visited the zone and talked with the rebels. While it lasted, it was a political and 
military success for the FARC.  
 
Although the ELN did not enjoy the same cosy relation with the Pastrana 
administration, they wanted a similar arrangement in south Bolivar and, as the 
paramilitary offensive advanced, this aspiration turned into an urgent need. In March 
1999, they proposed the demilitarisation of four municipios but several mayors 
quickly showed their opposition. Moreover, according to a regional newspaper, 
paramilitaries and government forces asked the people to sign a petition against the 
creation of such zone (El Colombiano 14 March 1999). In a sign of desperation, the 
ELN captured a domestic flight, forcing it to land near Monterrey, and demanded the 
demilitarisation of this village, recently occupied by paramilitaries as a condition to 
release the hostages (El Espectador 25 April 1999) but they only managed to elicit 
an aggressive rescue operation.  
 
However, negotiations about a demilitarised continued, facilitated by the Cuban and 
                                                
129 Admittedly, this term suggests a degree of formality that was lacking in this case. 
130 The demilitarisation involved the withdrawal of all government forces, including the police but 
armed insurgents patrolled the zone. 
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German governments and, early in 2000, the government put forward a proposal to 
demilitarise some municipios. While some rural communities greeted the idea (e.g. 
Paraiso, Vallecito and Villanueva, Micoahumado, see Vanguardia 31 January 2000), 
by and large, the reaction was negative. Several demonstrations took place in the 
towns of San Pablo, Santa Rosa, Morales and Simiti and, in February 2000, the 
protesters (between 1,000 and 7,000, depending on the source) crossed the 
Magdalena River and blocked the Troncal de la Paz to show their opposition to the 
demilitarised zone (El Tiempo 8 February 2000, El Colombiano 9 February 2000). 
 
What followed was a succession of failed proposals in which the government tried to 
conciliate the demands of the insurgency with the concerns of the local governments 
and the population, most of whom fiercely opposed the idea. New demonstrations 
followed in April and May and, in solidarity, ‘civic strikes’ were declared in 
municipios outside the region such as Puerto Boyaca, La Dorada, Puerto Nare, 
Puerto Triunfo, Puerto Salgar and Puerto Berrio, which had been controlled by 
government forces or paramilitaries for more than a decade (El Tiempo 14 and 24 
May 2000). In 2001, a rumour about the imminent demilitarisation of the zone 
prompted new demonstrations (Vanguardia 18 April 2001). In the end, as talks with 
FARC guerrillas in the demilitarised zone of El Caguan did not show significant 
progress, scepticism grew and the idea of a demilitarised zone lost any political 
feasibility.131  
 
The protests were organised by several ad-hoc organisations led by Asocipaz (or 
‘Civil Association for Peace in Colombia’) and No al Despeje (‘not to the 
withdrawal’ of government troops). Behind Asocipaz and, more generally, behind 
the anti-despeje movement, there was a broad array of local actors and groups such 
as politicians, local officials, merchants, agro-industrialists, cattle ranchers, drug-
traffickers and business organisations (Gutierrez 2004b). While some were just 
afraid of the reprisals that could follow if guerrillas regained control over the region, 
others were content with the new order imposed by the paramilitaries. Coca growers, 
coca pickers (raspachines), drug-traffickers and, in general, everyone involved in the 
coca economy, were uneasy about the media attention that a demilitarised zone could 
                                                
131 The Pastrana administration suspended FARC’s demilitarised zone in February 2002. Alvaro 
Uribe, a fierce critic of the demilitarised zone, won the presidential election three months later. 
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bring and the possibility that the insurgency might had to engage in a serious 
programme to eradicate coca crops in the area within a reasonable period.132  
 
Beyond the potential immediate consequences, they were also afraid of the 
agreements that could be reached in a negotiation, as the ELN had expressed their 
interest in turning south Bolivar into a special zone where they could put to test their 
ideology. This could involve experiments like an agrarian reform, which could 
imperil the existing distribution of property rights. In addition to the local concerns, 
agro-industrialists and cattle-ranchers in the neighbouring departments of Cesar and 
Santander were afraid of the impact of a demilitarised zone and feared a new wave 
of extortions and kidnappings. They joined the anti-despeje campaign and made 
public their views. Similarly, sympathetic politicians from Antioquia, Santander, 
Cesar and Norte de Santander created their own anti-despeje movement. 
 
As in the case of the peasant marches, these demonstrations were followed by 
rumours of manipulation by armed organisations—in this case, by paramilitaries. 
Indeed, Castaño claimed to be the promoter of the protests occurred in 2000 
(Aranguren 2001: 317-347). Reportedly, they put pressure on the population to 
participate in the anti-despeje demonstrations although, by then, they had managed 
to build ‘wide social support’ (Gutierrez 2004b: 38). Moreover, they apparently 
resisted several calls made by the government to withdraw their troops from the zone 
but these claims have not been confirmed (Aranguren 2001: 317-347).  
 
At any rate, this episode shows how paramilitaries, social organisations and regional 
elites acted together and forced the government to shelve a decision that threatened 
their political and economic interests and their standing in the region. Thanks to the 
massive demonstrations, local authorities and the ad-hoc organisations mentioned 
above raised their profile and were recognised by the national government as 
representatives of the population, taking back a role that peasant organisations, 
sidelined by the evolution of armed conflict, had assumed in the past years. While 
they did not sanction the atrocities committed by the paramilitaries, they legitimised 
their presence in the region. In 2002, one of the leaders of the movement, Carlos 
                                                
132 The FARC, for instance, offered to eradicate coca crops in the demilitarised zone of Caguan in 
collaboration with international donors (Uribe and Ferro 2002: 74). 
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Clavijo, was elected senator, backed by the paramilitary organisation Bloque Central 
Bolivar (Valencia 2007: 15). 
 
 
6.5. Discussion 
 
As seen in previous chapters, civilians were sometimes caught in the crossfire and, 
more often, deliberately targeted by armed organisations who harassed them, killed 
them or forced them to leave their homes to gain military advantage. But there was 
more to their role than being victims, as this chapter shows. Local politicians and 
peasant organisations engaged in dialogue and negotiations with insurgents and 
paramilitaries and co-operated in ways that enabled them, both, to better position 
themselves in the local, and even national, political arenas. The chapter therefore 
supports the notion that civilians, on the one hand, and armed organisations and the 
state, on the other, engage in ‘alliances’, as Kalyvas (2003) suggested.  
 
One of main virtues of the notion of alliance is that it provides a rational basis for 
civilian collaboration. Most contributions to the study of irregular wars have 
emphasised ideological sympathy as the basis of collaboration; according to this 
views, civilian support relies on a vague hope that eventual political change would 
bring rewards for everyone. The notion of alliance (Kalyvas 2003) sheds new light 
on this matter by making collaboration part of a transaction in which a variety of 
possible resources, not necessarily material or economic, are exchanged between 
civilians and armed organisations. In this way, alliances make possible alignments 
between national and local interests and, by the same token, connect social conflicts 
which would otherwise develop independently. This is, precisely, another important 
virtue. 
 
The notion of alliance is well suited to describe the relation between social and 
armed organisations in south Bolivar as it highlights the interests of the parties. 
Insurgents and paramilitaries engaged in alliances with civilians in an effort to 
expand and consolidate their territorial control and, crucially, to gain legitimacy vis-
à-vis supra-local actors, including the national government. Thanks to massive social 
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mobilisation, social organisations gained visibility and legitimacy as representatives 
of their constituencies to a degree that would not have been possible without the 
pressure exerted by armed organisations on the population. 
 
However, by contrast with the alliances described by Kalyvas in the Argolid (2006), 
characterised by the opportunistic behaviour of civilians, and materialised in 
‘malicious denunciation’, alliances in south Bolivar went well beyond the sphere of 
the individual, atomised interests of civilians. The peasant marches and the anti-
despeje movement, in particular, led to the articulation of interests of a variety of 
local actors and manifested in the episodes of social and political mobilisation 
described in this chapter. An excessive emphasis on opportunistic alliances as the 
crucial relationship between armed organisations and civilians, risks overlooking the 
fact that even amid conflict, local actors ‘continue to engage in routine, if still 
contentious, forms of politics’ (Tarrow 2007: 592) 
 
Indeed, even without reference to the evidence, claims about the pervasiveness of 
malicious denunciation and, consequently, about its prevalence as a form of 
relationship between armed organisations and civilians seem misplaced, first because 
they would effectively make selective violence ineffective and second because they 
would require that armed organisations were unable or unwilling to check the 
accuracy of the malicious accusations they get. What is more, they are not actually 
alliances as they do not involve any sort of agreement between the parties (armed 
organisations kill to punish collaborators, not to honour a deal or please those who 
accuse) and the benefits accrued to one of them (civilians) are conditional, precisely, 
on his betrayal of their role as informers. 
 
Regarding the second aspect of the debate—the convergence between crime and 
warfare and its effects on the relation between armed organisations and civilians—
the chapter shows that the involvement of armed organisations in criminal activities 
does not necessarily mean that they are less willing or able to engage in politics, co-
operate with politicians, local governments, political parties and social organisations, 
and engage in talks, negotiations and deals with them and even with the national 
government and foreign agencies.  
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While the production and trade of coca and coca paste provided armed organisations 
with financial resources, it also created political opportunities for them. Insofar as 
coca involves thousands of peasants and provides a substantial share of the 
agricultural income in the region, it demands a regulatory framework that cannot be 
provided by the state, creating opportunities for armed organisations to jump in and 
fill the void, providing and enforcing that framework. Furthermore, as the trade in 
cocaine sits at the top of the national political agenda by virtue of the ‘war on drugs’, 
controlling coca-cultivated areas turned out to be a useful card in a political 
negotiation with the national government or international donors.133 
 
In the case of the paramilitaries, it may seem that the actual purpose of their 
campaign in south Bolivar was taking over the regional coca paste market and that, 
after all, they were merely acting as a large-scale criminal organisation. However, 
controlling such market did not entail a use of violence in the scale they did. 
Reorganising the market required the ability to control the main points of access to 
the region and use violence and coercion but it did not entail a direct control over the 
cultivation areas, the crops or the peasants. Moreover, there is little correlation 
between the scale of the crops and the intensity of violence at the municipal level. 
Santa Rosa, for instance, where paramilitary violence against civilians (civilians 
killed, forced displacement) was relatively moderate, had the largest coca-cultivated 
area in the region. Yondo, by contrast, with about an eighth of that area, had three 
times more forced displacement and eleven times more civilians killed.  
 
What the evidence suggests is that paramilitary violence was more intense in 
municipios with higher levels of insurgent activity. It was aimed to weaken the 
insurgents’ social base thus reducing the risks for companies, merchants, 
agriculturalists and cattle ranchers in the region and defusing a threat to the 
government’s authority, making possible the peaceful running of local elections and 
reducing the chances of terrorist operations such as the kidnapping of a domestic 
flight in 1999. Thus, paradoxically, they were violent precisely because they were 
more than just criminals, and it was their criminal nature that made them most 
valuable in crushing the insurgency.  
                                                
133 As noted above, the ELN offered to eradicate coca crops in the demilitarised zone. 
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6.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter lends support to the notion that, in contexts of irregular war, civilians 
and armed organisations may co-operate and provide support to each other, in ways 
that are beneficial to the interests and needs of the former and to the political and 
territorial ambitions of the latter. In south Bolivar, those ‘alliances’ involved peasant 
organisations, local elites and armed organisations and were shaped in response to 
the challenges and opportunities created by the changing patterns of territorial 
control and military advantage and by policy changes in the national political arena. 
The chapter shows that the involvement of armed organisations in criminal activities, 
such as the drug business, does not make them less willing or able to engage in deals 
with politicians, political parties and social organisations. It also shows that despite 
the increasing convergence between armed conflict and organised crime, the political 
dimensions of the Colombian conflict during the late 1900s and early 2000s should 
not be underestimated. Hence, rather than a privatisation of political violence, 
alliances in south Bolivar led to a re-politicisation of a struggle that sometimes 
seemed to be self-serving at best, or plainly criminal at worst. 
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7. VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS AND THE NATURE OF  
ARMED CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE MAGDALENA VALLEY 
 
 
 
During the last decade there has been intense controversy over the nature of 
contemporary armed conflicts and their connexion with ethnicity, crime and natural 
resources. The influence of neoclassical economics on how insurrections and civil 
wars are modelled has led scholars to focus on issues of financial feasibility and 
individual profit over the political projects and social roots of conflicts (Cramer 
2002). Indeed, many recent armed conflicts seem to be permeated by a criminal 
ethos and driven by the personal appetites of politicians, warlords and combatants, 
attracted by the opportunities of power and enrichment that conflict and disorder 
create. Armed organisations no longer seem interested in defeating their enemies and 
predatory behaviour towards civilians is widespread, either as a result of the 
generalised misconduct of combatants or as a planned strategy of economic 
exploitation, exclusion or elimination (Kaldor 1999). Even civilians, usually seen as 
fearful victims, are said to be instrumental in producing violence against their 
fellows for their own benefit or as a way to settle personal disputes (Kalyvas 2006).  
 
In sum, both the theory and the facts seem to point towards a new form of war in 
which individual interests thrive, collective action collapses and only authoritarian or 
exclusionary political projects succeed. And whereas organised crime and war-
making may have inadvertently contributed to the formation of centralised states in 
Europe (Tilly 1985), the amalgamation of crime and conflict seen in recent times 
appears to be weakening states across the developing world and contributing to the 
spread of terrorism and insecurity at a global scale.  
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In this context, the post-Cold War Colombian armed conflict is often offered as a 
typical example of how private and criminal motives end up being the key factors 
behind the continuation of armed conflict and the abuses against the population. 
While Colombian armed organisations have not relied on identity politics, that is, on 
political mobilisation ‘around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose of 
claiming state power’ (Kaldor 1999: 76), they are often mentioned as a typical 
example of the convergence between crime and warfare. For instance, Laqueur 
claimed that Colombian insurgencies spent less than ten per cent of their income in 
sustaining the war and ‘have become capitalists, collectively and, in some cases, 
individually’ (1999: 213). The involvement of insurgents in the coca economy and 
of drug bosses in paramilitary organisations led some observers to characterise the 
conflict as a ‘war of lumpen elements’ (UNDP 2003: 93) or a clash between 
‘brigands’ and ‘mercenaries’ (Mueller 2003: 509). Moreover, it has been argued, 
‘traditional revolutionary movements […] have turned more violent as a result of the 
drug trade’ (Bibes 2001: 244). 
 
This chapter highlights the limits of this emerging approach to our understanding of 
the Colombian conflict and, more generally, of contemporary irregular wars. It is 
based on findings presented in previous chapters and on new results obtained by 
analysing the distribution of different forms of violence in the Middle Magdalena 
Valley. While the region is not representative of the entire country, armed conflict in 
the Middle Magdalena Valley shared some typical features with other Colombian 
regions in the 1990s: the most important non-state armed organisations in the 
country at the time (the FARC, the ELN and the BCB) were present. Indeed, the 
ELN and pioneering paramilitary organisations such as the MAS were born in this 
region. Moreover, the production of coca and cocaine, which had a decisive 
influence on the evolution of armed conflict since the 1980s, was a vital element in 
the local economies of several municipios. And, as seen in Ch. 4, the region saw a 
fair share of violence against civilians. 
 
The chapter starts by presenting new empirical findings based on a simplified 
version of the five-zone analytical model of territorial control employed in Ch. 5; 
rather than tackling new issues, these findings confirm some of the conclusions 
reached in previous chapters and are the basis for the discussion that follows. The 
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second part goes through the key concepts and findings tackled in the dissertation, 
discusses its methodological implications and brings it to its conclusion. 
 
 
 
7.1 Zones of control and the rationales for violence  
 
Back in Ch. 4, the analysis of the spatial patterns of violence, armed conflict and 
economic activity in the Middle Magdalena Valley was used as a basis to make 
inferences about the aims of armed organisations in attacking civilians. Despite the 
limitations of the data and the ambiguity of some results, the regressions consistently 
showed that violence was more intense in the more contested areas (i.e. those with 
more hostilities) and also in areas where either faction’s enemy had a recent track of 
activity. These results were interpreted as a sign that violence was aimed by the 
factions to increase or maintain territorial control. Ch. 5 and 6 examined in closer 
detail two cases that, together, accounted for nearly a 60 per cent of the regional 
civilian death toll finding, again, evidence in favour of the notion that armed 
organisations used violence to achieve territorial control but also political control 
over the region.  
 
Altogether, this evidence reinforced our view that the behaviour of armed 
organisations vis-à-vis civilians in the Middle Magdalena Valley during these years 
resembled a ‘classical’ irregular war rather than a pseudo war. Perhaps more 
interesting, Ch. 5 showed how a detailed look at the distribution of violence across 
zones of territorial control in Barrancabermeja could provide significant clues about 
the aims and strategies of armed organisations in relation to civilians. This section 
extends the analysis to the whole region using a simplified methodology (see below) 
and focusing on three specific forms of violence. 
 
To identify these zones, the entire valley is divided in 86 areas: 43 towns 
(‘cabeceras’) and their 43 rural hinterlands (or ‘resto’ in the country’s statistical 
argot).134 These areas are sorted into five different zones of control depending on the 
                                                
134 This distinction seems appropriate considering the patterns of territorial control in the Middle 
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presence/absence of either actor, their level of activity and the frequency of 
hostilities (see Table 7.1). Compared to the technique used in Ch. 5, this version is 
simpler in that it follows a yearly periodisation, rather than one based on a timeline 
of significant periods and events. As in Ch. 5, these areas were assigned to different 
zones of control following quantitative criteria and assuming the conflict was 
bipolar. While using quantitative criteria does not guarantee accuracy, at least it 
provides a consistent way to categorise all the areas using a standard procedure that 
maximises the use of the information available. It is worth noting that these zones of 
control are dynamic, that is, the municipios allocated to each zone changes from one 
year to the next.135 
 
 
Table 7.1. Zones of control and operational criteria 
Zone Definition Operational criteria 
z1 Fully controlled by incumbents (see note). Insurgents absent. 
z2 Contested and nearly controlled by 
incumbents. 
Sporadic hostilities, insurgent activity low 
relative to the incumbents. 
z3 Highly contested. Frequent hostilities. 
z4 Contested and nearly controlled by 
insurgents. 
Sporadic hostilities, insurgent activity high 
relative to incumbents. 
z5 Fully controlled by insurgents. Incumbents absent, insurgents present. 
Note: Incumbents include government forces and paramilitaries. 
 
 
The resulting distribution of combatants killed in action follows the expected 
patterns, with more than half of the deaths occurring in zone of control z3. The 
distribution of municipios also reflects the asymmetric nature of guerrilla warfare: on 
the one hand, the number of areas controlled or nearly controlled by insurgents never 
surpassed eight (out of 86); on the other hand, the number of towns fully controlled 
by government forces or paramilitaries never fell below 32 (in 1998) and was always 
close to 40 (out of 43).  
 
7.1.1 Violence as a means for territorial control 
                                                                                                                                     
Magdalena Valley, where guerrillas usually roamed confidently in rural areas and only ventured 
occasionally into the towns.  
135 The level of activity measures the number of events in which each actor was involved, excluding 
killings and kidnappings, as these are the dependent variables. The thresholds used to establish 
whether hostilities were frequent were: over one per year in towns and over two per year in rural 
areas. Unlike the categorisation used in Chapter 5, some areas were assigned to zone of control z5, 
that is, fully controlled by insurgents. 
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Table 7.2 shows the number of conflict-related civilian deaths by zone of control and 
perpetrator. Each cell contains three figures: the first is the absolute number of 
deaths; the second is the percentage of killings committed by the state and armed 
organisations within each zone of control; and the third is the ratio of killings to 
population (100,000) per year. The third figure accounts for the different size of the 
zones of control in terms of population and was calculated just as a regular homicide 
rate, making comparisons across zones (or even with other conflicts) possible. 
 
 
Table 7.2. Civilian killings by organisation and zone of control in The Middle Magdalena 
Valley, 1996-2004 
Zones of control z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 Total 
 
Paramilitaries 
223 
32.5 
3.7 
191 
27.7 
13.1 
272 
39.6 
17.2 
1 
0.3 
0.2 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
687 
100.0 
7.1 
 
Government 
2 
10.0 
0.0 
7 
35.0 
0.5 
5 
25.0 
0.3 
6 
30.0 
1.4 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
20 
100.0 
0.2 
 
Guerrillas 
23 
17.6 
0.4 
30 
21.4 
2.1 
48 
35.9 
3.0 
24 
20.6 
5.7 
6 
4.6 
2.2 
131 
100.0 
1.4 
 
Total 
405 
23.7 
6.8 
444 
25.5 
30.6 
784 
45.6 
49.7 
55 
3.9 
13.2 
23 
1.3 
8.5 
1711 
100.0 
17.7 
Source: Based on VNN dataset. 
Notes: The totals shown in this table (bottom row) also include killings by 
unidentified organisations. They are slightly lower than those presented in Ch. 4 
because the location (town or rural) of some events was unclear or unknown and, 
therefore, they could not be allocated to any zone of control. 
 
 
Table 7.2 shows how lethal violence against civilians was more intense in contested 
zones (z2 to z4) and particularly intense in highly contested zones (z3). While 
paramilitaries used violence mostly in highly contested zones (z3), insurgents did it 
in zones they nearly controlled (z4).136 These patterns do not fit the expected 
distribution of pseudo-wars, in which violence against civilians tends to go hand in 
hand with few hostilities (thus leading to the typical high ratios of civilian to 
combatant deaths). 
 
Overall, the evidence confirms two of Kalyvas’s hypotheses: first, that ‘higher the 
                                                
136 Let us remember that, according to the operational definition given above, in fully controlled zones 
either opponent is unable to attack or confront the ruler in open hostilities but does not preclude 
attacks against civilians.  
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level of an actor’s control, the less likely it is that this actor will resort to violence’ 
and, second, that ‘violence will be exercised primarily by the political actor enjoying 
an advantage in terms of control: incumbents in zone 2 and insurgents in zone 4’ 
(2006: 204). However, it is worth noting that paramilitaries, killed nearly a third of 
all their victims in zones controlled by them or the government. Although these 
figures seem negligible in relation to the population size of the zones of control they 
suggest that killings were used for purposes other than territorial control. Political 
control, in particular, was paramount, as the following section shows. 
 
 
7.1.2 Violence for political control followed territorial control 
 
Table 7.3 shows the distribution of killings of politicians and members of social 
organisations in The Middle Magdalena Valley. In relative terms, the figures are low 
when the population size is considered: 1.5 victims per 100,000 inhabitants per year, 
with highly contested zones experiencing the highest rate. However, since politicians 
and local leaders are usually just a small fraction of a society, this figure may not be 
as meaningful as it seems. From the armed organisations’ perspective, things look 
different: it was precisely in zones they fully controlled where they killed more 
victims from these groups as a proportion of their total number of victims. 
Approximately one sixth of the victims they killed in those zones were politicians 
and local leaders—that is more than in any other zone. 
 
However, the most notorious example of violence being used for political purposes 
was the kidnapping of politicians, particularly by insurgents. Table 7.4 shows the 
number of victims of political kidnappings, as categorised by Fondelibertad, the 
government’s body in charge of monitoring these crimes. About a quarter of the 
victims held by these organisations were kidnapped for political motives. In absolute 
terms, most insurgent political kidnappings occurred in zones fully controlled by 
government forces. However, in relative terms, they focused in contested zones 
where they were dominant (z4), where, on average, nearly ten civilians were 
kidnapped every year. It was also in these zones where political kidnappings, as a 
proportion of all their abductions, reached the highest level (33.1 per cent). Most of 
these kidnappings occurred in south Bolivar and Yondo, during the electoral 
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sabotage of 1997 (see Ch. 6). 
 
 
Table 7.3. Killings of politicians and members of civil society organisations  
by armed organisation and zone of control in The Middle Magdalena Valley, 1996-2004 
Zones of control z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 Total 
 
Paramilitaries 
40 
17.9 
0.7 
14 
7.3 
1.0 
29 
10.7 
1.8 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
83 
12.1 
0.9 
 
Government 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
1 
16.7 
0.2 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
1 
5.0 
0.0 
 
Guerrillas 
1 
4.3 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
1 
2.1 
0.1 
1 
4.2 
0.2 
1 
16.7 
0.4 
4 
3.1 
0.0 
 
Total 
69 
17.0 
1.2 
21 
4.7 
1.4 
47 
6.0 
3.0 
5 
9.1 
1.2 
2575 
21.7 
1.8 
147 
8.6 
1.5 
Notes: The first figure within each cell is the absolute number of victims. The 
second represents their share in the total number of civilian killings by organisation 
and zone (for instance, 17.9 per cent of the paramilitary victims in zone of control z1 
were politicians or members of civil society organisations). The third shows the 
magnitude of these crimes relative to the population size, i.e., the number of victims 
per 100,000 inhabitants per year. Based on VNN dataset. 
 
These results suggest that once armed organisations achieved or were close to 
achieve territorial control over a given area, they continued using violence to control 
local authorities, leaders and organisations. The importance of political control in the 
context of irregular war is discussed below, in section 7.3. 
 
Table 7.4. Political kidnappings by organisation  
and zone of control in The Middle Magdalena Valley, 1996-2004 
Zones of control z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 Total 
 
Paramilitaries 
7 
50.0 
0.1 
1 
25.0 
0.1 
1 
12.5 
0.1 
1 
100.0 
0.2 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
10 
34.5 
0.1 
 
Guerrillas 
49 
23.2 
0.8 
38 
28.1 
2.6 
23 
15.3 
1.5 
43 
33.1 
9.6 
3 
8.3 
1.1 
156 
23.6 
1.6 
 
Total 
56 
24.9 
0.9 
39 
28.1 
2.7 
24 
15.2 
1.5 
44 
33.6 
9.9 
3 
7.9 
1.1 
166 
24.0 
1.7 
Notes: The first figure within each cell is the absolute number of victims. The 
second represents their share in the total number of kidnappings by organisation 
and zone (for instance, 50.0 per cent of the paramilitary victims in zone of control 
z1 were classified by Fondelibertad as political). The third shows the magnitude of 
these crimes relative to the population size, i.e., the number of victims per 100,000 
inhabitants per year. Based on: Fondelibertad dataset. 
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7.1.3 Ransom kidnappings lacked a political rationale 
 
Although ransom kidnapping has, by definition, an economic motive, it may play a 
role in the strategies of politically motivated insurgent movements. For instance, 
funds gathered from the ransoms paid by the victims may be used to buy weaponry 
or maintain troops on the field; but given the lack of information on the internal 
finances of insurgent groups it is impossible to check if this was the case. However, 
Naylor’s (2004) theory on the finances of guerrilla movements offers a viable path 
of enquiry and, as this section shows, indicates that the distribution of ransom 
kidnappings across zones of control was at odds with the expected behaviour of an 
insurgency interested in consolidating political control. 
 
Naylor’s hypothesis is based on the idea that even an insurgency genuinely 
motivated by ideological motives and exclusively interested in prompting political 
change, may resort to forms of violence commonly associated with petty crime, from 
looting to extortion. The difference with petty criminals, he argued, is that insurgents 
would employ these means in a politically sensible way and taking into account their 
‘broader relationship to society and its relative strength vis-à-vis the enforcement 
arm of the state’ (2004: 53). More specifically, he predicted that in areas controlled 
by the government insurgents would use kidnappings and other typically criminal 
forms of fund-raising (e.g. bank robbery). As insurgent control increased, fund 
raising would become more predictable and less based on coercion. At the other end 
of the spectrum, in insurgent-controlled areas, the rebels would impose regular, 
predictable forms of collection, similar to those used by the state.137  
 
In the case of ransom kidnappings this hypothesis has two alternative observable 
implications. If insurgents had a long-term interest in consolidating control, 
establishing authority and gaining popular support in ‘liberated’ areas, they would 
have to carry out their kidnappings elsewhere, in areas controlled by the government, 
just as the author predicted. By contrast, if insurgents only had a short-term 
economic interest, i.e., if they wanted to get as much resources as possible in the 
                                                
137 Naylor’s hypothesis echoes Olson’s distinction between roving and stationary bandits, but it does 
not seem to be inspired by, or based on, Olson’s work. In fact, Naylor’s theory was first published in 
1993—the same year as Olson’s article on stationary bandits (Naylor 1993; Olson 1993). 
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shortest time and at the lowest risk, with little concern for their acceptance among 
the population, they would probably concentrate ransom kidnappings in areas they 
controlled, and would not dare into areas held by government forces. The test that 
follows is based on these two scenarios.  
 
Table 7.5 shows the distribution of ransom kidnappings by organisation and zone of 
control. At first sight, it matches the distribution predicted by Naylor, as less than a 
quarter of their ransom kidnappings took place in areas they controlled or nearly 
controlled (z4 and z5) and nearly a third took place in areas fully controlled by the 
government. However, when the population size of these zones of control is taken 
into account, it turns out that the rates of kidnapping per 100,000 inhabitants are 
significantly higher in zones controlled or nearly controlled by insurgents (see Table 
7.5, figures in boldface). 138 
 
 
Table 7.5. Ransom kidnappings by organisation  
and zone of control in The Middle Magdalena Valley, 1996-2004 
Zones of control z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 Total 
 
Paramilitaries 
7 
50.0 
0.1 
3 
75.0 
0.2 
7 
87.5 
0.5 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
2 
100.0 
0.7 
19 
65.5 
0.2 
 
Guerrillas 
162 
76.8 
2.7 
97 
71.9 
6.7 
127 
84.7 
8.2 
87 
66.9 
19.5 
33 
91.7 
12.2 
506 
76.4 
5.2 
 
Total 
169 
75.1 
2.8 
100 
71.9 
6.9 
134 
84.8 
8.6 
87 
66.4 
19.5 
35 
92.1 
12.9 
525 
76.0 
5.4 
Notes: The first figure within each cell is the absolute number of victims; the 
second represents the proportion of ransom kidnappings by zone; and the third 
shows the magnitude of these crimes relative to the population size, i.e., the 
number of victims per 100,000 inhabitants per year. Based on: Fondelibertad 
dataset. 
 
 
Discounting doubts about the validity of the data and the test itself, these results 
suggest that insurgent ransom kidnappings lacked a political rationale. In particular, 
by targeting civilians in zones they controlled, insurgents may have undermined their 
own attempts to consolidate territorial and political control on those zones. This 
inconsistent behaviour is hard to explain without exploring the inner life of insurgent 
                                                
138 As for the paramilitaries, the distribution runs in symmetric to that of the insurgents, with most 
kidnappings in areas where they were more comfortable, and therefore it also suggests an interest in 
economic resources themselves rather than on territorial and political control. However, the number 
of victims is too small to draw any significant conclusion. 
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organisations and, in particular, issues of decision-making such as the scale and 
targets of kidnappings and the way funds gathered through kidnapping were 
distributed among different units. For instance, units (‘frentes’) or commanders 
within the same organisation may have had different objectives and therefore behave 
with different rationales.  
 
 
7.2 Violence and irregular wars—concepts, evidence and implications 
 
This part discusses the key concepts involved in understanding the rationale for 
violence in irregular wars as well as the implications of the empirical findings 
presented in this and previous chapters regarding the place that violence had in the 
strategies of armed organisations.  
 
 
7.2.1 Territorial control—the main determinant of violence 
 
Territorial control is the degree to which the state or an armed organisation 
monopolises the use of the force within a given territory. It depends on their ability 
to prevent (or successfully respond to) military challenges posed by any challengers. 
It can be achieved by capturing, securing and policing positions, as conventional 
armies do, or by exploiting the inability of a conventional army or police force to 
patrol every corner of a territory, as guerrillas do. 
 
Territorial control is essential, by definition, in armed conflicts over territorial 
autonomy but it is also critical in conflicts over government as it enables the factions 
to access resources, protect more effectively their bases and headquarters and, 
eventually, launch decisive attacks against their enemies. Territorial control is 
particularly valuable for insurgents, as it allows them to establish a parallel 
administration and to operate as a state, eventually enabling them to acquire 
international support from other states. If territorial control is necessary to fight and 
win a war, it is just as crucial when a peaceful resolution is at sight, as it signals the 
relative strength of the factions, thus influencing the final outcome of a negotiation. 
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Territorial control is often achieved by using violence against those individuals and 
communities that, willingly or not, support the operation of either faction or to 
extract rents required to fund the military struggle. Civilians provide support to 
armed organisations in a range of ways, and sometimes unknowingly. While some 
forms of collaboration demand an active involvement in political and military tasks, 
the mere presence of civilians in an area might be of use to an irregular force. Trade, 
travelling and, in general, the day-to-day activities of any community provide a 
cover for insurgents and enable them to obtain goods or to move around disguised as 
civilians. Likewise, economic activity enables insurgents to extract rents in a variety 
of ways, from random looting to regular protection fees. Because of this, the 
elimination of individual collaborators—but also of entire communities—can be 
instrumental to the achievement of territorial control, depending on the extent to 
which the opposite force relies on them. Thus, achieving territorial control involves 
the use of organised force not only against enemy forces but also against civilians 
who are instrumental to their operation. 
 
The quantitative analysis carried out in Ch. 4 showed that the intensity of armed 
conflict, as measured by the number of hostilities, was the most consistent predictor 
of the magnitude of lethal violence against civilians across the region. Likewise, 
both insurgents and paramilitaries were more likely to attack civilians in municipios 
where their enemies had been more active in the past. These findings suggest that 
killings were aimed to increase territorial control. Likewise, some kidnappings were 
aimed to increase territorial control, such as the capture of a domestic flight by ELN 
insurgents in April 1999, when they demanded the demilitarisation of a village 
recently occupied by paramilitaries as a condition to release the hostages. Finally, 
although the data on forced displacement does not allow a rigorous analysis of the 
specific motives behind the households’ decisions to flee their homes, the N&N 
reports contain plenty of examples of threats and continued harassment towards 
communities by armed organisations in contested areas where the presence of 
civilians, collaborators or not, was functional to the operation of guerrillas.  
 
Even in Barrancabermeja, where the ratio of civilian to combatant deaths was well 
above 1:1, indicative of a ‘new war’ scenario, a close look at the distribution of 
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civilian deaths across zones of control shows that violence was used to increase 
territorial and political control, rather than to strip civilians of their assets or expel 
them on the basis of their identity (see Ch. 5).  
 
 
7.2.2 All politics is local—even in wartime 
 
While political control is a long-term goal of the parties engaged in armed conflict, it 
is equally important in the course of the conflict itself as it enables armed 
organisations to redirect resources or mobilise the population in line with their 
political and military strategies. Political control can be defined as the ability of 
armed organisations to influence, steer or take over local decision-making processes 
and mechanisms. While in fully controlled areas either armed organisation may 
become the sole form of authority, in disputed zones civilian allegiance is still up for 
grabs and armed organisations must compete for it. Achieving political control often 
involves coercion and violence against civilians but armed organisations also resort 
to other forms of political action, e.g. propaganda and ideological mentoring. They 
can also engage in coalitions and alliances with individuals, groups, parties or social 
organisations, which are less based on ideological persuasion or long-term 
expectations (i.e. post-conflict) than on the opportunities, risks and needs faced by 
the parties in the short-term. Thus, even amid armed conflict, local polities remain 
alive and may become crucial arenas of the larger confrontation. 
 
By controlling local authorities in the Middle Magdalena Valley, armed 
organisations were able to channel local public expenditure towards projects, areas 
and communities of their interest, rewarding collaboration and strengthening social 
support. Moreover, through their influence in social and political mobilisation, they 
put pressure on the national government to adopt or abort measures that could affect 
their political and military stance. As shown in Ch. 6, both insurgents and 
paramilitaries developed alliances with local organisations with a view to strengthen 
their political position in the national arena in the context of the peace and 
demobilisation processes launched by presidents Pastrana (with guerrillas) and Uribe 
(with paramilitaries). The following two sections show how armed organisations 
relied on violence against civilians and alliances with social organisations and elites 
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to increase political control. 
 
 
Political control through violence  
 
Armed organisations used violence and coercion against civilians in the Middle 
Magdalena Valley to increase political control, that is, to influence or steer collective 
action and decision-making processes by local authorities, social organisations and 
communities. The use of coercion and violence to achieve political control is evident 
in the harassment and kidnapping of local leaders and politicians. Politicians, 
journalists and leaders of social organisations were the main targets of this sort of 
violence. In Barrancabermeja, for instance, the anchor of a radio news programme 
was killed in April 2003 after he expressed critical views on the paramilitary 
presence of the city (Vanguardia 16 August 2003). Other three journalists were 
threatened by paramilitaries during the second half of 2003; one of them was forced 
to leave the city, another was detained and tortured (CINEP 2004: 133-4). Likewise, 
leaders of Organizacion Femenina Popular (People’s Women’s Organisation) were 
harassed and threatened by paramilitaries in several occasions; this organisation is 
well known in the city for their critical views of the government as well as for their 
work in providing affordable housing to women. According to one of their leaders, 
rather than forcing the closure of this NGO, paramilitaries wanted to co-opt it and, in 
fact, they tried to ‘seduce’ them with offers of funding; when these approaches failed 
they threatened their leaders and tried to occupy their building (‘Casa de la Mujer’) 
using the force  (I-14). 
 
Although labour unions in Colombia have diverse political leanings, some of them 
have been seen as particularly close to the insurgency. For instance, Castaño once 
claimed that members of the ELN had direct influence on the running of several 
labour unions (Aranguren 2001:139). Echoing that view, ‘Julian’, one the BCB 
commanders, explained in an interview that the USO had been ‘infiltrated’ by the 
National Liberation Army for a long time (Aranguren 2001: 312). And ‘Alex’, 
another paramilitary commander asked those members of the USO who still had 
links with the insurgency to ‘leave them behind and become impartial’ (Vanguardia 
8 July 2002). Besides the USO, members of other labour unions in sectors such as 
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oil and mining, agriculture, health, education, in both the private and public sectors, 
were also targeted by the paramilitaries. 
 
Attacks against members of grassroots organisations probably had a wider range of 
motives but many were aimed to achieve political control. Juntas de accion 
communal, in particular, are the most basic form of collective action and political 
organisation in Colombia and one of the main points of contact between parties, the 
state and the poor, especially concerning the provision of public goods, and have 
become key arenas of competition between political parties and, not surprisingly, 
between the state and the insurgency. Juntas, for instance, were crucial pieces in the 
machinery that made possible the peasant marches of 1996 and 1998 (I-6, I-12). 
  
But, as noted above, political control does not always involve violence. It may be 
achieved through persuasion, negotiation and political deals and alliances with 
civilians, thus helping politicians, local leaders and social organisations to strengthen 
their position in the local political arena. 
 
 
Alliances, private interests and collaboration 
 
Achieving political control does not necessarily entail the use of force. Indeed, 
insurgency and counterinsurgency doctrines usually advocate a friendly approach 
towards the population, aimed to win their ‘hearts and minds’, that is, to obtain their 
allegiance through good deeds and propaganda (as seen in Ch. 1). More realistically, 
it has been suggested that armed organisations can engage in alliances with civilians, 
that enable them both to further their interests. In the Middle Magdalena Valley, 
such alliances enabled armed organisations to increase political control and gain 
influence over local polities and promote large-scale social mobilisation and 
collective claim-making on issues that concerned their ability to control the territory, 
such as the eventual demilitarisation of south Bolivar. Armed organisations also 
supported social mobilisation in connection with broader issues and claims, 
connected indirectly with territorial control, such as the provision of infrastructure 
and services to the population and the eradication of coca crops, as was the case of 
the insurgency during the peasant demonstrations of 1996 and 1998. 
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Rather than a result of an innate communion of interests between armed 
organisations and civilians, alliances in south Bolivar emerged in response to actual 
or potential changes in the patterns of territorial and political control. They allowed 
social and armed organisations to advance their agendas, raise their visibility and 
gain legitimacy in the political arena. Political entrepreneurs played a pivotal role in 
aggregating the demands of specific social groups and in articulating them with the 
strategic needs of armed organisations, translating them into claims and voicing 
them up in the public sphere. For instance, while the ‘development plan’ put forward 
by peasant organisations in 1999 demanded better infrastructure and social services 
in south Bolivar, it also proposed institutional changes that would enable the 
insurgency to consolidate their control over local authorities.  
 
Similarly, the anti-despeje movement embodied the interests of paramilitary groups 
and a variety of local actors who saw in a ‘demilitarised’ zone a threat to their assets, 
income and local power. In doing so, political entrepreneurs, politicians, local 
leaders and heads of social organisations raised their profile and legitimacy vis-à-vis 
the national government, armed organisations and their own constituencies. This is 
particularly evident in the case of some of the leaders of the anti-despeje movement, 
whose political careers were boosted after the massive demonstrations in which they 
took part.  
 
The notion of alliance correctly underscores the fact that collaboration entails an 
arrangement in which even the weakest part, civilians, make a contribution (e.g. 
information, legitimacy) and try to advance their interests in the context of an 
ongoing confrontation with other armed organisation and social groups. While an 
individualistic, opportunistic version of the notion of alliance may be accurate in 
some contexts, it should not lead us to underestimate the possibility that civilians 
may get involved in ways that go beyond the sphere of their own individual, 
atomised interests. Insofar as this process may involve the aggregation of interests of 
different social groups, their articulation with the goals of armed organisations, the 
making of claims vis-à-vis the state in the public arena (e.g. in the media, in talks 
with officials) and the actual negotiation with those actors, its political nature cannot 
be neglected. Thus, as noted before, while alliances may lead to privatisation of 
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political violence, they also can also lead to the politicisation of private and even 
criminal violence. 
 
But if the pseudo-war approach put violent rent-seeking at the centre of our 
understanding of how armed organisations operate, Kalyvas’s model of collaboration 
and alliances (2006) did the same in relation to collaboration and civilian behaviour 
in the context of irregular war. To be fair, Kalyvas does not subscribe the ‘new wars’ 
hypotheses about the degradation of conflicts (2001); moreover, his original 
definition of alliances is compatible ‘with all sorts of motives ranging from the most 
ideological to the most opportunistic’ (2003: 483). But in modelling the relation 
between control, collaboration and violence, he gave a central role to the private, 
individual motives of civilians in shaping alliances and in explaining the distribution 
of violence and, more specifically, who is targeted: civilians accuse foes and local 
competitors, he claimed, even if they are not collaborators—hence the term 
‘malicious denunciation’—hoping that they will be eliminated by combatants. In this 
sense, he does for civilian collaboration what others scholars did for insurrections, 
namely, emphasising the ‘expected private returns to insurgents’ (Grossman 1991: 
912). In doing this, the model reduces the local sphere to the realm of private 
interests and equates local conflicts to personal rivalries and vendettas, missing other 
potential arrangements that may emerge between armed organisations and 
civilians—considered not only as individuals but also as members of groups, classes 
and civil organisations.  
 
The mutually reinforcing relation between alliances and violence 
 
Collaboration and violence in irregular wars tend to reinforce each other both at the 
individual and collective levels: on the one hand, collaboration provokes selective or 
indiscriminate attacks against those believed to support the enemy; on the other 
hand, those who fear being victimised by a given armed organisation, look to their 
opponents for protection and collaborate with them. In the Magdalena Middle 
Valley, individuals actively involved in alliances with either side were often 
selectively targeted. For instance, Edgar Quiroga, one of the leaders of the peasant 
mobilisations of 1996 and 1998, was kidnapped and killed by paramilitaries (Cambio 
24 January 2000, No. 344: 34); likewise, Jorge Sarmiento, member of the anti-
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despeje movement in south Bolivar, was killed in 2001, apparently by insurgents 
(N&N 20: 57).  
 
At the collective level, the peasant mobilisations and the anti-despeje movement, in 
turn, emerged in part as a reaction to paramilitary and insurgent violence, 
respectively. However, alliances and collaboration also reshaped the distribution of 
risks faced by different social groups. In Barrancabermeja, for instance, poorer 
neighbourhoods, where the insurgency was deeply rooted, were hit harder by the 
paramilitaries during the counterinsurgent operations of the late 1990s and early 
2000s. Likewise, paramilitaries attacked peasants, miners and rural dwellers in 
general more than any other social group (while paramilitaries accounted for 43.3 
per the civilian death toll, they killed 62.8 per cent of all the peasants, miners and 
fishermen killed in conflict-related events). This trend probably reflects the 
perception that many among the rural population were in fact guerrillas ‘in disguise’ 
or, at least, functional to the operation of insurgents. 
 
Although the evidence is not compelling enough, the mutually reinforcing effect of 
alliances and violence is visible when the distribution of violence by armed 
organisations against different social groups is considered. Figure 7.1 shows the 
absolute number of victims of killings and kidnappings by insurgents and 
paramilitaries during the period of study, classified according to their occupational 
status. On the one hand, rural dwellers and members of NGOS and grassroots 
organisations, who were (seen as) functional to the operation of (or willing to 
cooperate with) insurgents, were targeted mostly by paramilitaries. On the other 
hand, social groups targeted by the guerrillas, such as local politicians and merchants 
became vocal supporters of the paramilitary presence in the region and actively 
opposed proposals to demilitarise south Bolivar, as the insurgency demanded. 
 
 
At any rate, these figures underscore the relevance of social groups and classes as 
analytical categories in explaining the scale and distribution of violence against 
civilians. Rather than a challenge to the dominant empirical approaches to the 
subject, which have tended to look at civilians either as a homogeneous population 
(and therefore have focused on aggregate variables) or as a collection of 
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heterogeneous agents with fragmented, disparate interests, these social categories 
(e.g. Kalyvas 2006) may be seen as part of an intermediate layer that makes possible 
to specify causal links between micro behaviour and macro events, as advocated by 
methodological individualists (e.g. Coleman 1990). 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Occupation of victims of kidnappings and killings  
by armed organisation in the Middle Magdalena Valley, 1996-2004 
 
Insurgents Paramilitaries 
Notes: The left-hand side of the figure shows the victims of the insurgency; the right-hand side, 
victims of the paramilitaries. The occupations categorised by the author based on descriptions 
provided by the sources. Sources: Fondelibertad and VNN.  
 
 
Moreover, introducing this layer is a necessary step to unveil the relation between 
armed conflict and other, previous and ongoing, social conflicts. First, because 
armed conflict and violence, unlike earthquakes, emerge from societies themselves. 
As Keen put it, war cannot be understood as ‘an external variable, something that is 
superimposed on a society, rather than something that grows out of the political and 
economic processes at work in peacetime’ (1997: 74). And second, because armed 
conflict and violence cause more than mere death and destruction. They transform 
society in a variety of ways: reshaping institutions, relocating populations, 
reallocating assets and, in general, reshuffling the risks and opportunities that 
different social groups face. In other words, ‘war is not simply development in 
reverse’ (Cramer 2006: 282). 
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7.2.3 The limits of criminalisation 
 
By the late 1990s, armed conflict in the Middle Magdalena Valley was showing 
some typical symptoms of a pseudo-war. Private militias lacking a stable chain of 
command, just as those described by Kaldor (1999: 95), often led by drug lords, 
committed brutal abuses against civilians. And insurgent and paramilitary groups 
were involved, in one way or another, in the production and trade of coca paste and 
cocaine and other criminal enterprises such as the stealing of petrol from pipelines. 
In spite of this, this section claims that the convergence of criminal and armed 
organisations did not lead to an outright criminalisation of violence against civilians, 
that is, to a mutation in the purpose of violence from political and military aims to 
reckless rent-seeking. True, economic resources were critical for armed 
organisations to fund and expand their operations and material rewards and 
expectations surely played a role in the recruitment of combatants. But economic 
motives did not play a central role in explaining the notorious increase in the number 
of civilians killed and displaced. In particular, the struggle to control and regulate the 
coca economy did not lead to widespread violence. However, ransom kidnappings 
ran contrary to the political ambitions of the insurgency; in particular, its distribution 
across zones of territorial was at odds with the aim of consolidating political control. 
 
Crime and the true aims of paramilitary violence  
 
The case for a pseudo-war interpretation seems especially strong in the case of 
paramilitaries: first, because they had only a marginal participation in armed 
confrontations as such (as measured by the number of actual clashes they took part 
in and the insurgents they killed in action). Second, they were notoriously involved 
in the drug trade and, third, were responsible for the largest number of abuses, in 
particular killings, against the population. But the evidence shown in previous 
chapters indicates that they their excesses were not aimed to strip civilians of their 
assets or directly associated with their attempts to control the regional coca paste 
market or other illegal activities. For instance, in Barrancabermeja, homes occupied 
by paramilitaries in 2001 did not belong to particularly affluent households or had 
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significant economic potential; indeed, some were actually returned to their owners 
in 2006 (see Ch. 5). As shown in Ch. 6, they used violence and coercion to control 
local authorities and social organisations and to mobilise political support.  
 
This conclusion may come as a surprise given the scale of the coca economy and the 
involvement of armed organisations in the drug business, traditionally associated 
with gruesome vendettas and vengeful attacks. Indeed, the restrictions imposed by 
paramilitaries on the coca market after they managed to control the towns (i.e. 
forbidding transactions with ‘unlicensed’ buyers and eliminating competitions), 
entailed the use of violence against those who breached the new rules. However, 
these measures did not lead to a massive use of violence against civilians. Not only 
was widespread violence unnecessary, as peasants grew the crop voluntarily, but 
inconvenient, since harvesting requires a constant supply of labour to pick the leaves 
throughout the year.139  
 
Consistent with this reasoning, is the quantitative evidence obtained in Ch. 4, which 
shows that coca crops (municipal areas, to be precise) did not explain lethal violence 
by paramilitaries in the region. They also indicate that their actions were aimed at 
municipios and communities with a recent track of insurgent activity, presumably 
with the aim of weakening the social base needed by guerrillas to operate. In south 
Bolivar, they helped the state in holding and patrolling towns, villages and other 
positions that, in the past, had been targeted by the insurgents or used as transit 
points. In other words, if paramilitaries had been interested exclusively in taking 
control over the coca paste market, the levels of violence reached in the region 
would probably have been much lower than they actually were.  
 
What is more, if we are to believe Castaño’s claim that they used funds from the 
drug trade to fund their operations, as the protection fees paid by merchants and 
companies were insufficient (Aranguren 2001: 253), they were effectively 
subsidising the protection they provided to politicians, cattle ranchers, merchants and 
public and private companies. Hence, it was their ability to use unlawful methods of 
warfare and criminal forms of funding that made their assistance so welcome, 
                                                
139 Coca is a permanent crop; some varieties yield up to six harvests per year. 
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valuable and even urgent in the effort to push back the insurgency and enable the 
Colombian state to increase control over the region. Thus, paradoxically, they were 
violent precisely because they were more than just criminals and it was their criminal 
nature that made them most valuable in crushing the insurgency. As Naylor noted, 
‘mature criminality is compatible with the continued existence of the formal state 
and can even be employed to defend it’ (2002: 55). 
 
That said, it must be acknowledged that the counterinsurgent campaign had notable 
economic consequences for the region. While forced displacement probably 
increased poverty and hindered growth, overall, the retreat of the insurgency created 
a safer environment for businesses and for the regional economy in general, 
improving its long-term economic prospects. As noted in Ch. 5, the paramilitary 
presence in Barrancabermeja was welcomed by merchants and unleashed the 
generation of new businesses. In south Bolivar, oil palm plantations jumped from 
250 to 3,340 hectares between 2000 and 2004. In the same period, cattle stocks 
across the region grew by 15 per cent, offsetting the decline seen in the four previous 
years. In sierra San Lucas, a subsidiary of the mining company Anglo American 
launched a project to assess the magnitude of gold reserves. In Yondo, the national 
government built a bridge over the Magdalena River, connecting the town with 
Barrancabermeja as a way to promote trade between this traditionally isolated region 
and cities such as Bucaramanga. All these positive economic outcomes became a 
crucial factor in buttressing the political stance of the paramilitaries in the region as 
providers of security and helped them to obtain social and political support despite 
their ruthless methods and their involvement in the drug business. 
 
The criminalisation of the insurgency 
 
While the extent of the involvement of insurgents in the illegal drug industry is still 
unclear (Thoumi 2003), it is well known that throughout the period, guerrillas 
charged a fee on the production of coca and coca paste and policed transactions in 
local coca paste markets in south Bolivar. Just as in the case of the paramilitaries, 
enforcing this regime entailed some degree of coercion and, probably, violence 
against cultivators. But the evidence does not back the idea that this had been a 
crucial determinant of violence against civilians. Indeed, insurgents did not behave 
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as the typical organised criminals, who would rather develop friendly ties with 
enforcement officials rather than fighting them, or as the kind of organisations 
described in the pseudo-wars literature, which tend to avoid open warfare and even 
collude with their supposed enemies while attacking civilians.  
 
But there is an aspect of the insurgents’ behaviour that shows clear signs of 
criminalisation, that is, signs of a change in their priorities and strategies, from 
political or institutional change, along the lines of a ‘classical’ insurgency, towards 
violent rent-seeking. This aspect is, of course, the prevalence of ransom kidnappings 
throughout the period. As noted in Ch. 4, insurgents were the most important 
perpetrators of kidnappings in the region and only a minority of the victims were 
captured for political reasons. Indeed, during the second half of the period, political 
kidnappings dropped to practically zero. Most kidnappings had an economic 
motivation and targeted low- and middle-income civilians, rather than large 
landowners, cattle ranchers or ‘oligarchs’. Many victims were captured at random in 
flash checkpoints, means-tested (so to speak), and retained if their families or 
employers seemed to have the resources to pay for their release. In other words, the 
choice of victims lacked any sort of revolutionary or ‘class-struggle’ narrative.  
 
At any rate, the results point towards a fatal flaw in the insurgents’ strategy. While 
they established other predictable, quasi-bureaucratic forms of fund raising such as 
the fees on coca crops and coca paste in the areas they controlled, they unwisely 
persisted in kidnapping civilians for ransom in the same areas. To put it in Olson’s 
terms (1993), they continued acting as roving bandits when the most sensible 
behaviour towards the populations was that of stationary bandits. In doing so, they 
alienated key local actors and groups, including local politicians, merchants and 
cattle ranchers who, not surprisingly, saw in the paramilitaries not only an inevitable 
option but also a preferable alternative in terms of providing a friendly environment 
for businesses and a less volatile relation with local politicians. 
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7.2.4  Summing up—violence and the strategies of irregular warfare 
 
Based on the findings made in this and previous chapters, this part reconstructs the 
main elements of the strategies followed by armed organisations and the state in the 
Middle Magdalena Valley and suggests that their rationales for violence and, more 
generally, their behaviour in relation to civilians is consistent with a ‘classical’ 
irregular war, rather than with a pseudo-war, as defined in Ch. 1. Table 7.6 outlines 
these strategies, aimed to achieve territorial and political control through three broad 
sets of means: armed conflict (i.e. hostilities), violence against civilians and politics 
(i.e. negotiation, compromise, mobilisation). 
 
The struggle for territorial control manifested itself in military actions aimed to 
capture and hold geographic positions: insurgents exploited the government forces’ 
inability to fully control the territory, developed strongholds and controlled rural 
isolated areas and even, temporarily, some towns. Counterinsurgent forces suffered 
significant losses and initially seemed unable to respond to the insurgents’ challenge 
but eventually managed to push them back, assisted by the growing numbers of 
paramilitary troops that moved into the region and, probably, strengthened by the 
investments in military equipment made by the Pastrana administration and partly 
funded by the US under the ‘Plan Colombia’. 
 
Armed organisations also tried to increase territorial through political negotiation, as 
the ELN desperately did—and nearly achieved—in 2000 and 2001, when the 
Pastrana administration agreed to ‘demilitarise’ south Bolivar as a first step towards 
a peace process. Crucially, the demilitarisation involved the withdrawal of 
government and paramilitary forces but not guerrillas, who were close to obtain 
temporary territorial control over several municipios, had it not been for the fierce 
local opposition of social organisations and paramilitary groups.  
 
The struggle for territorial control also led to attacks and abuses against civilians and 
their scale and forms reflected the way the factions relied on civilians to operate and 
succeed. On the one hand, guerrillas, punished suspected collaborators and also 
coerced civilians from all backgrounds to exact financial resources. On the other 
hand, paramilitaries resorted extensively to collective and individual killings in 
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insurgent-controlled areas in what appeared to be an attempt to weaken the 
insurgents’ social base. While government forces were only marginally involved in 
direct attacks against the population, they certainly made no attempt to stop 
paramilitary attacks on civilians. 
 
 
Table 7.6. Ends, means and actions in irregular warfare 
Means Ends Territorial control Political control 
Armed conflict 
Attacks against military targets. 
Landmines. 
-- 
Violence against 
civilians 
Killing or displacement of 
collaborators and ‘functional’ 
groups and populations.  
Predatory and parasitic rent 
extraction (e.g., protection rackets, 
kidnappings). 
Kidnappings and killings of 
politicians, journalists and social 
leaders.  
 
Politics 
‘Demilitarised’ zones obtained 
through negotiation. 
Propaganda, indoctrination. 
Alliances with politicians, social 
organisations and local elites. 
 
 
Armed organisations also wanted political control over grassroots organisations and 
local governments across the region as they enabled them to access local resources, 
mobilise the population, legitimise themselves as representatives of their purported 
constituencies and act as such in the national political arena. To this end, they killed 
and kidnapped local officials, politicians, grassroots leaders and journalists. 
However, they also developed alliances with politicians and social organisations, 
which were particularly visible in the local elections of 1997 and in the massive 
demonstrations of 1996, 1998 and 2001. 
 
 
7.2.5 Methodological implications 
 
Recent contributions to the study of contemporary armed conflicts underscore the 
self-interested behaviour of combatants and civilians and suggest that war, violence 
and collaboration are increasingly driven by personal ambitions rather than political 
goals. In this context, combatants, warlords and politicians seem less interested in 
victory than in satisfying their lust for power and money, usually at the expense of 
the population; meanwhile, fearful but rational civilians try to exploit the 
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opportunities that conflict throws up, engaging in individualistic alliances with 
armed organisations and even prompting the use of violence against their fellows.  
 
Understanding individual behaviour is surely crucial in developing theories of 
conflict and violence built on solid micro-foundations and, in particular, in 
explaining issues such as the recruitment of combatants and the incentives involved 
in shaping their behaviour on the battlefield as well as in relation to civilians. 
However, as Tilly (2007: 4) argued, ‘collective violence is not simply individual 
aggression writ large’ and surely cannot be reduced to the study of the private, 
individual motives of the people involved in its production. For instance, the tragic 
scale of the Holocaust cannot be explained by looking at the personality, emotions or 
motives of individual Germans and, indeed, researchers have shown how the whole 
machinery behind it was cleverly designed to make it possible without relying on 
individual feelings of scorn, hatred or revenge (Bauman, 1989; Browning 1992). 
 
As for civilians, methodological individualism has posed interesting questions about 
their individual motives in the context of armed conflict. Kalyvas (2006), in 
particular, showed how their individualistic, opportunistic behaviour could be 
pervasive enough to privatise political violence. However, methodological 
individualism cannot lead us to neglect collective and political action through 
grassroots organisations and political parties. This is particularly relevant in 
understanding irregular wars where local institutions and organisations continue 
operating amid armed conflict and indeed, are seen as instruments to control the 
population and, hence, become themselves an object of dispute between the parties. 
 
Likewise, it is necessary to go beyond the purely individual sphere and incorporate 
concepts and variables that capture the social and economic divide that characterises 
communities and societies into the analysis of armed conflicts. As shown in this 
dissertation, this is a promising path to unveil the connection between armed and 
social conflicts, the mechanisms through which they feedback each other and the 
stakes that different social groups may eventually have in the production of violence. 
Thus, while the distinction between civilians and combatants (or civilians and 
‘thugs’) remains both morally indispensable and analytically relevant, further 
distinctions between significant social attributes (e.g. strata, occupations, classes) are 
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necessary to examine the content—the ‘what are they about’—of armed conflicts. 
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